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Abstract
This thesis discusses the history of Jerusalem from 1912 to 1920, with a 
particular focus on the period of the First World War and the British military 
administration of the city up to July 1920. It examines the dynamics of the 
transition from Ottoman to British rule and compares the two administrative 
structures, as well as changes which affected the foreign population of the city 
and its religious communities. This thesis is organised in six chapters and evolves 
around three main themes. The first theme discussed in Chapter One addresses 
the complex issue of periodisation. The re-interpretation of the transitional period 
from Ottoman to British rule is discussed through the historiographical approach 
known as microhistory, in order to highlight the methodological underpinnings of 
this study. The second theme considers these two periods from the perspective of 
continuity and change. As far as change is concerned, this thesis underlines the 
changes which affected the political sphere; namely, the political identities of 
local communities that followed the end of the war in 1917 and the establishment 
of the British Military administration in Jerusalem. The third theme investigated 
is the' relationship between the city and its foreign population, focussing on the 
foreign impact upon the political and social milieu of Jerusalem.
Chapter Two discusses the late Ottoman administration of Jerusalem,
providing a thorough analysis of the demographic structure in the transitional
period. Chapter Three examines in detail the phases of the transition from the
Ottomans to the British as a consequence of the military operations in Palestine.
Chapter Four looks at the presence and functioning of the Christian religious
institutions and their reactions to the British occupation. Chapter Five assesses
the foreign presence in the city, with particular focus to some unexplored
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diplomatic sources. Chapter Six examines the functioning of the British Military 
administration, with particular focus on the role of the military governor Ronald 
Storrs.
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Note on Transliteration
For the purposes of this thesis Ottoman-Turkish words have been written 
following the modern Turkish vocabulary. For example I have used maclis 
(council) and mutasarraflik (governor). Also for personal names I have used this 
forma which respects the context of the person and his background. For example 
I have used Cemal Pa§a and not Djemal Pasha.
For Arabic words and names I followed the spelling of the Encyclopaedia
t
of Islam, thus I ha ve used Muhammad ‘All. The sing (‘) marks the ‘ayn as in the 
case of a ’yan (notables).
The footnotes and bibliography entries are arranged according to The 
Chicago Manual o f  Style, 15th edition (2003).
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1 Introduction: Jerusalem and the First W orld W ar
“No document can tell us more than the author of the document thought, what he thought 
had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what 
he wanted others to think he thought, or even what himself thought he thought. None of 
this means anything until the historian has got to work on it and deciphered it.”1
L I  Overview o f  the dissertation
On the night between 8 and 9 December 1917, the German-Ottoman 
troops abandoned their positions in the city of Jerusalem. No battle took place, 
and on 9 December the British were ready to occupy the Holy City. Two days 
later the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, General Edmund 
Allenby, made a dramatic entrance into the city, ending four centuries of 
Ottoman rule. Generally the British were welcomed as liberators, or rather 
rescuers, as the population had suffered famine and epidemics throughout the 
war. This was a turning point in the history of Jerusalem and of the region as a 
whole. The occupation of Jerusalem marked the end of the late Ottoman 
Palestine and ushered in the years of the British Mandate. The aim of this 
dissertation is to bridge these two periods by exploring the period of the First 
World War.
This dissertation will focus on the transition from Ottoman to British rule 
in order to underline the processes of change taking place in the mixed socio­
political structures of Jerusalem. As far as continuity and change are concerned, 
these two terms are considered flexibly and this dissertation will not necessary 
argue clearly in favour of one or the other. Rather, as it will become clear in the 
following chapters, continuity and change are not clear cut categories of analysis
1 E.H. Carr, What Is History? , (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 16.
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with regard to transformations which affected administrative institutions, 
religious organisations and the foreign presence in the city. Yet this thesis will 
underline a number of ruptures that followed the end of the war and the 
establishment of British Military rule in December 1917, with particular attention 
on the renegotiation of local political values between the old and new elites and 
national identities of the indigenous communities.
This thesis is organised around three major themes and divided into six 
chapters. In the first instance, this thesis addresses the issue of periodisation, 
which is both looked at as a theme and as methodological approach, and in doing 
so, it opens the transitional era from Ottoman to British rule to more research and 
debate. By focussing attention on this historical period and on its limited 
historiography produced on it, this dissertation proposes to re-interpret this 
transitional period by making use of the approach of microhistory. The 
methodological assumption of this approach is to investigate a small temporal 
unit to highlight particular aspects of the history of Jerusalem.
The second theme deriving from the methodological approach employed, 
considers the late Ottoman and early British periods from the perspective of 
continuity and change in relation to several spheres of urban life: political, 
religious and social, particularly after the British occupation of the city in 
December 1917. In. order to understand the importance of this transitional period 
a number of areas will be discussed. The late Ottoman and British military 
administrations will be investigated in order to highlight the administrative 
transition and the rationales behind both administrations. This thesis argues that 
the process of administrative modernisation did not start with the arrival of the
13
British in 1917 as claimed by some scholars.2 In fact, the British built on a 
modem administrative apparatus that had started to take shape in the 1830s 
following Egyptian rule and the Tanzimat reforms implemented by the Ottoman 
Empire. This work will also study the impact of the transitional period on the 
demographic structure of the city as a way to understand whether demography 
was a crucial factor in determine the political weight of the various communities. 
This weight evidently changed in favour of the Jews through the activities of the 
Zionist Commission after the beginning of the British military occupation of the 
city in late 1917. Following this line of enquiry this dissertation also discusses 
political changes among the local political milieu represented by Arab elites and 
the renegotiation of local alliances between the various religious groups as 
determined by the Zionist presence under the military administration. In this 
connection the case study of the Nebi Musa riots of 1920 is investigated as the 
expression of an emergent conflict among newly formed Arab and Jewish 
political communities.
The third theme is that of foreigners, who are investigated with reference 
to consuls, religious authorities, pilgrims, institutions and private citizens 
travelling to and residing in Jerusalem. This thesis argues that these actors were 
an integral component of the local milieu, with multiple influences upon the 
political, social, religious and economic life of the city. Through the discussion 
of several examples of foreign residents before and after the war (with a 
particular focus on British citizens and on those individuals that for various
2 M. Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996); N. Libertun de 
Duren, “Jerusalem at the Beginning o f the Twentieth Century,” City Vision, MIT (2004).
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reasons remained in the city during the war), this thesis will bring in the agency 
of foreign actors.
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is divided into six chapters. The general 
purpose of Chapter One is to establish a framework to the study of Jerusalem by 
discussing sources, methodological approach and the historical context of the 
First World War in the Middle East. In the first part of this chapter I discuss the 
question of sources in relation to the themes of the research. In the second part I 
analyse and explain the meaning of the term periodisation in order to provide a 
methodological framework to the case study dealt with in this dissertation. At a 
first glance, the discussion about periodisation appears to be a philosophical one 
and the discussion of sources a practical one. Nonetheless, if on one hand the 
debate about periodisation could appear to be meta-historical, on the other hand it 
is strictly related to the substantial construction of history. So if discussing 
sources could appear as an explicit definition of history, then it also opens a more 
incorporeal debate about the interpretation and use of sources themselves. The 
last part of the chapter will outline the general historical framework of this 
research in order to understand the political and strategic position of Jerusalem 
during the First World War.
Chapter Two discusses the administrative structure of the late Ottoman 
period focussing on Ottoman governance in order to set the framework for the 
comparison with the British Military administration and the assessment of the 
transitional era. The study of the Ottoman administration serves also the purpose 
to highlight the process of administrative modernisation that took place from the 
mid nineteenth century. It is argued here that this process did not halt because of
15
the war but in fact continued under the new British rulers. Furthermore this 
chapter also provides also a thorough analysis of the demographic composition of 
Jerusalem from the late nineteenth century until the first British census of 1922. 
Data is investigated, discussed and interpreted in order to underline the 
continuities and changes brought by the war and the British occupation.
Chapter Three examines in detail the phases of the transition from 
Ottoman to the British rule in light of the changed policy making towards the 
Eastern Front and the military operations in Palestine on the part of the British. In 
the first section the chapter discusses how the process of mobilisation enforced 
by the Ottomans worked and affected the human, material and ideological 
infrastructures of Jerusalem. The second part focuses on the British military 
operations and on the plans of British policy makers in London to transform the 
occupation of Jerusalem into war propaganda. The last part of the chapter deals 
with the different reactions of local, British and international actors such as 
members of the Allied and of the Central Powers as well as o f neutral countries 
to the British conquest of Palestine and occupation of Jerusalem.
Chapter Four and Five are interrelated as they discuss foreign presence 
and activities in the city with a particular focus on Christian institutions and 
consular missions. Chapter Four looks at the presence and functioning of the 
Christian religious institutions in the transitional period. The crucial issues of 
Capitulations and the Status Quo are contextualised and discussed, underlining 
changes that took place after the British occupation of Jerusalem. A part of the 
chapter is devoted to the discussion of the renegotiation of the alliance between 
Arab Christian and Muslim elites and residents following the issue of the Balfour
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Declaration in 1917, and the arrival of the Zionist Commission in 1918, whose 
main purpose was to promote Jewish immigration.
Chapter Five discusses and assesses the foreign presence in the city, with 
reference to the activities of various groups such as scholars, pilgrims, tourists, 
explorers and private entrepreneurs; the main focus of the chapter, however, is on 
consular missions. Particularly under scrutiny are the consular missions of Italy, 
the United States and Spain. As these missions remained opened during the war 
for longer periods than their British and the French counterparts, their records 
represent a new historical source for the study of the period under discussion.
The last chapter of this dissertation examines the structure and functioning 
of the British Military administration of Jerusalem with a particular focus on the 
figure of the military governor Ronald Storrs. This discussion of British military 
rule aims to show the continuity and changes in the administrative structure that 
took place as a consequence of the war and the following British occupation. 
This chapter also discusses the role of the military in relation to local elites and to 
the Zionist Commission, a new actor in local and international politics. Through 
the discussion of the Nebi Musa riots of April 1920, which led to the dismissal of 
the military administration of the city, it is argued that one of the major changes 
that took place after the British occupation in 1917 was the renegotiation of local 
alliances, as discussed in Chapter Four, which eventually led to the emergence of 
a structured conflict between Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews 
(Zionists).
17
1.2 A note on sources and themes
The question of primary sources, their availability, their interpretation and 
their use, is a crucial one in any historical research. As explained in the previous 
section, in broad terms this dissertation deals with the history of Jerusalem 
between 1912 and 1920. Primary sources are used to answer questions related to 
the late Ottoman administration of the city; to the British conquest of the city in 
1917 and the establishment of the military rule; to the presence, foreign 
connections and the activities of the Christian churches in Jerusalem; to the 
communities of non-Ottoman subjects living in the city throughout the war 
period; and last but not least to the symbolic value of Jerusalem and its 
exploitation as a propaganda tool on the part of the British particularly in the 
period of the First World War.
Relevant primary materials regarding the history of the city are available in 
numerous archives. The selection of the archives has been made according to the 
relevance of the actors involved with a particular attention to the sources which 
have not been used before. The selection and nature of the sources used will be 
openly discussed both in this chapter and throughout this study.
1.2.1 Ottoman, Israeli and Zionist sources
The first relevant group of sources to be under scrutiny are those related to 
the Ottoman administration of the city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These are useful in order to assess the changes which occurred after 
the establishment of British rule in 1917 particularly with reference to the impact 
on the urban population. The Jerusalem district at the end of the Ottoman rule
18
was a Mutasarnflik, an administrative unit that was quite unique as the
'y
M utasarnf (district governor) answered directly to Istanbul. Furthermore in the 
1860s Jerusalem acquired a municipality which was in charge of the management 
of urban services such as the cleanliness of streets and the management of the 
markets.4 In 1914, the Ottoman government, following the outbreak of the war in 
Europe called for a general mobilisation of all Ottoman subjects for the war 
effort, although the Empire was still neutral. As martial law was proclaimed 
throughout the Ottoman domains, Jerusalem was placed under military rule and 
continued to be administered by a military governor until 1917.
The documentation on the provincial and urban administration of late
Ottoman period is to be found in the Israel State Archives5 of Jerusalem and as
£
part of private collections which are mostly located in Israel. Moreover another 
great deal of primary materials, mostly unexplored, is available in the Ottoman 
Archives (Osmanh Ar§ivi Daire Ba§kanhgi) in Istanbul. The documents from the 
Israel State Archives have been used mainly by Israeli or Jewish scholars such as 
Ruth Kark, Moshe Ma’oz and Haim Gerber, in order to write the institutional 
history of the city.7
Kark and Gerber’s work are mainly based on the protocols and records of 
the administrative council (Meclis-i Idare) of the Jerusalem District for the years
3 H. Gerber, “The Ottoman Administration o f Sanjaq of Jerusalem 1890-1908” Asian and African Studies 
12, no. 1, (March 1978): 32-76.
4 R. Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality at the End o f the Ottoman Rule” Asian and Africa Studies 14, 
(1980): 117-141.
5 The relevant sources from the Israel State Archives are: Record Group (RG) 39, Ottoman 
Administration. Census and Population Registers; RG 67, Collection o f Documents from the German 
Consulates in Palestine; RG 123.1, Collection of Documents from the British Consulate in Jerusalem; RG 
151, Austrian Consulate in Palestine.
6 Collection o f documents and published material may be found in the Jewish National Library; a special 
collection on Palestine is held at the Library of St. George’s College in Jerusalem; another important 
source for published materials of the nineteenth century and private papers is the Khalidiyah Library 
belonging to the notable Khalidi family of Jerusalem.
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1910-1915 which are held in the Israel State Archives, and the minutes of the 
administrative council for the years 1906-1908 which were discovered in the late 
1970s. These documents are not strictly relevant to the period under review but 
they provide good information on the period just before the war, particularly on 
aspects of the local administration. Other documents are available from the Israel 
State Archives, particularly records of births, deaths, marriages and censuses of
g
the population (niifus) for the years 1884-1914.
The Israel State Archives also hold materials from the British Consulate 
before it was closed in 1914.9 There are records listing British subjects and 
persons enjoying British protection. Whilst British material available in the Israel 
State Archives has proved to be interesting but not crucial, these archives do 
however hold a very special collection of documents from the German consulates 
in Palestine.10 There are personal files of the consuls and of consulate workers, 
divorce and declaration of legal inability, lawsuits and claims, legacies, wills, 
guardianship, personal status like birth registers, marriage registers, and death 
registers, military service, correspondence and notices dealing with the adoption 
of Jewish first names and cancellation of name-changes, registration of German 
subjects, provision of passports, and revocation of German citizenship. Most of 
these records proved not to be useful; however there is a great deal of material 
dealing with the war and with the political situation in the Europe and in 
Palestine. A German Jerusalem never existed, but German material sheds light on 
some aspect of the Ottoman military administration of the city as German
7 Gerber, “The Ottoman Administration”; R. Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality.”
8 A list o f documents from archives and collections in Israel has been compiled by Moshe Ma’oz, 
Palestine During the Ottoman Period, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University o f Jerusalem, 1970).
9 ISA, Record Group 123.1.
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officers reported on the Ottoman institutions, but also this material shed light on 
the value attached to the city by the German government.
With regards to the archives in Istanbul the material available relates to 
the local administrative institutions including documentation on the Mutasarnflik 
of Jerusalem and the municipality. The amount of material available for the 
period concerning the war period is considerable, although less substantive than 
materials on the preceding period as the war disrupted communications between 
central government and local authorities. For the period 1912 to 1917 the 
available documentation includes police reports, administrative reports, requests 
for services, correspondence between the local authorities with the foreign 
residents as well as reports from the different administrative bodies about budget 
discussion and other daily matters.11 Sources on the period after the outbreak of 
the war are of a different nature as they concern mainly the maintenance of 
public security and include police and prison reports.
The last paragraph of this section is dedicated to the Zionist Archives. 
These archives are a collection of material covering the growth of the Zionist 
movement worldwide, the development of the Jewish immigration in Palestine 
and various aspects of the history of the Jewish people in the last two centuries. 
These materials have been used to understand the establishment and development 
of the external support during the war to the Jewish communities in Palestine and 
Jerusalem through aid and remittances.
10 ISA, Record Group 67.
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1.2.2 Jerusalem in Christian sources
As Jerusalem was an important religious centre, sources from its religious 
institutions are crucial in the understanding of the impact of the war on these 
institutions and their activities in the city during the war time. Christians were 
not the majority of the population; but they had connections with all the major 
European powers. European countries, whether Anglican United Kingdom, 
Protestant Germany, Catholic France, Italy and Spain, Orthodox Russia and also 
multifaith United States of America, fought each other on a national basis in 
order to protect Christian institutions. The only theocratic state, the Vatican, was 
indeed interested in Jerusalem however war conditions altered Vatican policies. 
The Vatican authorities proclaimed strict neutrality towards all belligerents, 
vigorously condemning the war and defending the Catholics and all the other 
religious institutions in the city. Given practical limitations research in the 
archives of the Christian Churches has been limited to the Anglican Archives in 
London, the Vatican Archives in the Vatican City and the archives of the 
Custody of the Holy Land in Jerusalem.
Despite the fact that the majority of the Christians in Jerusalem belong to 
the Greek Orthodox Church, I will discuss the materials from the Catholic 
institutions first, given the political weight of the Catholic Church. In Jerusalem 
the Catholics were represented by the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, re­
established in 1848 after its closure in 1291 when the Mamluks defeated the 
crusaders and by the Custodia di Terra Santa (Custody of the Holy Land), 
managed by Franciscan friars since 1342. Unfortunately the archives of the Latin
11 See for instance the following series in the Ottoman Archives: DH.EUM.MEM; DH.EUM.MH; 
DH.MB.HPS; MV; DH.KMS; DH.EUM.ECB; DH.EUM3, §B; DH.EUM4, §B; DH.UMUM.
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Patriarchate are not available for consultation but the archives of the Custody of 
the Holy Land prove to be crucial for the history of the Catholic institutions 
during the war. A diary kept on daily basis by the deputy Custos (the Franciscan 
friar in charge of the whole institution), Fr. Eutimio Castellani from 1914 to 
1918, sheds light on some aspects of internal life of the Custody and the social 
life in Jerusalem during the war. These archives also contain information 
regarding the conditions of the clergy during the war. Moreover they shed light 
on the organisation of the clergy and in their relationships with the Turkish and 
German officials.12
The Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Vatican Archives) contains considerable 
material on the political importance of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Vatican 
international politics.13 If Catholic institutions in Jerusalem were generally 
concerned with the local situation, the Vatican was mainly interested in the future 
of Palestine and of the Holy Places, particularly after the British occupation of 
the city. Of interest are some materials which shed light on the relationship 
between the Zionist movement and the Pope during the First World War. From 
the reports of the meeting held in Rome between the Pope Benedict XV and 
Nahum Sokolow (a Zionist leader sent by the Zionist Organisation through 
Europe looking for support to the Zionist cause) in May 1917. The Pope, 
according to this report expressed sympathy for the Zionist cause and approved 
the establishment of a large number of Jews in Palestine provided that Jerusalem 
came under international administration; nevertheless the Vatican later in 1919
12 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, Jerusalem.
13 See for instance: ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl.; Segr. Stato, Guerra (1914-1918)', Rubricelle.
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refuted this statement and actually stated that the Pope never approved the aims 
of the Zionist movement.14
The Anglican Church, whose bishopric in Jerusalem was established in 
1841 in cooperation with the Lutheran church of Germany, worked like a semi­
political establishment with close relations to the British government. In 1899 the 
agreement was abolished and the Anglican Church alone maintained the 
Bishopric. The jurisdiction of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem extended to the 
congregations in Egypt, the Red Sea regions, Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, the 
Island of Cyprus and Palestine where he resided. The Anglican Church, as a 
newcomer, was not involved in international struggles for the control of the Holy 
Places, but instead was active in a process of missionary expansion mainly 
through educational and charitable activities. The Lambeth Palace Library in 
London which holds Archives of the Anglican Church has been particular useful 
not only for the documentation related to the history of the Anglican Bishopric in 
Jerusalem but also on its activities.15 Anglicans opened several schools for the 
local population from the end of the nineteenth century, that proved to be of good 
quality and attended by both foreigner and local residents. The Anglicans played 
some role in the internal matters of the Orthodox Church before the war but it 
was after the conquest of Palestine that the Anglican Church became highly 
involved in the conflict between the Greek establishment and the Arab laity of 
the Orthodox Church.16 Since the Anglicans took under their protection the local
14 ASV, Segr. Stato, Guerra (1914-1918), State Secretary to General Director o f the Cult, Vatican City 8 
March 1919.
15 See for instance: Papers of the Lambeth Conference; Papers o f Archbishop Davidson; Jerusalem and 
the East Mission Reports.
16 LP, Lambeth Conference 65, p. 87, Bishop Blyth to Lambeth Conference, 6/7 July 1908 “Upon our 
action with the Churches of the East may depend very materially the future o f Christianity amongst the 
sons of Abraham, the Jews and the Arab Moslems,”
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Arabs, it is not a surprise that among the Anglicans there was a strong opposition 
towards Zionism. During the war the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, resided in 
Cairo and no other English subject lived in the city, therefore there is not overall 
considerable information available on the city from this institution of the war 
period. On the other hand the documents hold at Lambeth Palace proved to be 
extremely important in the reconstruction of the history of city in the late 
Ottoman period, as well in the reconstruction of the city since the British took 
over in 1917.
1,2,3 Jerusalem in diaries and memoirs
This work will also rely on personal diaries and memoirs. Personal diaries, 
memoirs and papers are often regarded with suspicion and scepticism as they are 
“subjective” documents as historical sources. There are a great numbers of 
diaries which were written in and about Jerusalem. In methodological terms this 
source is precarious as it is difficult to handle, nonetheless diaries and memoirs 
can shed light on several aspects of an historical investigation, on the other hand, 
without a proper contextualisation and knowledge of the authors these sources 
can also become useless. A good example is represented by British soldiers 
during the Palestine campaign as they recorded their arrival in the “Holy City.” 
Besides their impressionist readings of what surrounded them, they seem to have 
been influenced by the place occupied by the city in Christian devotion. Without 
previous contextualisation these works can be perceived to be of no particular 
value. Among the large amount of memoirs and diaries published, three have 
proven to be interesting; one was kept until the early days of the war and two
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1 7recorded the events in the city during the war until its conclusion. In the 
development of this work I have therefore taken these three sources, 
contextualised them and investigated with details of the personal lives of the 
authors.
The personal memoirs of Estelle Blyth, When We lived in Jerusalem 
published in 1927, the daughter of the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem George 
Blyth, sheds light not only on the life of the Anglican Church as an international 
entity but above all on the daily life of British citizens. 18 Estelle Blyth as the 
other British subjects living in Jerusalem left the city when the war broke out in 
1914. However her memoirs contain useful information on the late Ottoman 
period. The second diary is entitled Our Jerusalem written by Bertha Vester 
Spafford, daughter of Horatio Spafford who in 1881 founded the American 
Colony in Jerusalem. This diary illustrates the activities of the American Colony 
which provided services to the population during the war. Bertha Spafford who 
was married to a German subject, Frederick Vester, lived throughout the war in 
Jerusalem.19 Despite her American citizenship, the Ottoman administration 
allowed the Vesters and the other members of the Colony to live in the city 
where they provided services such as distribution of food and medical care to the 
residents in need.
The third diary under review is quite complex and more politically loaded 
than the previous two. The diary of the Spanish consul in Jerusalem from 1914 to 
1919, Conde de Ballobar; this is somewhat of a unique and unexplored
17 Besides the diaries discussed in this Chapter, other diaries and memoirs will be discussed in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7.
18 E. Blyth, When We Lived in Jerusalem, (London: John Murray, 1927).
19 B, Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, (New York: Arno Press, 1977).
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document.20 The Spanish consulate was the only official establishment which 
remained opened during the war, as Spain remained neutral in the conflict. The 
Spanish consulate took care firstly of the interests of the members of the Entente 
(France, Britain, Italy and USA). Quite paradoxically, when the German and 
Austrian troops and diplomats left the city, Ballobar also took care of their 
interests becoming a sort of “universal consul”. As such the Spanish consulate 
became the centre of great activity. Antonio de la Cierva Lewita Conde de 
Ballobar was a young diplomat, who was appointed consul of Jerusalem in 1914. 
This diary besides reflecting his personal experience and opinions provides a 
political perspective in view of the conflict as experienced by a member of a 
“neutral” power. He handled the affairs of different Christian groups, and above 
all he functioned as an intermediary between the Catholic groups in the city, 
mainly the Latin Patriarchate and the Custody of Terra Santa. He also mediated 
between members of the belligerent parts during the conflict residing in 
Jerusalem, and this diary also offers some insights on the international 
situation.21 Unfortunately, after a visit in the archives of the Ministerio de 
Axuntos Exteriores (the Spanish Foreign Office), I have to conclude that we 
cannot rely on any consistent documentation from these archives. Few materials 
have remained in order to support the information provided by the diary with the 
view from the Spanish government.
Among the private papers, are those of Ronald Storrs, governor of 
Jerusalem from 1917 to 1926, stand out. These papers are held at the Pembroke 
College in Cambridge and cover different periods of the life of the British official
20 Conde De Ballobar, Diario de Jerusalem 1914-1919, (Madrid: Nerea, 1996).
21 See for instance Ibid, 65.
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from 1904 to 1950. Most of the material is personal correspondence. The papers
o n
are integrated with the published The Memoirs o f Sir Ronald Storrs.
Another relevant collection of letters and papers is that of Chaim 
Weizmann, one of the most important Zionists in the interwar period and 
president of the British Zionists. These letters and papers are held in the Zionist 
Archives in Israel and they were published in 1977.23 These documents shed light 
on Weizmann’s thought in relation to Jerusalem. He acknowledged the symbolic 
value of the city and that any Zionist project over Eeretz Israel should include 
Jerusalem as capital.
1.2.4 Foreign Consulates in Jerusalem
Foreign consulates started to be established in the middle of the 19th 
century. Because of its religious status the city on one hand lived the life of an 
Ottoman provincial town however on the other hand any issue involving 
religious institutions, mainly Christians, projected Jerusalem in a larger context. 
In this connection it is important to understand the impact of the war for the 
internationalisation of the Jerusalem question; that is the control of the Holy 
Places. There were about a dozen consulates in the city before the war, and, as 
explained in the previous section only the Spanish remained opened throughout 
the whole period of the war. I have chosen to study only some of them, according 
to criteria of relevance and availability of materials: American, German, and 
Italian consulates. British archival sources will be discussed separately as in fact 
after 1917 the main bulk of sources available are from the British archives.
22 R. Storrs, The Memoirs o f  Sir Ronald Storrs, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937).
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The first material under review is from the American Consulate. This 
institution as well as other consulates remained opened for some time after the 
beginning of the war, and American sources have been so far neglected, 
primarily because before the end of the Firs World War the United States were 
not considered to be a major player in the conflict. American documents seem to 
provide good information about work and labour conditions in Palestine as in 
fact several reports were available for American firms willing to invest in 
Palestine. These documents shed light on important aspects of the economic and 
social life of the city. Besides primary sources also the book by Ruth Kark 
American Consuls in the Holy Land, 1832-1914 is a good source discussing the 
relationship between America and Palestine.24 The American Consulate in 
Jerusalem opened in 1857 and closed in April 1917 following the rupture of 
diplomatic relations between the American and Ottoman governments following 
the American declaration of war against Germany. The consulate reopened in
9 SMay 1919. The consular correspondence, available at NARA (National 
Archives & Records Administration) is composed of more than a hundred 
bounds. The records of the correspondence with the Department of State are also 
quite extensive.26 The records dealing with the war period are related to the 
protection of Allied interests and to the distribution of funds sent to Jerusalem’s 
Jewish residents by Jewish-Zionist philanthropic organisations. They also include 
letters from enterprises looking for business opportunities in Palestine.27 To an
23 M. Weis gal, W, ed., The Letters and Papers o f  Chaim Weizmann, (Jerusalem: Transaction Books, 
1977).
24 R. Kark , American Consuls in the Holy Land 1832-1914, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994),
25 H.D. Mayer, “Records o f the United States Consulate and Consulate General at Jerusalem, Palestine, 
1857-1935” (unpublished 1976).
26 See for instance Consular Post Vol. 69 to 91; Record Group 59 Department o f State.
27 See Chapter 4 for examples.
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extent the distribution of relief and business correspondence seems to have been 
the main concern of the American consul while from the correspondence with the 
Department of State it transpires that the American Government did not have a 
clear policy vis-a-vis Palestine and Jerusalem in the war period.
Other relatively overlooked material comes from the Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri (the Italian Foreign Office). Although these archives have been 
extensively used by Sergio Minerbi in his study of the economic and political 
relations between Italy and Palestine from 1914 to 1920, they have never been 
used for the study of Jerusalem. Other Italian scholars studied the political 
relations between Italy and Palestine in the war and intra-wars periods; however 
these works focused mainly on the politics of the Italian government towards 
Palestine.28 Italy joined the war on 24 May 1915 when the Italian Government 
declared war against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Yet only in August 1915 
Italy entered hostilities against the Ottomans. In Jerusalem, when Italy joined the 
war, everything was ready for the departure of the Italian consular mission.29 Yet 
the archival material from the consulate has never been ordered therefore only a 
partial section is available.30 The material available is mainly composed of 
correspondence from the Italian Consulate in Jerusalem with the Italian Embassy 
in Istanbul and with the Italian Government, moreover a large portion of the 
material deals with Italian policy vis-a-vis Palestine, Jerusalem and the Holy
28 See for instance: A. Gabellini, L ’Italia e VAssetto della Palestine 19/6-1924, (Florence: SeSaMo, 
2000); A. Giovannelli, La Santa Sede e la Palestine, (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 2000).
29 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 73, Morgenthau to Glazebrook, 9 June 1915: “As in the event o f a rupture 
in the relations between Italy and Turkey, the United States of America will be entrusted with Italian and 
Russian interests, it will be well for you to arrange all preliminaries with your Italian Colleague in order 
that the transfer may be effected as expeditiously as possible.”
30 See for instance: Serie Politica P, Busta 498; Archivio di Gabinetto Pacco 163; Archivio di Gabinetto, 
Pacco 185; Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 186; Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Busta 122, Italian Embassy in 
Istanbul, Busta 239.
30
Places. It appears that, like the United States, the Italian government did not 
posses any clear-cut policy towards Palestine. From the sources it transpires that 
the Italian government was desperately looking to gain some access to Palestine 
in order to establish their influence over the religious institutions.
1.2.5 The British and Jerusalem
British official sources deserve a special place in this discussion. The 
British consulate in Jerusalem was opened in 1838. Records from this consulate 
are one of the main sources for investigating the history of the city before the war 
and in the immediate aftermath of the British occupation in 1917. The British 
consulate was one of the most important consulates in the city and in this respect 
it rivalled the German consulate. Great Britain had extensive interest in the 
Eastern Mediterranean region in the late 19th century and though Jerusalem did 
not possess any military or economic value for the British, the city was the seat
o  -j
of the most important shrines of Christianity. British consular officials in 
Ottoman Jerusalem dealt with a great number of issues; the involvement with the 
city administration and public life was, sometimes, very substantial.j2
The consulate was closed at the beginning of the war by the late consul 
William Hough, who burnt the consular archives under special instructions from
*5*5
the British Embassy in Istanbul. As a result the material from the British 
consulate is incomplete but it has nonetheless proven to be crucial in studying the 
late Ottoman history of the city. From the British conquest of Jerusalem the
31 Most of the documents of the British consulate have been published in collections such as: M. Eliav, 
Britain in the Holy Land, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1997); A. Hyamson, The British Consulate in 
Jerusalem, vol. 2, (London: E. Goldstone, 1941).
32 British consular activity will be discussed with great detail in Chapter 4.
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documents on Jerusalem, conserved at the Public Record Office in London, 
became the main, and in some cases the only, sources available to study the 
British military administration of the city.34
British sources dealing with the period from 1917 to 1920 have been 
explored with a different purpose. Only a small fraction of the material available 
deals with urban administration, most of the material related to Jerusalem is of 
political and propagandists nature. The inevitable dual nature of Jerusalem as 
city and propaganda element of great value has been confirmed by the British 
sources. Any research on Jerusalem after 1917 cannot be carried out without an 
extensive knowledge of the British documents hold at the Public Record Office.
L3 Methodology and literature review
History and time are generally considered to be in a strong relationship. If  we 
believe that time is composed of the past, the present and the future, and their 
relation as a continuum we can see history mainly as the expression of the past. 
However it would be reductive not to consider history also as the explication of 
the present and to an extent of the future. Although we cannot predict the future, 
we, to some degree, can make some generalisations. Time and history walk 
alongside and they interact every single moment of the continuum. Marc Bloch 
argues that the objects of history are men and societies in which men live, but he 
also adds that history is the science of men in time.36 In this connection time is
33TNA: PRO, FO 369/776 W. Hough to Sir E. Grey, Cairo 21 November 1914.
34 See for instance: CAB 21/58; CAB 27/1; CAB 27/7; FO 369/628; FO 141; FO 368/872; FO 368/875; 
FO 369/776; FO 371; FO 373/7; FO 383/95; FO 395/51; FO 608; FO 882/14; WO 106/718; WO 106/722; 
WO 158/986.
35 See Chapter 3 for examples.
36 M. Bloch, The Historian’s Crafty (Manchester: Manchester: University Press, 2002), 23.
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something that to an extent, can be shaped by historians that want to tell us about 
the past.
1.3.1 A methodological approach to the study o f Jerusalem: the questions o f  
periodisation and microhistoiy
Defining the concept of periodization is to follow a debate among 
scholars, philosophers and historians; a debate which has engaged Europeans and 
more generally Western scholars. I shall outline the terms of this debate in order 
to provide a critique to a certain idea of historicism, which looks at the different 
periods in history as a monolithic construction.37 I shall also discuss some 
arguments of postmodernism, and principally a particular hyper relativism rooted
I Q
in the idea of postmodernism itself History, necessarily, needs to be 
periodized, but the rationale needs to be explained. One of the main risks of this 
historical operation is to fall into an imperialistic vision of history which is 
evident in some studies of the extra European world in the age of empire. This 
vision tends to focus on western behaviour instead of contextualising historical 
change within trajectories of indigenous development. In the particular case 
under discussion of Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period, that is the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I shall consider the history of the city in 
the context of western and indigenous influence.
37 Historicism dates back to the 19th century mainly in the German academic tradition. Historicism claims 
that history is a process to link past and present; history is seen as an organic succession of developments. 
See J. Black and D.M. MacRaild, eds., Studying Histoiy, (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 38-42; M. Bentley, 
Modern Historiography, (London: Routledge, 1999), 36-42.
38 One of the main postulates of postmodernism is the idea of separation between the subject and the 
object; historians can separate themselves from the object o f their research. Postmodernism is closely 
linked to the study o f the text or of a discourse which should be study according to a plural reading and 
interpretation; it is argued that facts are meaningless on their own. See Black and MacRaild, eds., 
Studying History, 161-162; Bentley, Modern Historiography, 140.
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This general methodological framework will be applied to the object of 
my research, in order to show the importance of the concept of periodization and 
how changing subdivisions in history are crucial to the study of Jerusalem. I will 
review some historical studies on the city and discuss how a change in 
periodization can provide new perspectives. Moreover I will provide a brief 
summary of some of the debates about periodization. One of the most important 
examples of the significance of periodization is represented by the case of the 
17th century German scholar named Cellarius who defined the Middle Ages as 
the historical time which separated the great civilizations as Greece and Rome 
from the new civilised Europe of the Renaissance.39 This subdivision of historical 
time led to the idea that the Middle Ages were a backward period; therefore 
much of the earlier literature dealing with the period defines it as a Dark Age. 
Even today the very adjective medieval is by some considered synonymous with 
bigotry and equated to the “uncivilised” world. In 19th century the Romantics 
mainly of German background revived the Middle Ages providing a different 
perspective on the assessment of this particular era. Historians today tend to 
consider this idea of the Middle Ages as a concept which takes as a reference 
European history alone, therefore this kind of periodization has often been 
considered artificial and western centric.
Establishing categories and subdividing time and therefore history has 
always been one of the main concerns for historians. Choosing to divide history 
implies that the historian will apply values and judgements to his research. 
According to post-modem ideas it may be argued that applying values to
39 The story of Cellarius is briefly quoted in G. Barraclough, Histoiy in a Changing World, (Oxford: 
1956), 54-55.
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structures is like applying meta-narrative to history. I do not think this is the case. 
The problem of attributing values to a subdivision of history can be overridden 
knowing the historian and the context he or she works and writes. Textual 
analysis is therefore important in order to understand the context in which history 
has been written and to understand the historian himself but it does not explain 
the periodization chosen per se, Division in history is not a fact but more likely, 
as E.H. Carr argues, a necessary hypothesis whose validity depends on 
interpretation.40 Fernand Braudel, quite interestingly, points out that past and 
present illuminate each other, therefore the different time spans an historian 
chooses are nonetheless part of the whole historical time.41 This means that 
beyond the simple task of dividing history on paper, what really matters is giving 
some meanings to the subdivision.
Historians like Marc Bloch and Eric Hobsbawm do not make clear 
statements about the issue of periodization; nevertheless their own ideas are 
related to the point under discussion. Bloch, talking about history, men and time 
argues that, there is too much stress on the search for the origins in the historical
49 •field. As time is a continuum, the boundaries between different periods could 
be only set by hypothesis rather than fixed as used by historicist tradition. 
Searching for origins has obviously a political meaning as it created discourses of 
legitimacy and power. This is indeed a point stressed by postmodernists, who 
quote the narrative used in this context in order to explain the imperialist, 
orientalist or other “ist” discourses. Eric Hobsbawm suggests that every society
40 Carr, What Is History?, 60.
41 Quoted in J. Tosh, ed., Historians on Histoiy, (London: Longman, 2000), 247-253.
42 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 24-29.
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or civilisation tends to create a genealogy and chronology of their own history. J 
These two structures, genealogy and chronology, are crucial to the issue of 
legitimacy. There are many examples of this kind of operations, such as in the 
history of Turkey written after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 whose 
purpose was to legitimise Mustafa KemaPs revolution which brought the new 
regime to power. Historians in this particular case have rewritten history 
stressing the Turkish, rather than the Ottoman, past trying to inculcate a sense of 
national unity based on the common cultural past of the Turkish-speaking 
people.44
In this debate it is also quite interesting to consider the master of empirical 
history, Leopold von Ranke. He states that “every epoch is immediate to God”45, 
suggesting that because God is the master of time it is not possible to subdivide 
it. Because of his empiricism and the idea that history could be studied only in 
the context of the past, Ranke also introduced the study of the text. According to 
him, any type of historical source, including literature as well as official 
documents, could help to explain the context in which historical events took 
place. The main problem with Ranke’s approach is that it relies mostly on the 
Divine Providence and it is clearly outmoded. Carr rightly remarks: “Ranke 
piously believed that divine providence would take care of the meaning of 
history, if  he took care of the facts.” In the debate about periodization I believe 
that there are no substantial differences between the position of Ranke and the 
postmodernist one: they differ in the attribution of values and therefore meanings
43 E, Hobsbawm, On Histoiy, (London: Abacus, 2002), 28-31.
44 A. Evin, “Communitarian Structures and Social Change,” in Modern Turkey, ed. A, Evin, 11 (Opladen: 
Leske Verlag, 1984).
45 Quoted in R. Evans, In Defence o f  Histoiy, (London: Granta Books, 2000), 17.
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to the periodization itself, whether they subdivide history or not. For Ranke 
subdivision was not possible because time is a creation of God. To 
postmodernists subdividing history is a derivative process from the discourse 
applied to history itself. Therefore periodization is a narrative discourse too, 
which means that subdivision of history is only a meta-process located outside 
history.
As a school of thought Marxism has also something to say about 
periodization. Marxism takes as a starting point the beginning of capitalism 
following the economic development of the 19th and 20* centuries, but it is weak 
about the periodization of history of earlier ages. Nevertheless Marxism is also to 
an extent, the father of a new historical approach: microhistory. Microhistory 
developed in the 1970s among Italian scholars such as Carlo Ginzburg and 
Giovanni Levi.47 It was with Carlo Ginzburg whose famous work The Cheese 
and the Worms: the Cosmos o f  a Sixteenth Century Miller, revealed large 
patterns of cultural production through the thorough study of individual 
experiences. Ginzburg recognized the fundamental influence on his works of 
the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawn who relied on the concept of 
“subaltern class” in the choice and hypothesis of study.49 Historical research is 
not considered an aesthetic and rhetorical activity; microhistory discusses the 
plurality of possible interpretations available in a historical inquiry.50
46 Carr, What Is Histoiy?, 19.
47 See C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: the Cosmos o f  a Sixteenth Century Miller, (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1980); J. Revel and G. Levi, eds., Political Uses o f the Past, (London: 
Frank Cass).
48 N. Stieber, “Microhistory o f the Modem City,” The Journal o f  the Society o f  Architectural Historians 
58, no. 3, (September 1999): 383.
49 H. Espada Lima, “Historical Microanalysis and Social Histoiy,” Conference Paper, Edge Hill College 
of Higher Education, (26-28 June 2002): p. 3.
50 G. Levi, “On Microhistory,” in New Perspective on Historical Writing, ed. P. Burke, 98-99 
(Cambridge*. Polity Press, 2001).
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Microhistory studies the past on a very small scale. Historians, who 
belong to this school, focus on the social history of small villages or towns and 
generally view the roots of major events as grounded in the actions of their 
inhabitants, or of other agents who are in a relationship with the object of the 
study. There are however examples of microhistory that not necessarily focus on 
social history. In fact this approach has become useful in the study and 
investigation of topics such as the history of tobacco and cuisine or military 
history.51 Indeed themes of social history are investigated in these works as will 
also be so to an extent in this thesis, nevertheless this literature shows how 
microhistory is evolving towards the inclusion of more subjects and themes to 
investigate. Microhistory should not be confused with the common practice of 
amateur historians who look at the history of their village or church. These 
studies generally lack method besides being more open to bias.
Giovanni Levi argues that microhistory is a sort of an experiment. It is 
based on the reduction of the scale of observation and an intensive study of the 
material available.52 Therefore periodization in microhistory is one of the most 
important criteria to consider. Jacques Revel summarizes quite precisely the main 
purpose of microhistory, that is, to enrich social analyses by introducing new 
variables. Indeed this approach shows some limitations because commonly we 
look for general rules governing social structures, therefore the results of 
microhistorical research could be misleading. Yet Levi argues that one of the
51 See I. Gateley, Tobacco: the Story o f How Tobacco Seduced the World (New York: Grove Press,
2002); P.P. Bober, Art, Culture and Cuisine: Ancient and Medieval Gastronomy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999); C.R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Collins, 1998).
52 Levi, “On Microhistory,” 99.
53 J. Revel, “Microanalyses and the Construction o f the Social,” in Histories: French Construction o f  the 
Past, eds. J. Revel and L. Hunt, 492-502 (New York: The New Press, 1996).
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purposes of microhistory through the reduction of the scale of observation is to 
reveal factors previously unobserved.54 Looking at a local scale however does not 
mean constructing only a local history. In fact as Revel suggests microhistory 
works towards a multiple contextualization of the actors, this is partly what I did 
with some of the most relevant actors discussed in this work.55 This is the 
connection between microhistory and history as we normally define it. In this 
work I propose to revisit the concept of microhistory. The question is, what 
microhistory is actually in relation to the study of Jerusalem. Through the 
investigation of specific institutions and key figures I aim to reduce the scale of 
observation, to gather data and information which will be then translated into a 
narrative aiming to show the functioning of certain dynamics in the city of 
Jerusalem in the period under discussion and to illustrate general concepts from 
specific points in the real life. In the tradition of the micro historical approach I 
will also try to make my point of views and also the limitations of documentary 
evidence part of the narrative, in order to avoid hiding these features from the 
reader.56 This is the context in which I would present this research in order to 
explain the importance of periodization and eventually suggest a fresh micro 
study of the case under review.
1.3.2 Jerusalem in academic and divulgative literature
In this section I shall review three types of literature. Considering the 
large amount of literature available on the history of Jerusalem of both academic 
and non academic nature, the following discussion will consider works on the
54 Levi, “On Microhistory,” 101.
55 Revel, “Microanalyses
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city from the perspective of periodization with particular reference to the late 
Ottoman and War Period. Furthermore it will highlight the attention received by 
the First World War and the transition from the Ottoman to British rule. The first 
kind of literature deals with Jerusalem following a specific periodization and 
theme mainly on the late Ottoman period. The second type approaches the 
history of the city in the long duree; this particular literature that may be defined 
as divulgative is often aimed at non-academic audiences. The third kind of 
literature under review discusses specific aspects of the history of the city with a 
well defined periodisation that is the closest to the idea of microhistory. This 
literary genre is similar to the first one; however, as I will show below, these 
historians did not use historical research for pure rhetorical and aesthetic activity, 
besides they selected a specific point of real life from which to exemplify general 
concepts.57
As defined earlier in the Chapter the micro-historical approach is a 
combination of focus on a specific unit of study (in this case Jerusalem), and a 
clearly defined periodization which allows us to address coherently a number of 
thematic priorities through appropriate primary sources. In the literature available 
there is not a full micro historical study of the city of Jerusalem though it may be 
argued that works focussing specifically on demography or economics, as will be 
presented below, can be already a micro study in the sense of the intensive study 
of data available. Nevertheless microhistory is interested with the quantitative 
study of history only if  the data analysed can be contextualised and eventually 
the macro (the data collected and processed) can relate with the micro (the
56 Levi, “On M icroh istory110.
57 For these criteria defining microhistory see Ibid, 98-100.
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narrative that aims to contextualise the data collected).58 One of the main 
assumptions of microhistory is the reduction of the scale of observation which 
implies a clear periodization, in other words the scale of observation is not only 
related to the object under scrutiny. The setting of a clear periodization is 
necessary in order to research a clear and small temporal unit. In some cases the 
periodization chosen by the author were misleading, as some works claimed to 
discuss a particular period but eventually discussed it with limitations as the 
examples below will show.59 Despite the importance of the dramatic transition 
between the Ottoman and the British administration, there are no comprehensive 
studies on the period of the First World War to date.60
The first study under review is the book by Haim Gerber Ottoman Rule in 
Jerusalem 1890-1914 published in 1985.61 This work is a thorough analysis of 
the late Ottoman period in Jerusalem, focussing on the demographic, economic 
and administrative structure of the city. Despite the comprehensive discussion of 
the topics suggested, this work cannot be defined as a micro historical account, in 
fact Gerber is interested in the structure of the institutions under scrutiny but not 
in the enquiry of the individuals who belonged to those institutions. In the 
discussion of the demographic aspects he fails to bring the micro into the macro, 
in other words Gerber provides a thorough discussion of the demography of the 
Jerusalem region at the end of the Ottoman rule but he does not link the
58 See M. Peltonen, “Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Link in Historical Research,” Histoiy and 
Theoiy 40, no. 3 (October 2001): 359.
59 In some cases the periodization had been chosen according to great events but then not all the period 
under discussion had been developed.
60 The only recent work is the PhD thesis o f Abigail Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem in the 
Transition Between Ottoman and British Rule 1912-1920” (PhD thesis, The University o f Chicago, 
Chicago, 2006). Recently it has also been published a book by Amy Dockser Marcus, Jerusalem 1913 
(New York: Viking Penguin, 2007), however this work cannot be considered as a fully academic work as 
the writer, a journalist, does not provide a discussion o f sources and does not explain her methodological 
approach.
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demographic aspects discussed to the real people living in the area. Gerber’s 
main purpose is to show the modernizing effects of state intervention. He 
concludes that: “Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period underwent an impressive 
process of modernization”. Gerber tends to equate modernisation with 
westernisation and takes the western model of state-led urban development as the 
frame of reference for his discussion by investigating the long term impact of the 
Tanzimat reforms upon the administration, the judicial system and the provision 
of services to the population.63
Crucially Gerber does not deal directly with the Tanzimat but with the 
Hamidian era. He discusses the deeds of the Tanzimat reforms in the Hamidian 
era following the broad framework of the “modemisationist” approach. A second 
problem with Gerber’s work from the perspective of microhistory is about 
sources. Gerber relies mainly on material from the archive of the Ottoman 
administration of the province of Jerusalem but he does not use materials from 
the central Ottoman archives in Istanbul complemented by British consular 
sources and secondary materials.64 Nevertheless this work is indeed a thorough 
investigation of the sources available in Jerusalem, nonetheless it represents only 
half of the picture that could have been drawn with the examination of the 
material available in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul.
Belonging to the same category of literature dealing with the late Ottoman 
era and the transition to the British is the edited book by Kamil J. Asali entitled, 
Jerusalem in History. This work is a collection of articles dealing with specific
61 H. Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem 1890-1914, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985).
62 Ibid, 250.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, 1.
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periods.65 In the chapter written by Alexander Scholch, Jerusalem in the 19th 
Century (1831-1917 AD), there is a good account of the economic and social 
structures of the city until the beginning of the war, and interesting tables 
showing demographic changes.66 However, the periodization suggested in the 
title is misleading; in fact there is little mention of the history of the city during 
the war period.67 The chapter written by Michael C. Hudson, The Transformation 
o f Jerusalem (1917-1987 AD), is also less informative in relation to the war 
period.68 Hudson provides an overview of the transformation of the city in the 
twentieth century, but he focuses mainly on the Arab-Jewish conflict suggesting 
that also in this case the title is misleading. As in the case of Scholch the war 
period has been almost entirely discarded. Asali’s aim to show the transformation 
of the city since its very foundation is quite interesting; however the articles 
under review do not seem to respect the periodization chosen particularly with 
reference to the First World War.
The second category under review is what has been defined as divulgative 
literature which is composed mainly of non academic works which are 
representative of how the history of Jerusalem can be reconstructed for public 
consumption and with more or less explicit political aims in mind. In the book 
Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century Martin Gilbert describes the history of the 
city from the beginning of the twentieth century up until 1996, the date of the 
publication of the book.69 Gilbert chooses a large periodization that does not
65 K.J. Asali, ed., Jerusalem in Histoiy (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).
66 A. Scholch, “Jerusalem in 19th Century 1831-1917 AD,” in Jerusalem in History, ed. K.J. Asali, 228- 
148 (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).
67 Of the war is reported only “the entry o f Allenby into Jerusalem (1 IDecember 1917)” Ibid, 245.
68 M.C. Hudson, “The Transformation o f Jerusalem 1917-1984 AD”, in Jerusalem in History, ed. K.J. 
Asali, 249-278 (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1989).
69 M. Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Centuiy.
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follow any particular great event, in order to show how Jerusalem was 
transformed from a small provincial town of the Ottoman Empire to the capital of 
the state of Israel. Gilbert’s work focuses mainly on the history of the Jewish and 
Christian communities, with a strong emphasis on Zionist colonisation from the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Though the focus is on a quite specific topic, 
the periodization suggested and indeed the clear rhetorical style does not allow us 
to consider this work in the category of microhistory. In fact Gilbert does not 
reduce the scale of observation and indeed fails to study intensively the material 
available. Despite the complete absence of references it is possible to trace some 
of the sources used, diaries, memoirs, which are most likely British and Zionist 
sources. It is possible to claim that Gilbert aims to use history in the construction 
of power and legitimacy of both the British in taking Palestine and of the Zionists 
in developing their projects. When discussing the British conquest of Jerusalem 
in 1917, Gilbert states: “The first Christmas under British rule marked the first 
return of a Christian power to Jerusalem since the Crusades, more than 600 years
70earlier.” It can be argued that ultimately Gilbert’s book falls into the category of 
those works defined as Orientalist. As shown earlier, Gilbert aims to justify and 
legitimise British rule and he believes Ottoman rule was not efficient.
Another work written largely for public consumption, which takes a broad 
approach in relation to periodization, is Karen Armstrong’s Jerusalem: One City,
71Three Faiths published in 1996. Armstrong’s book reconstructs the relationship 
between the different religious communities of Jerusalem since the very 
foundation of the city; nevertheless she does not follow any particular
70 Ibid, 61.
71 K. Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (London: Harper Collins, 1996).
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methodological approach. The four centuries of Ottoman rule in the city are dealt 
with only one chapter. Armstrong discusses the meaning of “Holy City” in 
relation to the Jewish, Christian and Muslim traditions; and despite the 
commendable idea to look at this topic the time span chosen is too broad and the 
result is quite generic. In the chapter entitled “Rebirth” Armstrong gives us an 
account of the history of the city in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
She does not discuss the First World War and simply states: “Jerusalem became 
the headquarters of the Turkish VIII Army Corps”.72 A few paragraphs later she 
also defines the British conquest of the city as the end of the “work of the 
Crusaders.”73 This book first suffers from the lack of a balanced periodization; 
secondly Armstrong attempts to be objective in relation to the very sensitive 
topic of the coexistence of the different religious communities in Jerusalem 
without a proper investigation of the sources available. If  on one hand this work 
has proved to be a best seller on the other hand this kind of work does not 
contribute academically to the improvement of the knowledge of the subject. 
Ultimately Armstrong, like Martin, tries to legitimise British, Christian and to an 
extent Zionist rule of Jerusalem.
Moving to the third literary genre under review, I will discuss works that 
are closer to the definition of microhistory discussed earlier in the chapter and in 
this section. A new historical approach is proposed by the book of Ruth Kark and 
Michal Oren-Nordheim, Jerusalem and its Environs. This work considers 
particular aspects of urban life and development in the period before the 
establishment of the state of Israel as suggested by its subtitle “Quarters
72 Ibid, 369.
73 Ibid, 370.
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Neighbourhoods, Villages 1800-1948”.74 This is mainly an attempt to link the 
urban development of Jerusalem to that of its rural hinterland from the beginning 
of the 19th century to the end of the mandate period. In many respects this work 
falls into the remit of both urban studies and social geography as it focuses on the 
urban environment, the spatial socio-political structure of the quarters and 
districts and their demography. In terms of periodization this work falls clearly 
under the rubric of microhistory as it offers a fairly comprehensive investigation 
of the city in the period under discussion in the appropriate context. A similar 
study in approach, is that of Michael Dumper, who in his The Politics o f  
Jerusalem Since 1967 shows how politics was turned into effective policy 
making in relation to Jerusalem after 1967. Jerusalem from 1948 was divided in 
two sections (one under Israeli control and the other one under Jordanian rule). In 
1967 following the Six-Day war, Jerusalem was eventually reunited under Israeli 
rule.75 This particular work is not in strict relation with the periodization of the 
current research, however it bears a clear micro-historical value which lies in the 
focus on urban structure, organisation, services and the relationship between 
social-geography and politics. Dumper’s work is a thorough analysis of the 
demography, housing policies, economic development, services, and religious 
communities of Jerusalem since 1967. Dumper follows carefully both the 
periodization and the thematic priorities. He contextualises the period before 
1967 by providing an overview of the late Ottoman administration of the city, the 
war period and the British mandate. In this work the macro that is the context and 
the themes suggested is clearly related with the micro represented by the
74 R, Kark and M. Oren-Nordheim, Jerusalem and Its Environs, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University 
Magnes Press, 2001),
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particular use of the narrative aimed at the demonstration of aspects of politics 
which would be distorted by simple generalisation from the sources available.
The review of Jerusalem in the academic and non academic literature reveals 
that there are many different positions around the argument of periodization and 
therefore in the methodological approach to the subject. Some scholars have used 
periodization as a tool in order to construct their narrative around a specific 
event; to others periodization represent a simple temporal place into which they 
organise their research; sometimes the chosen periodization has fully explained 
and worked, however on other occasions it represents a mere boundary in order 
to fix the parameters of research.
L4 Jerusalem: a definition
Besides the discussion of periodization, sources and the war context which 
is the subject of the following section, it is important to highlight the meaning of 
Jerusalem as a sacred space and the problem of the interpretation of this 
definition from the perspective of the urban population and the international 
actors involved. Jerusalem was considered for centuries a Holy Place, a site 
where the divine became manifest.76 A general definition is necessary in order to 
contextualise the city in the larger context of the First World War in the Middle 
East.
One of the main bonds between Judaism, Christianity and Islam is indeed 
the city of Jerusalem; all of the three religions possess different connections with 
the city, nevertheless all of them considered Jerusalem sacred. To summarise
75 M. Dumper, The Politics o f Jerusalem Since 1967, (New York, Columbia Press University, 1997).
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briefly, Jerusalem for the Muslim is a sacred place as suggested by the name al- 
Quds (the Holy) given to the city. Jerusalem was the first qibla (direction of 
prayer), and the Qur’an claims that the Prophet ascended to heaven from here. 
The Islamic sacrality of the city stemmed from the sanctity attributed to the city 
by the Christians in the centuries which preceded the birth of Islam. Christian 
definition of Jerusalem is quite complex however as in Christian theology there 
exists a differentiation between the earthly Jerusalem and the heavenly one.77 
Werblowsky quotes the example of St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in the 4th century 
advised that the real pilgrimage was to undertake from the body to God rather
no
than from a place to Palestine. This is to suggest that Jerusalem became for 
Christianity an archetype, a model in opposition to the vision of the Jewish 
community. For the Jews, Jerusalem represented the land of Israel (Jerusalem 
and Zion can be used as synonyms); Jerusalem was also the place of the temple 
that represented the direct channel of communication between the people of 
Israel and God.79
On the eve of the First World War Jerusalem was also a city of intrigues, 
discussion, fighting and compromise: Muslims and Christians were defending 
their sacred space while the Jews were trying to restore themselves in the land of 
Israel {Eretz Yisrael). Competition over the sacred space became part of the 
discourses of war and Jerusalem became a battleground not only for the opposing 
British, Ottoman and German armies but also for the redefinition of the city 
itself. In Britain the pious Prime Minister David Lloyd George defined Jerusalem
76 R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, “The Meaning o f  Jerusalem to Jews, Christian and Muslims,” in Jerusalem in 
the Mind o f the Western World, eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis, 7 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997).
77 Ibid, 11-12.
78 TUirl
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as a “Christmas present for the nation” for the Christian community, implying
on
that the heavenly Jerusalem was to be reunited with the earthly one. The war 
redefined Jerusalem also for the Muslims in so far as Ottomans rule was 
relinquished and a “Christian” power replaced it. For the Jews these political 
developments meant the redefinition of the idea of “being Jew”, since the war 
ushered in the process which led to the restoration of the land of Israel in 1947- 
48.
1,5 The First World War in the Middle East and the question o f  Jerusalem
In November 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers 
in the First World War, Jerusalem became an important player in the Middle East 
front of the war operations. This section will investigate the causes which 
brought the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers. Then 
it will discuss more specifically the military operations on the Eastern front, as 
the Middle East campaign was called and how the British army came to occupy 
Jerusalem. Prior to 1914 Britain acted as an ally of the Ottoman Empire with the 
purpose to defend the Dardanelles from Russia and to protect the imperial route 
to India.81 Following the outbreak of the war, British policies towards the 
Ottoman Empire radically changed. Before the war Ottoman Empire was 
challenged in many places. In 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the Sultan 
Abdulhamid II and re-instated the constitution which was suspended in 1876. 
The Empire was then attacked by the Italians in 1911 and lost Libya. The
79 G. Greenberg, “Heavenly and Earthly Jerusalem: Pedagogical Perspectives”, in Jerusalem in the Mind 
o f  the Western World, eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis, 252 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997).
80 D. Fromkin, A. Peace to End All Peace, (New York: Henry Holt & C., 2001), 313.
J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, (London: jFHe^Sthlone Press, 1969), 2 
following year, the outbreak of the Balkan wars additionally weakened the 
position of the Ottoman government.82 Eventually in 1913 the leadership of the 
Empire changed when a coup d'etat staged by the members of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) installed a military dictatorship.83
In the months preceding the outbreak of the war in 1914 the Ottoman 
Empire was diplomatically isolated. Most of the European governments 
considered the Porte to be on the brink of the collapse. It is not that surprising 
that Great Britain, France and Russia planned the partition of the Ottoman 
territories before the war ended envisaging the downfall of what throughout the 
19th century had become known as the “Sick man of Europe”. The British 
government believed that as a result of the war, the Ottoman Empire would be 
dismembered. In 1915 Britain agreed to the Russian occupation of Istanbul and 
the straits whilst the French government claimed Syria. 84 Hebert Samuel, the
o c
President of the Local Government Board, submitted a proposal to the Foreign 
Office in order to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. In London British 
officials wondered whether acquisition of new territories in the Middle East 
would strength or weaken the global position of their Empire.86 Other agreements 
for the partition of the Middle East followed.
The first important document related to British War aims in the Middle 
East is the De Bunsen Committee or “British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia”.87 
The De Bunsen committee was established in April 1915 with the purpose of
82 A. Bruce, The Last Crusade, (London: John Murray, 2002), 6.
83 B. Lewis, The Middle East, (London: Phoenix, 2003), 338.
84 M. Hughes, Allenhy and British Sti'ateg)> in the Middle East 1917-1919, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 1.
85 The Local Government Board was a ministerial post with responsibilities over the Local Government. 
In 1919 it had been abolished and its functions came under the responsibilities o f the ministry of health.
86 Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 13-16.
87 TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 1915.
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considering the nature of British interests in the Middle East in the event of a 
successful conclusion of the war. The origin of this committee is to be found in 
the confusion and conflicting analyses of the different governmental 
departments. The deadlock was resolved when Prime Minister Asquith, 
appointed an interdepartmental committee chaired by Maurice de Bunsen.88 The 
report, published on 30 June 1915, opened with a general statement and 
preliminary considerations, it was divided into nine sections; the ninth and last 
was related to the question of Palestine and the Christian holy places. Overall the 
committee discussed the issue of the future of the Ottoman Empire proposing 
four solutions, the division of the Empire in spheres of influence, partition, status 
quo or large decentralisation. It is clear that in any case the existence of the
O Q
Ottoman Empire was still seen as desirable. As for Palestine the committee 
included this region in the British sphere of influence, directly challenging 
French claims. Recognising the complexities in relation to this particular region, 
the committee concluded that “Palestine must be recognized as a country whose 
destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and 
neutrals are alike interested.”90 The De Bunsen Committee de facto 
recommended that the Holy Places should be internationalised, whilst also 
postponing the discussion according to the outcome of the conflict.91 Although 
Jerusalem as such was for the first time mentioned in the Sykes-Picot agreement
88 A. Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915”, Journal o f  Contemporary Histoiy, Vol. 
3, no. 3, (July 1968): 241-242.
89 TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 28-29.
90 TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 28.
91 Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 19.
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of 1916, the position of the city in the future arrangement of the Arab Middle 
East remained vague.92
Before joining the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire was left in a state 
of ambivalent neutrality towards the warring parties. On the one hand, the 
Ottoman government commissioned two war ships from the British naval docks. 
On the other hand, as Perry and Yapp argue, both Abdulhamid II and the Young 
Turks had relied on German military missions in order to retain power and
Q*5
defend the Empire from outside aggressions. This ambivalent neutrality was not 
meant to last as, in fact, the CUP was desperately looking for an ally in Europe. 
As stated by Ziircher: “they were prepared to accept any alliance rather than 
continued isolation”.94 Isolation was not an option for the CUP government as 
the Ottoman leaders were seeking an opportunity to regain full sovereignty over 
the Empire through the ending of the capitulary regime and were also looking for 
protection in order to save the Empire from partition.95 A neutral stance was 
equally unacceptable for the Entente and for the Central Powers as territories 
under Ottoman control were strategic for both the alignments.96 In the two years 
preceding the war German-Ottoman relations were cold. Both the Young Turks 
and members of the CUP disliked Germany’s support of the Hamidian regime.97 
However, things were to change. When the war began the British government
92 M.E. Yapp, The Making o f  the Modern Near East 1792-1923, (London: Longman, 1987), 277-286. The 
position o f Jerusalem in the Sykes-Picot agreement remained vague. Palestine (a part from Haifa and 
Acre which were to be placed under British administration) was to be placed under international 
administration with no indication of how this administration should work. In the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence the question o f Palestine and of Jerusalem were not discussed.
93 M.E. Yapp and V.J. Parry, eds., War, Technology> an Society in the Middle East, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 367.
94 E.J. Ziircher, Turkey. A Modern History, (London: Tauris, 1993), 116.
95 D. Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace, 47-48.
96 F. Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the end o f the Ottoman Empire, ed. 
M. Kent, 18 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).
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refused to deliver the two war ships commissioned by the Ottomans, which had 
been financed through a popular subscription. Although this caused a great deal 
of popular resentment which was echoed in official circles, Great Britain was still 
considered the natural ally of the Ottoman Empire by many politicians such as 
Cavid, the CUP Minister of Finance.98 On 28 July 1914 Enver Pa§a, Minister of 
War, met the German ambassador Wangenhaim in secret to discuss a defensive 
alliance with Germany while Cemal Pa§a, Minister of the Marine, continued to 
favour contacts with France being of very well known French sympathies.99 In 
August, ideological, economic and geopolitical factors, and the personal pressure 
of the Kaiser Wilhelm II himself brought together the Ottoman and German 
Empires with a secret agreement signed by the CUP triumvirate in power and the 
German representatives.100
When Russia entered the war alongside the Entente, the casus foeder 
arose. The CUP, however, delayed the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the 
conflict for a number of reasons. According to Ziircher and Nicolle the 
government was in no condition to fight a war. Logistics was the main problem 
as the government could not easily deploy the aimy throughout the vast domains 
of the Empire. Moreover the Ottoman involvement in the war operations was 
dependent on supplies from their German and Austrian allies.101 On 9 September 
1914 unilaterally the Ottoman Empire declared the abolition of the capitulations
97 U. Trumpener, “Germany and the End o f the Ottoman Empire,” in The Great PoM>ers and the end o f  the 
Ottoman Empire, ed, M. Kent, 123 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).
98 D. Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace, 49; Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” 13.
99 D. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 48; U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, (New 
York: Caravan Books, 1989), 15. The Ottoman Government proposed to the Germans a closer 
relationship' between the two countries on 22 July, but the German Ambassador turned down this 
proposal,
t0° Ziircher, Turkey, 116. Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” 11.
101 D. Nicolle, The Ottoman Army 1914-18, (London: Osprey, 1994), 20; Ziircher, Turkey, 117.
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regaining full sovereignty over its subjects. While the European powers involved 
in the war did not intervene, neutral countries forwarded their complaints to the 
Turkish government. The announcement of the abolition of the Capitulations had 
a terrific impact on the population and boosted the morale of all Ottoman 
subjects who had not been under the capitulary regime.102
At the end of October 1914 Turkish warships opened fire against a 
Russian naval base in the Black Sea but it was only in November that the 
Ottoman officially entered the war. The Ottoman army was mobilised in August 
and it was composed of 4 army Corps whose effectiveness had to be tested. 
Turkish officials hoped to increase military performance during the war thanks to 
the German support. Palestine came under the military district of Syria which 
included 2 army corps including 2 or 3 infantry divisions each, one cavalry 
brigade, 3 howitzer batteries, a battalion of engineers and a company of 
telegraphers.103 As soon as the 4* army was established in Damascus it was sent 
to the Palestinian front under the direct command of Cemal Pa§a.
For their part the British government since the outbreak of the war in 
1914, had focused on Egypt which had been under British control since 1882. 
Although the war cabinet advocated the direct annexation of the country, it was 
eventually declared a British protectorate in December 1914. British officials 
were concerned with a possible attack launched against the Suez Canal, which 
was vital for British interests in the region and beyond. However in the early 
stages of the war, Palestine was a secondary issue on the agenda of the British 
War Office, the main concerns were indeed Europe and as for the Eastern Front
102 Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” 17.
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the main issue were the Dardanelles and Istanbul. It is only with the Sykes-Picot 
agreement of 1916 that British policies emerged with more clarity. The following 
year Jerusalem was included in the British military as it became clear that the 
Ottoman authorities were not in a position to retain control of the city. The Prime 
Minister, David Lloyd George, declared that Jerusalem should be a Christmas 
gift to the nation.
While Britain, France and Russia were discussing the future of Middle 
East, on the Turkish front Cemal Pa§a was appointed governor and commander 
in chief of Syria and Palestine. He was assisted by the German chief of staff 
General Friederich Kress von Kressenstein who played a key role on the 
Palestinian front. According to Bruce the Gennanisation of the Turkish army led 
to tensions between the officers of both armies.104 These tensions were confirmed 
in the following years by many observers inside Jerusalem.105 A surprise 
offensive against the Suez Canal was launched from Syria in early 1915 but 
failed with heavy losses on the Turkish-German side. Turkish victories in 
Mesopotamia and at Qannakale (Gallipoli) and the hope that a further attack on 
the canal would raise an anti-British rebellion in Egypt in the name of Islam, led 
the German and Turkish commands to plan a second strike. By the beginning of 
the summer of 1916 the troops were ready, but the British soon discovered the 
advance through air reconnaissance. By mid August the British outnumbered the 
Gennan-Turkish troops de facto  ending their Palestinian campaign.106
103 M. Roubigek, Modern Ottoman Troops 1790-1915, (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1978), 20- 
2 1 .
104 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 8.
105 Conde de Ballobar, Diario. In the diary, kept from 1914 to 1919 there are several entries enlighiting us 
on the tensions betweem German and Ottoman officials.
106 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 43.
55
Palestine and Syria had remained virtually unscathed but in 1917 the 
British army led by General Archibald Murray, who was appointed commander 
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in January 1916, moved from a 
defensive strategy to an offensive one. He attempted twice to take Gaza in the 
spring of 1917 but both campaigns failed. In London the Military High 
Command and the new Prime Minister David Lloyd George viewed the inability 
to take Gaza as unacceptable. In June 1917, General Edmund Allenby assumed 
command of EEF with instructions to prepare for an offensive campaign during
i n*7the autumn and winter. He soon adopted new and more hazardous military 
strategies which allowed the British army to occupy Gaza through Beersheba. 
Jerusalem was eventually taken from Gaza before Christmas in fulfillment of the 
order of Lloyd George.108
The British army, after the defeat at Gallipoli in 1916, regained the 
initiative throughout the region as in southern Iraq that was a key passage to 
India through the Persian Gulf. From British occupation in 1914 Basra in 
southern Iraq was transformed into a modem port that served as base for British 
troops. In 1916 a new commander was appointed in the region, General Stanley 
Frederick Maude. Eventually Maude conquered Baghdad on 11 March 1917 
creating the possibility for the British advance towards Anatolia and the very 
centre of the Ottoman Empire.
While the British army was advancing, the Turkish and German 
commands established a new army group called Yildinm (storm) under the
107 J. Priestland, ed., Records o f  Jerusalem, vol. 1, (Oxford: Archive Editions, 2002), 89.
108 Quoted in D.L. Bullock, Allenby’s War, (London: Blandford Press, 1988), 66.
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command of General Erich von Falkenhayn.109 The purpose was to launch a 
strike against the British forces in Southern Iraq with guerrilla tactics. Although 
this new corps was meant to be offensive, it turned out to be a defensive force. In 
view of the British advance towards Palestine, Von Falkenhayn in 1917 
suggested that the Yildirim was to be sent to Palestine in order to defend the 
Gaza-Beersheba line rather than defending an indefensible Baghdad. It was 
however too late.110 By 7 November 1917 the Turco-German troops were 
retreating from the Palestinian front, and the path for the British advance towards 
Jerusalem was opened.
109 A debate on the Yildirim army group is to be found in E.J. Erickson, Ordered to Die, (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2001).
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2 Administration and Population from Egyptian rule to the W ar
“...and ere his term 
Of warfare, hence permitted he is come,
From Egypt to Jerusalem, to see.”
(Dante, Paradiso, XXV, 55)
This chapter studies the administrative structure of Jerusalem in the late 
18th, 19th and early twentieth centuries focussing on Ottoman governance, with 
particular reference to the role of local notables, this in order to understand how 
the process of modernisation that was taking place in the empire influenced the 
city. The second part of the chapter deals with the demographic structure of the 
city in the first decades of the twentieth century in order to assess the impact of 
the war 011 the demographic composition of Jerusalem and its dynamics and to 
discuss the demographic changes in light of the new political framework 
established after the British occupation of the city in December 1917.
The Ottoman history of Jerusalem began with the occupation of the city 
by the Sultan Selim I who, in 1517 defeated the Mamluks who had ruled 
Palestine from Egypt since 1260. It was not until the rule of his son, Kanuni 
Suleyman (the Law-giver, known as the Suleyman the Magnificent, 1494-1566), 
that Jerusalem regained its importance after centuries of oblivion. He rebuilt the 
walls that still stand in the city today, improved the water system and established 
the foundations of the millet system which regulated relations between the 
different religious communities.1 The beylerbeylik (region) of Damascus, which 
included Palestine, was assimilated into the administrative structure of the 
Empire soon after the conquest of Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria); however the
1 The structure and purposes of the Millet System will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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Ottomans established a form of indirect rule relying on local notables whose 
importance continued until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.“ The 
beylerbeylik of Damascus was composed of fifteen sancaks. a smaller 
administrative unit. The Sancak-i Kudiis-i ?erif (Province of Jerusalem) was 
divided into a number of nahiyes (sub-districts) whose boundaries changed 
during the Ottoman times.4 The two most important were Hebron and Jerusalem.
each centring upon the two towns.5
Illustration 1: View o f  Jerusa lem 6
2.1 In preparation for change: the historical context o f  the 19th century’
The Ottomans considered Jerusalem to be of great religious significance 
as the city was regarded as the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina.
2 A. Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994), 
4.
3 Ibid, 7.
4 KudUs was the name o f Jerusalem in Ottoman Turkish, meaning the Sacred City. In Arabic the name of 
the city is al-Quds.
5 Singer. Palestinian Peasants, 7; A. Cohen. Palestine in the 18th Century, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press. 
1973), 169.
6 NARA, View o f Jerusalem, ffee Copyright.
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However, both strategically and economically it was not of paramount 
importance to the Ottomans as Jerusalem was not at the centre of any important 
trading routes and did not possess any military or strategic value.7 The return of 
Palestine in general and of Jerusalem in particular on the stage of international 
politics was triggered to an extent by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 
which revived the question of the Holy Land and of the Holy Places. The 
invasion of 1798 was carefully prepared by Bonaparte himself; he gathered 
troops, engineers, scientists, artists, economists, pharmacists, physicians, writers, 
interpreters and publishers. This was not meant to be a simple conquest of Egypt, 
but the transfer of the French civilization to Egypt,8 The question of the legacy of 
the Napoleonic invasion, although studied intensively, has been only recently 
considered from the perspective of its legacy in a longer period. The influence of 
the Napoleonic invasion on Palestine should not be overestimated as in fact the 
French adventure was short and eventually ended in failure. However as Beshara 
Doumani argues, the local response to French invasion revealed the awakening 
of cultural and military mobilisation.9 Idinopulos also underlines how the French 
had little influence on the modernisation of Palestine, however he stresses how 
the exploration of Palestine began the very year Napoleon returned to Europe in 
1799 following the opening of easier travel routes in the region.10
The legacy of Napoleon was picked up by Muhammad ‘Ali who 
eventually became the viceroy of Egypt in 1805.11 Muhammad ‘Ali, who was of 
Albanian origins, came to Egypt with the Ottoman forces sent to fight against the
7 Y. Ben-Arieh, Jerusalem in the 19,h Century. The Old City, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 104.
8 S. Noja, Storia deiPopoli dell'Islam. L'Islam Moderno, vol. 5, (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1990), 5.
9 B. Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, (London: University o f California Press, 1995), 16.
10 T.A. Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 28.
11 Noja, Storia dei Popoli dellTslam, 11-13.
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French army in 1799. Eventually he seized power in Cairo in 1805 after the 
withdrawal of the French army in 1801 and became virtually independent from
| rj
Ottoman control. In 1831, Muhammad ‘Ali and his son Ibrahim invaded the 
region known as Bilad al-Sham which included present day Palestine and Syria 
and which became part of Egypt, an event which was a turning point in the 
history of modern Jerusalem. When the Egyptian army entered Jerusalem the 
population was surprised and to an extent fearful of what appeared to be a new
1 o
European army. Muhammad ‘Ali had in the previous decades carried out 
expensive reforms of the army and had introduced a new style of discipline and 
military techniques, new weapons and uniforms; Muhammad ‘Ali also planned to 
produce armaments directly in Egypt in order to avoid relying on European 
countries.14
In the 19th century Jerusalem experienced two periods of administrative, 
political, social, economical and military reforms. The first being under the rule 
of Ibrahim ‘Ali the second from 1839 till 1876, the so called Tanzimat era, which 
will be discussed later in the chapter. Following the administrative reforms 
imposed by the new rulers the status of Jerusalem began to rise. Ibrahim ‘Ali 
abolished the Ottoman administrative division of Syria and Palestine which 
constituted two separate provinces. Instead he appointed a general governor over 
the entire region of Greater Syria who resided in Damascus. This process of 
administrative centralisation was nevertheless balanced with the establishment of
12 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 41; A. Hourani, A Histoiy o f  the Arab Peoples, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1991), 273.
13 M. Abir, “Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine 1800-1834,” in Studies on Palestine 
During the Ottoman Period, ed. M. Ma’oz, 303 (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1975).
14 J. Dunn, “Egypt’s Nineteenth Century Armaments Industry,” The Journal o f Military Histoiy 61, no. 2, 
(April 1997): 232.
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city councils, maclis, which included representatives of the elite families.15 On a 
local level the Egyptians relied on a civil governor who was a local notable. 
Donna Robinson Divine notes how far the Egyptians adapted according to the 
local circumstances their idea of centralisation of the state.16 Furthermore the 
Egyptians did not prove able to eradicate corruption and they had limited success
I n
in curbing the power of the local notables. Nevertheless a number of changes 
positively improved the status of the non-Muslim population, as Ibrahim hoped 
that favouring Christians would earn some European support for the occupation
1 Rof Palestine against the Ottomans. As a consequence of the ameliorated status of 
the Christian communities, the number of European visitors to the Holy Land and 
Jerusalem increased.19 The Egyptians, also, in order to extend trade with 
European countries promoted a strong religious tolerance and new rights were
9f)granted to the dhimmis. Under Egyptian rule the first European consuls were 
allowed to station in Jerusalem as a symbol of a new approach towards 
Europeans and non-Muslims.21 Particularly relevant for the city of Jerusalem was 
the removal of the centuries old prohibition to build and repair churches and 
synagogues and the abolishment of other restrictions on non-Muslims.
Besides administrative reforms the Egyptians brought some economic 
developments which were welcomed by local notables and entrepreneurs.23
15 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 108. The councils will be discussed in detail in several sections o f this 
chapter.
16 D.R. Divine, Politics and Society in Ottoman Palestine, (Boulder: Lynner Rennier, 1994), 67-69.
17 Ibid, 6 8 .
18 Ibid, 65.
19 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 109.
20 Divine, Politics and Society, 6 6 ; S, Shamir, “Egyptian Rule (1832-1840) and the Beginning o f the 
Modem Period in the History of Palestine,” in Egypt and Palestine: a Millenium o f Association, eds. G. 
Baer and A. Cohen, 221 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
21 Divine, Politics and Society, 6 6 .
22 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 45-46; Divine, Politics and Society, 65.
23 Shamir, “Egyptian Rule,” 228.
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Ibrahim 4Ali who ruled both Syria and Palestine promoted the introduction of 
new crops and of new industries: cotton and soap proved to be the most 
successful.24 Furthermore the Egyptian authorities supported the idea of free 
trade, leaving access therefore to foreign merchants.25 Nevertheless the increased 
import of European goods threatened local handicrafts therefore Egyptians 
encountered some opposition from local notables and inhabitants as they 
perceived these reforms as hostile and against their interest.26 Besides Ibrahim 
‘Ali in order to face the increased military expenses introduced a progressive 
income tax, which eventually heavily hit the Palestinian elite families.27
The new administration was also meant to deal with corruption and public 
security as bribes, bandits and other similar problems were rife in the period 
preceding the occupation. The relative efficiency of the new system and the 
introduction of income tax as mentioned earlier led to the outbreak of a revolt in 
1834 directed by the Muslim notables of Jerusalem which had the strong support 
of the peasants. The Husaynis, one of the most important families of Jerusalem, 
played a crucial role in the uprising. At the same time they were planning the 
revolt, the Husaynis showed their support for the Egyptian rulers; furthermore 
they were trying to avoid loosing the good relationships with the Ottomans who 
eventually returned in 1840: a masterpiece of politics.29 Something similar 
happened when the British took Jerusalem in 1917 and the burden of the 
deliverance of the city was placed on the Mayor of Jerusalem Husayni Salim
24 Ibid, 228.
25 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, 106.
26 Divine, Politics and Society, 72-73; Shamir, “Egyptian Rule,” 228.
27 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 46.
28 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 107-110; Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 46.
2 9 1, Pappe, “The Rise and Fall o f the Husaynis, 1840-1922,” Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 10, (2000),
63
Effendi al-Husayini.30 After the conclusion of the revolt of 1834, two members 
of the family were included in the maclis and Tahir al-Husayini was named Mufti 
of Jerusalem.31
Egyptian rule in Jerusalem lasted only a decade (1831-1840), but its 
legacies reverberated throughout the administrative organisation of the city once 
it was re-occupied by the Ottomans. Under Egyptian rule the local governors fell 
under the check of a council, the meclis, composed mainly of the Muslim elite 
but also including some of the most influential Christian and Jewish members of 
the community. The Egyptians therefore introduced both elements of 
representation and of balances and checks.
Following the opening of the British Consulate in 1838, other European 
Powers followed including France, Prussia, Austria and Spain whilst the Russian 
government sent a diplomatic agent. These European Powers promoted business, 
protected travellers and supported the construction of hospitals and hospices for 
visitor and locals alike. The French opened three hospices between 1851 and 
1889. The activism of the European Powers reinvigorated pilgrimage and 
tourism. Moreover Jerusalem’s increased importance on the international stage 
coincided with the Crimean War (1854-1856) which brought the issue of the 
control of the Holy Places to the forefront of intra-European politics. Jerusalem 
became the pretext for war between France allied with the Ottomans against 
Russia. Despite the fact that the war was fought far from Jerusalem, the conflict 
impoverished Palestine, in fact food, fuel and other resources were redirected to 
the war front. Jerusalem had to rely on aid coming from European countries
30 See Chapter 3.
31 Pappe, “The Rise and Fall o f the Husaynis.”
32 R. Brunelli, Storia di Gerusalemme, (Milan: Oscar Mondadori, 1990), 258.
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particularly Great Britain. France and Germany. The Crimean War marked the 
emergence of new tensions between Muslims and Christians in the city as the 
Orthodox were accused of supporting Russia." Nevertheless the presence of a 
strong governor and the Ottoman alliance with Britain and France helped the 
situation not to escalate to open violence against the Christians. 4
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2.2 From the Tanzimat to the Young Turks through the Hamidian era: patterns o f  
governance and administration
This section opens the discussion of the patterns of governance and 
administration in different periods, from the Tanzimat to the Hamidian and 
Young Turks era with a general overview of the Tanzimat era, which proved to 
be a crucial period, in the Ottoman Empire and some references to Palestine and 
Jerusalem. The sub sections will deal with the development and evolution of the 
Ottoman administrative units in relation to Jerusalem.
The reform movement known as Tanzimat initiated in the Ottoman 
Empire in the first half of the 19th century was linked to Muhammad ‘Ali’s rise to 
power in Egypt and his conquest of the Bilad al-Sham. The Tanzimat-i Hayriye 
(Auspicious Reordering) era began on 3 November 1839 when Sultan 
Abdulmecit promulgated the Gulhane Hatti §erifi (The Edict of the Rose 
Garden). Tax-farming was abolished, Ottoman subjects were granted security of 
life and property and a new system of conscription for the army was established. 
The edict also promoted the principle of equality before the law of all persons 
and of all religions, which eventually meant the Ottoman subjects became
o r
equal. Although this was a genuine attempt to promote reforms in the Empire 
given the advanced process of decentralisation which had occurred in the 
eighteenth century, it was also part of a clear strategy adopted by the Ottomans in 
order to gain European support in their struggle against Muhammad ‘Ali, who as 
explained in the previous section had invaded Syria and Palestine threatening the 
core of the Ottoman Empire.
35 Literature on the Tanzimat is vast. See for instance these contributions: Ziircher, Turkey, 53. B. Lewis, 
The Emergence o f  Modern Turkey, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford Press University, 2002), 107; R.H. Davison, 
Nineteenth Centwy Ottoman Reforms and Diplomacy, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1999).
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On 24 June 1839 the Ottoman forces were defeated by the Egyptians at 
Nizip, in the southeast of Turkey. Only the intervention of the European powers 
stopped the advance of the Egyptian army towards the Ottoman capital. In the 
winter of 1840-41 British naval forces threatened the Egyptians, who eventually 
withdrew from the occupied territories of Syria and Palestine. In 1841 
Muhammad ‘Ali acknowledged the loss of the region and accepted the hereditary 
governorship of Egypt in exchange, although he had been independent from 
Ottoman control. Thus Egypt remained nominally part of the Ottoman Empire 
until the beginning of First World War when the British declared a formal 
protectorate over the country.
The Tanzimat reforms aimed to strengthen the Empire by implementing 
political and administrative centralisation. The deep essence of the Tanzimat was 
to change the very idea of the Ottoman state which included the restoration of old 
institutions no longer working and the establishment of new ones.36 This was 
done through general strategies such as administrative reforms, development of 
infrastructures and economical improvements. The government was reorganised 
into ministries and a Council of Ministers met in order to advise the Sultan; the 
government was presided by the Grand Vizier. In the area of education which 
was crucial for the modernisation of the Empire, schools were opened and new
QO
subjects taught by the mid 1850s. Economic reforms proved to be hard to 
enforce. Despite the good will, the Capitulary System was a foremost 
impediment to Ottoman economic reorganisation. In the mind of the Ottoman
36 J. McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, (London: Longman, 1997); S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, eds., History 
o f the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 55.
37 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 298.
38 Ibid, 299.
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reformers it was paramount the idea that a more efficient and honest government 
would create a stronger Empire composed of a highly committed population to 
the cause of the survival and development of the State itself. The Tanzimat 
reforms were eventually carried out throughout the Ottoman Empire until 1876 
when Abdulhamid ascended the throne; despite his conservativism and the 
official halt to the reforms, it has been argued that the E[amidian period was the 
continuation of the Tanzimat era; he aimed to save the Empire with different
39means.
The Vilayet law of 1864 reorganised the provinces of the Empire and 
remained the basis for the local administrations until the end of the Empire after 
World War O ne.40 The law aimed to define clear relations between the 
administrative units. Each vilayet was divided into sancaks or livas 
(interchangeable), then each sancak had several kaza, mainly villages 41 The law 
also introduced a system of councils, which will be discussed below, to 
counterbalance the power of the governors. With the reform of the provincial 
administration the ideas of the Tanzimat reached all regions of the Empire.
With the Ottoman restoration after 1841, the sancak o f Jerusalem regained 
some stability after the turbulent end of Egyptian rule. The sancak of Jerusalem 
was then composed of Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron and eventually Beersheba.42 
Following the establishment of a municipality in Istanbul in the late 1850s,
39 Divine, Politics and Society, 107; McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 297; S. Deringil, The Well-Protected 
Domains, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 11 and 175-176.
40 Shaw and Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire, 89.
41 Ibid.
42 Gerber, Ottoman Ride in Jerusalem, 93; P. Schoenberg, “Palestine in the Year 1914” (PhD Thesis, New  
York University, New York 1978), 470. According to Gerber attached to the sancak of Jerusalem there 
was the sub district o f Majdal that was eventually abolished in 1909 and replaced by the sub district o f  
Beersheba. Gerber, following British sources argues that the sub district o f Nazareth was detached from 
the province o f Nablus and attached to Jerusalem, but because o f logistic problems in 1909 it was 
abrogated.
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Jerusalem followed suit as we will see in following sub sections. Municipal 
government was a new institution across the Empire as in fact the idea of an 
urban administration on a territorial basis separate from the provincial 
administration was alien to the Ottomans and not part of the Islamic tradition. 
Eventually, in the case of Jerusalem the municipality became the most important 
local administrative body of the city.43 Ruth Kark claims that, despite some 
limitations, the Jerusalem municipality contributed largely to the development of 
the city and of the living conditions in the late nineteenth century.44
The following discussion of the administrative units of Jerusalem in the 
Tanzimat period necessitates a preliminary discussion of modernisation and 
historiographical debate. On one hand, Haim Gerber states that the Tanzimat 
reforms ignited a fast and lasting process of westernisation of Jerusalem that was 
already underway as a result of the Egyptian rule in the 1830s, but also as a result 
of the strong impact of the West in the region since the early nineteenth 
century.45 On the other hand, Nora Libertun de Duren has claimed that the real 
process of modernisation began with the arrival of the British.46 De Duren claims 
in fact that the period preceding the arrival of the British was not marked by the 
full imposition of the national state logic and state control, suggesting a different 
arrangement of people, institutions and territory, denying de facto an Ottoman 
process of state transformation 47 For the purposes of this work modernisation is 
intended firstly as a process of change, which entailed the transformation of the 
traditional Ottoman administrative machine through the adoption of new legal
43 Divine, Politics and Society, 115.
44 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 141.
45 Gerber, Ottoman Rule'in Jerusalem,, 7.
46 N. Libertun de Duren, “Jerusalem at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” 1.
47 Ibid, 1-3.
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and administrative tools. In this respect, modernisation is not viewed as a mere 
imitation of Western models but as the fruitful encounter between old and new 
form of urban administration. Though western administrative influence and 
cultural penetration in the Ottoman Empire was an undeniable development of 
the period, to equate modernisation to westernisation is perhaps too far fetched. 
At the same time it would be reductive not to consider the Tanzimat as a 
modernising process inspired by Western ideals.
2.2.1 The Sancak and the M utasarnf
After the end of the Egyptian rule in 1841 the Jerusalem sancak started to 
enjoy a particular status amongst the other Palestinian sancaks as a consequence 
of the foreign interest in the city.48 In the summer of 1872 the sancak of 
Jerusalem was detached from the Vilayet (Province) of Syria and made 
independent under the direct control of Istanbul.49 The sancak or mutasarnfhk of 
Jerusalem was ruled by a M utasarnf (governor). The M utasarnf of Jerusalem, 
after the sancak was detached from the vilayet of Syria, became quite unique 
amongst the other governors throughout the Ottoman Empire, as he was directly 
appointed and therefore responsible to the central administration in Istanbul and 
not to the Vali of Syria.50 Nevertheless the Jerusalem sancak, though highly 
independent as argued earlier, was subordinate to the Vilayet of Beirut in the 
judicial sphere, remaining so until 1910 when a court of appeal was established 
in Jerusalem. Despite the fact that troops were stationed in Jerusalem, the sancak
48 B. Abu Manneh, “The Rise of the Sanjak o f Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in The 
Palestinians and the Conflict, ed. G. Ben Dor, 24 (Haifa: Haifa University, 1982).
49 Ibid, 23.
50 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 96.
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was also dependent on the authority of the Fifth Ordu (army) quartered in
C 1
Damascus in relation to military matters.
The quality of the performance of the governors was dependent on the 
personal skills but also on the authority given to them by the central government 
in Istanbul. Mutasarnfs who served in Jerusalem in the late nineteenth century, 
according to Gerber, were not particularly experienced, or from a homogeneous 
background. None of these governors rose to a high position in the central 
administration in Istanbul.52 These governors were required, as part of their 
duties, to send the money collected from the taxpayers to Istanbul, furthermore 
they had no full control over other officials in the district.
In the late nineteenth century during the reign of Abdulhamid II, 
governors were appointed among the palace secretaries of the Sultan and later at 
the beginning of the twentieth century by the Young Turks among Turkish 
officials.54 According to Kushner there were no marked changes in the character 
and performance of the nominated governors between the Tanzimat, Hamidian 
and Young Turks periods.55 Kushner notes that during the last decades of 
Ottoman rule in Jerusalem, one or two governors could be labelled failures, like 
Faik Bey in 1876 who was accused of being heavily corrupted.56 Gerber, 
however, sees that the process of modernisation that was taking place in the 
Empire brought advancement in the quality of the governors of Jerusalem, in fact 
he notes that from the Tanzimat era it is possible to observe an embryonic 
modem pattern of public services which followed the principle of standardisation.
51 Ibid, 97.
52 Ibid, 100.
53 D. Kushner, “The Ottoman Governors of Palestine,” Middle Eastern Studies 23, (July 1987): 280.
54 Ibid, 276.
55 Ibid, 278.
56 Ibid, 277.
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What Gerber says is that governors became more loyal to the duties of their 
position than to personal loyalties.
2.2.2 The municipality (Belediye) o f  Jerusalem
The Mutassariflik was the largest and most important administrative unit 
of Ottoman Jerusalem. In order to study and understand the social fabric of the 
city and the relationships between its different religious and foreigner 
communities, it is necessary to analyse the municipality which became the most 
influential and relevant institution of the city after the late 1860s. As explained 
above the idea to establish local municipalities in the Ottoman Empire was 
revolutionary. In fact according to the Sunni Muslim tradition any legal entity 
other than the individual was unlawful. The creation of this body illustrates 
how the Tanzimat reforms were successful in the adoption of European ideas; 
eventually the legal status to the municipality was granted using state law rather 
than religious one. Indeed, the establishment of the municipality in Jerusalem is 
indicative of a trend towards modernisation in the social and administrative fields 
in so far as it provided a degree of communal representation.59 Furthermore, the 
establishment of the municipalities across the Empire addressed the issue of the 
establishment and provision of public services, an indication of the centralisation 
and the modernisation of the management of the city.60 The Jerusalem Belediye
57 Gerber, Ottoman Ride in Jerusalem, 100.
58 H. Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 113. The Encyclopaedia o f Islam defines the term Baladiyya 
(Arabic for the Turkish Belediye) as a modern institution of European style as against earlier Islamic 
forms o f urban organisation.
59 H. Gerber, “A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province o f Jerusalem,” in Palestine in the 
Late Ottoman Period, ed. D. Kushner, 39 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986); Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 
115-116.
60 Gerber, “The Case o f the Province of Jerusalem,” 42.
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(municipality) was one of the first to be established in the Ottoman Empire.61 
Gerber and Kark suggest that the municipality was possibly established in 1863 
but that it only started to work later.62 According to a letter sent by the Ottoman 
governor Nazif Pa§a to the Prussian consul in Jerusalem it seems that the 
municipality of Jerusalem began to work only after 1867. 6j Although, as 
explained above, the municipality was established around 1863, the law 
governing this institution was only passed in 1877 as part of the legislation issued 
by Istanbul which regulated the reforms of the Local Councils across the 
empire.64 The provincial administration was restructured several times before the 
issue of the Vilayet Belediye Kanunu (Provincial Municipal Ordinance) of 
October 1877 which defined the authorities, competences, the budget and the 
legal boundaries of the municipality.65
The activities of the Belediye were related to the cleanliness of the town 
and the streets, maintaining roads and water system, supervision on public health, 
cafes and restaurants, commercial activities and so forth.66The municipality also 
controlled a local police force which supervised urban communities and the 
sanitation of the city. The visit of the German Emperor in 1898 resulted in some 
improvement in the sanitary conditions of the city as for this purpose extensive 
cleaning operations were carried out inside and outside the walls. Linked to the 
sanitation of the city was street maintenance which since the 1880s began to
61 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 119.
62 Ibid, 120; Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 114.
63 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 120. Kark quotes a letter addressed by the Governor of Jerusalem 
Nazif Pa§a to the Prussian consul in Jerusalem in November 1867 about the constitution of the Municipal 
Council and its composition. The letter is conserved at the Israeli State Archives (ISA)
64 For a thorough discussion o f the administrative reforms of the late eighteenth century affecting 
Jerusalem see Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, Chapter 4.
65 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 118-119.
66 Ibid, 125; Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 123.
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improve thanks to the pavement of the main roads. In the period preceding the 
beginning of the First World War many roads were paved and widened for 
military purposes.67 The municipality improved the sanitary conditions of the city 
mainly with the support of taxation collected from foreigners.68 Later in 1911, 
when a cholera epidemic struck the city, the municipality intensified its efforts to 
clean streets and other public amenities.69 Although Jerusalem had several 
hospitals, in 1891 the municipality established a Municipal Hospital opened to all 
the inhabitants without distinction of religion or nationality. In 1915, when the 
war had already broken out, a local body was appointed for the distribution of 
provisions to the Muslim community, and informed by the municipality to save a 
portion of the provisions for the Municipal Hospital, managed directly by the 
Belediye.™ The municipality was also active in guaranteeing water supplies; 
foreign companies were called upon in order to try and improve the water supply
n t
for the city. In January 1914 the French Perier Company was awarded three 
concessions in order to develop and manage electric tramway, electric light and 
water supply services for the municipality of Jerusalem.72
The municipality was responsible for the establishment in 1886 of the first 
professional police force in Palestine. This police force was generally held in 
high esteem by local and foreign residents. Reputed as honest, it was often
67 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 131-132.
68 Ibid, 128.
69 NARA, RG 84, Vol. 57, 154, Governor o f Jerusalem Cevdet Pa§a to American Consul, 26 October 
1911.
70 NARA, RG 84, Vol. 72, File 310, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 5 August 1915.
71 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department o f State, Jerusalem, 24 January 1914.
72 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department of State, Jerusalem, 24 January 1914: 
“From a political point of view the award o f concessions of such importance to French interests is in line 
with the French policy of political domination in Syria and Palestine. [...] From a municipal point o f view, 
there is no doubt that these concessions will be o f great benefit to the city. An adequate water supply is 
one of the most urgent needs of Jerusalem, as the lack o f rain for seven months o f the year, causes a great 
deal of suffering in the city. The tramways will be no doubt open up the suburban sections and relieve the 
overcrowding and unsanitary conditions prevailing in within the walled part o f the city. [...].”
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compared favourably to the detachments of the Ottoman army camped outside 
the city particularly because municipal policemen were recruited from the urban 
population.73 Eventually some engineers, physicians and veterinarians became 
advisors of the Belediye; there was also a specific municipal office in charge of 
registering street names and house numbers as well as births and deaths.
At the head of the municipality there was the mayor under the supervision 
of the Mutasarnf. The office of Mayor, although without a salary, was 
considered very influential and therefore the most important families of 
Jerusalem regarded it as a source of power and competed in order to be appointed 
to this office. Until 1908 the municipal council was composed of only Muslim 
and Christian Arab members;74 later on in 1908 Jews also took part in the 
elections and eventually the first Jewish councillor was elected.75 Following the 
Provincial Municipality Law of 1877, members of the municipality were 
nominated through an electoral process. According to this law the number or 
elected members ranged from six to twelve, on the basis of the size of the city in 
terms of inhabitants. Only Ottoman subjects could participate in the elections. 
According to David Yellin a Zionist of the “first hour” and a teacher at the 
Alliance Israelite Universelle, male citizens and residents over twenty-five years 
of age, paying a property tax of over 5.0 Turkish piastres, were eligible to vote.77 
The municipal council in Jerusalem was composed of ten members; candidates
73 Schoenberg, “Palestine in the Year 1914,” 499. He also states that according to American sources one 
Jew and one Christian along with ten Muslims composed this police force. According to Ben-Arieh, The 
Old City, 124, the police force was composed of fourteen men, one of them Jewish.
74 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 125: “At the end of the 19th century, elections were held for Jerusalem 
Municipality [...] about 700 Muslims and 300 Christians too part in the voting.”
75 Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality,” 124: “In the municipal elections o f 1908, for example, votes were 
cast by 700 Moslems, 300 Christians and 200 Jews.”
76 Ibid, 122; a law governing the elections o f the Municipal Councils was promulgated in 1875, then 
redefined in 1877, accorded the taxpayers the right to elect council members.
77 D, Yellin, Jerusalem o f Yesterday, (Hebrew), vol. 1, (Jerusalem 1972), 192-223. Quoted also in Kark, 
“The Jerusalem Municipality,” 123; Gerber, Ottoman Ride in Jerusalem, 116.
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could be any Ottoman subject aged over thirty, paying at least 150 Turkish
*70
piastres annually. Members were elected for four years; however five of them 
were replaced every two years. Eventually the municipality was a dependent 
body on the municipal council as well as on the governor of Jerusalem, on the 
central government in Istanbul eventually the municipality of Jerusalem was also
70dependent on the attitude of the foreign consuls.
2.2.3 The Councils (Meclis) ruling Jerusalem
From the 1870s there were three councils based in Jerusalem. The Meclis-i 
Belediye (Municipal Council), that has already been discussed; the Meclis-i 
Umumi, the General Council of the Vilayet; the Meclis-i Idare, the administrative 
council of the sancak. The Vilayet Law of 1864 created a clearer hierarchy in the 
provincial offices; as a result of this law the Meclis-i Umumi and the Meclis-i
RnIdare were set up. Nevertheless the functions and the structure of these bodies 
were clearly defined with the issue of the Vilayet law of 1871 which introduced a 
number of regulations for city administration. The General Council of the Vilayet 
of Jerusalem, the Meclis-i Umumi however became fully operational only after 
the issue of the Vilayet law of 1913 which was passed by the Young Turks.81
The Meclis-i Umumi was meant to meet once a year for a period of no 
more than forty days. Originally the members of the General Council should 
have been elected on the basis of proportional representation, one representative 
for every 12,500 males, but the system was dropped after its inception in 1913
78 D. Yellin, The Jerusalem o f  Yesterday, 192-193; also in Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 116.
79 The information related to the Jerusalem municipality is mainly gathered through the two main works 
on the subject: Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality”; Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem.
80 M.J. Reimer, “Becoming Urban: Town Administration in Transjordan,” Int. J. Middle East. Stud., no. 
37, (2005): 191.
81 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 136.
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and the council was eventually composed of representatives from the various 
kazas (sub districts). The original law had stated that membership in the council 
was to be shared on a religious basis between Muslims and non-Muslims 
according to the population in the kazas since Muslims were not the majority in
n/}
every village. The Council was responsible for some important functions. The 
General Council had the power to review the draft budget for the province as 
well as to check and supervise projects.
Besides the Meclis-i Umumi the law of 1913 established a provincial 
committee (.Enciimen-i Vilayet) with the purpose of working whilst the General 
Council was not in session; its function was to check the annual budget and 
expenditure. This assembly rather than passing laws was meant to give 
approval to the governor’s actions; it has been claimed that this institution was a 
rubber stam p.84 The report of the American Consul in Jerusalem to the 
Department of State for the year 1914, suggests that this body was properly 
functioning. Unfortunately with the sources available we cannot state the real 
influence of the Governor upon the council; nevertheless the council was vital 
and clearly proactive:
82 C.V. Findley, “The Evolution of the System o f Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center,” 
in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, ed. D. Kushner, 21 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986); Gerber, Ottoman 
Ride in Jerusalem, 137. Interesting is a document from the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul that gives us 
some hints on the structure o f the General Council for the Vilayet. OA, DH.UMUM 62/34, 25 Safer 1333 
(11 January 1915), M utasarnf to Interior Ministry, Jerusalem: “Because o f new elections here, members 
of the General Assembly were convoked on 15 December 1331. Since the Mayor o f Jaffa is also a 
member of the assembly and he is under investigation by the assembly. It has been asked from the Jaffa 
administration (kaimmakanhk) whether the mayors should be excluded from assembly membership, 
counting them as government employees. Although the causes for dismemberment for general assembly 
are defined in the article 109 o f the law o f administration o f the Vilayet, the situation of the mayors who 
are later assigned as government employees is not clear and since the mayor o f Jaffa has been locally 
taken from his post, we await for instructions about other mayors who are also members o f the general 
assembly of Jerusalem.”
83 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 138.
84 Schoenberg, “Palestine in the Year' 1914,” 484.
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“I have the honor to report that in accordance with the new provisions of the 
Vilayet Law, the general Council for the Province of Palestine has just completed 
its 40 days session; besides approving the Concessions for tramways, electric 
light and water works, several important allowances from the general budget 
were made as follows: An appropriation of $1,826.00 to establish a breeding farm 
for horses and donkeys. For the establishment of an agricultural school, 
$13,200.00 and the transfer of the model farni from Arteef to Sajed and from 
Jaffa to Hebron. For the purchase of agricultural instruments $2,640.00. Small 
sums were appropriated for the repairing of the roads between Hebron and Beth 
Jibrin, Jaffa and Gaza, Jaffa and Sabil Abu Nabbott and Hebron and the Valley o f  
El Kort. The work of the Council produced general satisfaction as it gave the 
central authorities an idea of the general needs of the Province and appropriations 
were made to that effect.”85
The Meclis-i Umumi, as mentioned earlier, began to work only towards the very 
end of the Ottoman administration. The General Council for the Vilayet was 
involved in financial and budget supervision but no decision making was 
involved. Nevertheless its power was considerably strong as in fact through the 
approval or rejection of the budget the council could have strongly affected the 
implementation of the administrative decisions of the other governmental bodies.
The Meclis-i Idare, the administrative council of the Jerusalem district 
was set up as a result of the issue of the Vilayet Law of 1864. The Meclis-i Idare 
included ex-officio and elected members. Among the ex-officio members were 
the M utassanf the Kadi (the judge), and the Mufti (the religious leader), the 
representative of the Christian Churches and of the Jewish communities. There 
were four elected members, generally one or two of them were Christian and the
85 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Vice Consul to Department o f State, Jerusalem, 9 February 1914.
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others Muslims; on the whole there were seven Muslim members and five non
O/T
Muslims. The access to vote was based on the ability to pay at least 150 
Turkish piastres in taxation; possibly this means that only 5% to 10% of the 
population was involved in this process.87 According to Gerber the members of 
Meclis-i Idare were the leaders of the local communities. However the notables 
represented wealthy constituencies as the electoral franchise allowed only a 
small number of Jerusalemites rather than the whole of the population 
considering that only 1,000 individuals took part in the electoral process at the 
end of the nineteenth century out of at least 40,000 inhabitants.88 The Meclis-i 
Idare in this context became a sort of balancing institution between the 
M utasarnf and the local elite. The main purpose of the council was to deliberate 
on public works, police, land registry, agriculture, finance and tax collection. The 
Council had the authority to appoint officials in charge of the city, but only to a 
limited extent; in fact the Meclis-i Idare could appoint municipal policemen and 
gendarmes, but not other officials.89
The members of the Meclis-i Idare spent most of their time in discussions 
related to financial matters like their colleagues in the Meclis-i Umumi, however 
they had control over the financial resources collected through taxation, and they 
also had, to an extent, the power to impose taxes. Although the Municipal 
budgets were quite limited, the Meclis-i Idare could deliberate on and approve
86 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 130-131; Gerber, “The Administration of the Sanjaq of  
Jerusalem,” 59; Findley, “The Evolution o f the System o f Provincial Administration as Viewed from the 
Center,” 10-11.
87 Schoenberg, “Palestine in the Year 1914,” 485.
88 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 132.
89 Gerber, “The Administration of the Sanjaq o f Jerusalem,”55.
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those budgets. The Council also had considerable powers in matters of land 
holding, and it had the final word in issuing cadastral certificates (;tapn).90
The Establishment of the Italian hospital in Jerusalem offers us the chance 
to look at the powers and mechanisms of the Meclis-i Idare. In 1911 the Italian 
Government together with the Associazione Nazionale per Soccorrere i 
Missionari Italiani (National Association for the Assistance to Italian 
Missionaries) planned to build a hospital in Jerusalem. The first step taken by 
the Italian authorities was to change the status of the land which was the property 
of the consulate from mulk to mukataa; from private land exempt from state 
control (the land was a property of the Consulate) to a tax farm which could be 
developed.91 Although the works began, the completion of the hospital was 
delayed as a result of the Italian-Libyan war (1911-1912) and due to financial 
constrain.
In 1914 the National Association for the Assistance to Italian Missionaries 
intervened offering financial help for the hospital.92 The following year the 
members of the Meclis-i Idare visited the hospital whilst it was still under 
construction, fixing at 3,050 francs the tax on the value of the building estimated 
in 305,080 francs. The Italian Consul Senni immediately wrote to the M utasarnf 
complaining that the Hospital was not yet ready; therefore it was unlawful to tax
• no m # 4
it. After some time the Meclis-i Idare again intimated the Italians to pay, but in 
the meantime Italy joined the war against the Turks, therefore conditions
90 Ibid, 55-56.
91 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Foreign Office to Baron Mayor des Planches (Italian 
Ambassador in Istanbul), Rome, 22 April 1911.
92 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Consul (Semii) to Italian Foreign Office, Jerusalem,
25 April 1914.
93 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 6  April 
1915.
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changed, but still the Turkish authorities sought the money. In July 1915, Conte 
Senni reports that the Turkish authorities claimed the payment of 16,364 piastres 
as taxation on the land and the hospital.94 Not surprisingly the Italian Foreign 
Office ordered the Consul not to pay the tax on the hospital building, as it was 
closed and sealed, yet quite surprisingly on the other hand, the Italian authorities 
authorized the Consul to pay tax on the land.95 The Hospital remained closed 
until the end of the war.
As most of the material available for the Meclis-i Idare concerns minutes 
of a trivial nature this does not necessarily mean that the council dealt only with 
issues like the amendment of entries in the Population Register on the issue of 
“good behaviour” certificates. 96 Its members were often employed as 
intermediaries in some matters, or served on ad hoc committees like in the case 
of the Italian hospital where the tax committee visited the Italian building first 
hand in order to determine the amount of taxation to impose.97 We can best 
define this council not as executive, but in fact as Gerber states the Meclis-i 
Idare functioned mainly in a passive way, meaning that it usually reacted to 
problems submitted by other actors, such as the municipality, the Mutasarrif, or 
Consular agents or even private citizens.98
The Council, as mentioned earlier, was responsible also for the control of 
the population, mainly the immigrants. Jewish immigration was of course 
particularly under scrutiny as in fact at the turn of the century the majority of 
Jewish immigrants were from Russia, the strongest enemy of the Ottoman
94 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 9 July 1915.
95 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Italian Foreign Office to Senni, Rome, 28 July 1915.
96 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 123.
97 ASMAE, Italian Embassy in Turkey, 122, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 6  April 
1915.
98 Gerber, Ottoman Rale in Jerusalem, 127-128.
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Empire." On the eve of the First World War the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem Macid 
Bey wrote to the Ministry of the Interior that the Jewish immigrants were under 
surveillance, as well as the Jews who were Ottoman subjects in order to verify 
their loyalty to the Ottoman state. However the governor also highlighted that he 
would not tolerate whoever was to make any exaggeration about the Jews as 
malicious people in order to raise a Jewish question.100
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ed. M. Ma'oz, 190-191 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press. 1975).
100 OA. DH. EUM. 4 $B 23/5, Mutasarrif to Ministry o f Interior. Jerusalem, 24 Ramazan 1332 (16 
August 1914).
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2.3 The Notables o f  Jerusalem in the late Ottoman era
If  on one hand Jerusalem was ruled by Ottoman officials, on the other 
hand their power was balanced by the presence of local groups possessing, to
109different degrees social and political influence. These groups, who formed the 
backbone of local elites, were a class of notables which functioned as 
intermediaries between the population and the Ottoman administration. These 
notables, whose political profile was rather complex, derived their power from 
economic sources and from their religious legitimacy. The scholar who has 
developed the concept of notables in the Arab Middle East was Albert Hourani 
who coined the usage of the term “politics of notables” (in Arabic a ’yari) to 
explain the political configuration of Arab cities under Ottoman control. 
According to Hourani, the “politics of notables” firstly arose in a social milieu 
which was ordered around patronage; secondly when urban society was 
dominated by members of influential families who were able to control the rural 
hinterland; thirdly when these local notables could act politically freely. 103The 
notables, therefore, were an informal elite composed of the richest, most 
powerful and prestigious families of the Arab cities.104 Local notables were thus 
the intermediaries between the urban population and the Ottoman government; 
they mediated between the society that they represented and the state authority 
that often appointed them. As intermediaries, they had to possess both the 
political qualities to represent their constituencies and they had to be able to 
bargain with their counterparts.
102 P.P. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
10 .
103 A. Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics o f Notables,” in The Modern Middle East, eds. A. 
Hourani, P. Khoury and M.C, Wilson, 87(London: Tauris, 1993).
104 G. Baer, “Jerusalem’s Families of Notables and the Walcf in the Early 19th Century,” in Palestine in 
the Late Ottoman Period, ed. D. Kushner, 109 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
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The socio-political elite of Jerusalem was composed of three groups; the 
Muslim religious leadership (ulama) who provided voice for popular grievances 
and demands mainly through the Friday prayer but also Christian leaders; the 
secular notables {a ’yan, amirs) families or individuals whose power was rooted 
in the genealogic memory of the ancestors (the asabiyyah of the family) who, 
were in control of the available wealth and commodities such as land and 
commercial activities; and the commanders of the local military garrisons 
(<aghwat) who based their power on military strength.105 The notables of 
Jerusalem were both Muslim and Christian. These groups were not officially 
organised and worked on an informal basis. These were open groups where 
mobility within and between them was not only allowed but was also promoted 
(the only boundaries not crossed were of religious nature, intermarriage between 
persons of different religious background was not allowed); therefore mobility 
was taking place through groups belonging to the same religion.
The Ottomans relied constantly on these families in the provinces but 
after the Tanzimat during the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II the state claimed 
back its authority. The very meaning of the Tanzimat reforms was a process of 
centralisation that was indeed in direct opposition to the power of the local 
notables. In the initial phases of these reforms, Ottoman governors relied on the 
local notables but once they were able to establish direct control over the 
population they relied less on this class. It is from this period that the notables 
particularly in areas like Syria and Palestine began to fight back against Ottoman 
control. Furthermore after the mid-1850s, the expansion of European commerce
105 Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics o f Notables,” 89-90; A. Manna, “Continuity and Change 
in the Socio-Political Elite in Palestine During the Late Ottoman Period,” in The Syrian Land in the 18th 
and 19th Century, ed. T. Philipp, 11 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992); Khoury, Urban Notables, 11.
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throughout the empire strengthened the non-Muslim commercial classes. As a 
consequence of this, the economic order was redefined. Christian and Jewish 
merchants began to enjoy a period of economic prosperity provoking 
dissatisfaction among the Muslim leadership. 106 Eventually in 1860 the 
dissatisfaction turned into a wave of violence in the Christian areas of Damascus 
but Jerusalem was the theatre of only a few episodes of random attacks on
I  r\n
individuals.
In the case of Jerusalem, the question of the local notables fits into the 
framework presented by Hourani with some specific exceptions. The notables of 
Jerusalem were part of the three main families: the Husaynis, the Khalidis and 
the Nashashibis. As Jerusalem was far from important commercial routes, these 
notables did not base their power on wealth coming from trade but on land 
ownership in the rural hinterland of the city. It was the control of the key 
administrative, political and religious posts that conferred their authority over the 
population and consolidated their position as intermediaries with the Ottoman 
administration from the end of Egyptian occupation in 1841.108
As the military command for the region was based in Damascus there 
were no military notables in Jerusalem and the local notables could not build 
their power on military strength. Jerusalem was not of any particular military or 
strategic value and therefore Ottoman troops were camped in other towns and 
cities leaving Jerusalem practically un-garrisoned. Ottoman officials held the 
main administrative positions such as that of governor of the province and of
' 1 0 6 1. Pappe, A Histoiy o f  Modern Palestine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22-23; “In 
Jerusalem and the rest o f Palestine, however, it (violence) never went beyond random infrequent attacks 
on individuals.”
107 Ibid, 23.
108 Divine, Politics and Society, 77.
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kaimmakams (district governor-senior officials).109 However Jerusalemites Arabs,
mainly Muslims, were allowed to be part of the lower ranks of the administration
like mudur (director of school).110 The Turkish governors always tried to balance
the power of the different families like the Khalidis, the Nashashibis or the
Husaynis against one another, they guarded against any single family getting too
powerful assigning these notables with key positions within the province and
rotating them periodically in order to avoid that a single family could monopolise
certain positions.111
The Arab notables were largely present in the spheres of law and of the
traditional education as they used to preside over the religious courts as well as
the religious and state schools; as during the Tanzimat era education was
secularised and brought under the control of the central government the Arab
110notables found a way to adapt to the new system. Eventually the Khalidis and 
the Husaynis supported the reforms of Ali and Fuad Pa§as.113 With the end of the 
Tanzimat era in 1876, Sultan Abdulhamid II turned against the supporter of the 
previous regime, and eventually the Khalidis suffered the most as they lost their 
primacy amongst the notables of Jerusalem.114 The Hamidian regime re-shaped 
the image and career patterns of the notables in the Arab lands.115
The notables of Jerusalem proved to be the cornerstone of Jerusalem’s 
fragmented social framework. Both under Ottoman and British rule, the notables
109 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 106.
110 Ibid, 109.
111 B. Kimmerling and J.S. Migdal, Palestinians, (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 71; Pappe, A Histoiy 
o f Modern Palestine, 19.
112 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 39.
113 B. Abu-Manneh, “Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the 
Notables,” Die Welt des Islams 30, (1990): 40-41.
114 Ibid, 42-43.
115 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 65.
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of Jerusalem struggled to keep their pre-eminence as the demographic realities of
the city were changing as a result of Jewish immigration. To this effect the
speech of Ruhi al-Khalidi is quite instructive. He was elected to the Ottoman
Parliament in 1908 following the CUP revolution. Ruhi Bey warned that
Palestine was in danger because of Zionism and the number of settlers coming to 
116Palestine. Though the majority of the inhabitants, towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, were not Arab Muslim, the notables managed to keep control 
of the Administrative Council with six Muslim members and only two Christians 
and two Jewish.117
With the advent of the Young Turks in 1908 the status of Jerusalem’s 
notability underwent some radical changes. The first phase of the rule of the 
Young Turk was welcomed at the end of the Hamidian police regime.118 
However from 1909, after the failed attempt of a counter revolution inspired by 
Abdtilhamid in Istanbul, the Young Turks started to promote the turkification of 
the Ottoman and provincial society, a process which undermined the power of 
Jerusalem notables. Arab subjects began to feel as if they were second class 
citizens in relation to the Turkish subjects. Following the prohibition to establish 
political associations issued in 1909, as a result of a rising opposition to the 
Young Turks, some local notables became Arab activists in secret societies 
promoting early Arab national ideals in Jerusalem.119 These societies promoted 
Arab autonomy or independence and were composed of the notables as well as
1 ,6  Ibid, 80-81.
317 Khoury, Urban Notables, 71.
3 1 8 1. Pappe, “The Husayni Family Faces New Challenges,” Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 11-12, (2001); 
Divine, Politics and Society, 146.
1 ,9  Pappe, “The Husayni Family.”
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of teachers, students and Arab army officers.120 A report by the British Arab 
Bureau in Cairo, gathering enquiries made through natives of Jerusalem living in 
Cairo after the autumn of 1914, describes the notable families as not being pro
191Turk, but compelled to keep in with the Turks. Some less prominent members 
of the Husayni family were arrested, in the last days of Ottoman rule, because 
they were accused of being pro British; they hoped that a British victory would 
end Turkish rule.122
2.4 The People o f  Jerusalem (1905-1922): some definitions
In the cities of Palestine there was a strong tradition of urban local 
patriotism thus the idea of being a Jerusalemite was deeply rooted among the
193local population. However, considering the particular character and nature of 
Jerusalem the question who the Jerusalemites were is a complex one. Under the 
Ottoman government the local population, following the general rule of the 
millet system, was divided along religious lines. According to cultural patterns 
we can consider the population of Jerusalem as portioned alongside two axes: the 
first representing a religious cleavage; the second representing ethnic origins and 
linguistic cleavages. The first subdivision corresponded with the official one 
enforced by Ottoman religious law as exemplified by the millet system; the 
second represents the divisions which reflect ethnicity, nationality and language, 
besides which, self representation also played a major role in the definition of the 
various communities residing in Jerusalem, An additional element was the
120 Pappe, A Histoiy o f Modern Palestine, 56-57.
121 TNA: PRO FO 882/14, The Politics o f Jerusalem, Cairo, 29 December 1916.
122 Spafford Vester, Our Jerusalem, 252.
123 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 153.
presence of foreigner communities which complicated further Jerusalem’s 
demographic landscape.
The following paragraph presents a collection of data on the demography 
of Jerusalem from the late nineteenth century until 1922, including the data 
provided by the first official census carried out by the British authorities. The 
presentation of data is then analysed in order to show demographic changes 
which occurred during the war. Of particular interest is the analyses of the data 
in relation to the Jewish population in Jerusalem in the transitional period as 
Jews represented the majority of the inhabitants in the city.
2.4.1 The population o f  Jerusalem
The main issue about the demographic history of Jerusalem is that up until 
1922, the date of the first British official census, there are no official statistics 
available. Most of the information available comes from western travellers, 
consuls or residents. On the Ottoman side a register was held for the urban 
population called niifus. The General Administration of Population Registration 
{SiciU-I Niifus Idare-I Umumiyesi) was established during Hamidian time in the 
late nineteenth century as part of the system of control created for the Empire, 
however only Ottoman subjects were recorded.124 In 1905 there was an attempt 
to update the niifus adopting the European census style. Every individual 
Ottoman subject was recorded according to sex, year of birth and marital status:
124 C.V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 253-254.
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Jews and Christians coming from foreign countries but considered as permanent
1 9 c
residents were not recorded.
The work of Schmelz is one of the most important for the demographic 
history of Jerusalem from the Ottoman source perspective. He has worked 
thoroughly on the sources available from the nufus updated with the census of 
1905 and he offers us statistics regarding the population of the region (kaza) of 
Jerusalem. The main problem with Schmelz’s work, as far as Jerusalem is 
concerned, is that the statistics available do not detail figures for the urban 
population but only for the Jerusalem region {kaza)}26
Table 1 reports the figures of all the sources available from 1905 to 1919. 
Table 2 presents Schmelz’s figures for the Jerusalem region. Table 3 will show 
the figures from the British census of 1922. Table 4 presents the breakdown of 
the figures of the census of 1922 within the walls and table 5 presents the 
breakdown of the population outside the walls. The main division of the 
population is based on religious lines but where other criteria have been taken
17 7into consideration, notes will be provided.
Table 1: The Population of Jerusalem city from the late Ottoman period until the British Census of 
1922.
Source Year Muslims Christians Jews Others Total
Robinson P .128 1905 n.a. n.a. 45,000 n.a. 66,000
SchSlch A .la 1910 12,000 13,000 45,000 n.a. 70,000
125 U.O. Schmelz, “Population Characteristics o f Jerusalem and Hebron Regions According to Ottoman 
Census of 1905,” in Ottoman Palestine 1800-1914, ed. G.G. Gilbar, 18 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).
126 Ibid.
127 The first distinction in the construction of a credible and consistent table representing the population of  
Jerusalem for the period from 1912 to 1922 is between sources. There are available primary sources as 
well as secondary sources in terms of reconstructions attempted by scholars and I will combine and 
analyse these different materials.
128 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl Straordinari, Africa, Asia, Oceania, Pos. 102, Fasc. 69, Robinson P. on 
the situation in Palestine, 1 February 1921.
129 Scholch, “Jerusalem in the 19th Century” 231.
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British Consul 1911 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 5 0 W 80,000
Luncz 1913 10,050 16,750 48,400 n.a. 75,200
Biger G.133 1914 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 80,000
Bish. Blyth134 1914 n.a. n.a. 60,000 n.a. 75,000
Matson O.G.135 1914 10,000 15,000 50,000 n.a. 80,000
Arab Bureau136 1914 20,000 25,000 45,000 n.a. 90,000
War Office137 1914 9,000 14,000 57,000 n.a. .80,000
Bentwich N .13S 1914 n.a. n.a. 60,000 n.a. 100,000
American 
Consulate 139
1914 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 90,000
American 
Consulate 140
1915 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85,000
Ruppin A .141 1915 n.a. n.a. 45,000 n.a. 80,000
StoiTS R .142 1917 11,000 30,000
Zionist Org.143 1917 10,600 11,663 31,147 n.a. 54,410
Segev144 1917 n.a. n.a. 27,000 n.a. 55,000
Biger G.143 1917 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 55,000
Andrews F.F.146 1918 n.a. n.a. 40,000 *147 60,000
Bentwich N .148 1919 n.a. n.a. 30,000 n.a. 60,000
130 ISA, RG 123.1, File 790/12, Report on Trade o f the Consular District, Jerusalem 1911.
131 British Consul Satow states that in 1911 there were 350 British citizens living in Jerusalem.
132 Luncz, Eretz Israel Almanac 19, (1912/1913), 34; see also Kark and Oren-Nordheim, Jerusalem and 
Its Environs, 29.
133 G. Biger, An Empire in the Holy Land, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 29.
134 LP, Davidson 396, Bishop Blyth to Archbishop, London, 20/08/1914.
135 O.G. Matson, The American Colony Palestine Guide, (Jerusalem: The American Colony, 1913), 8-10.
136 TNA: PRO FO 882, The Politics o f Jerusalem, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 29 December 1916. The report is 
o f 1916 however the figures reported are in relation to the year 1914.
137 TNA: PRO WO 158/986, 1917. The figures reported are for the year 1914.
138 N. Bentwich, Palestine o f the Jews, (London: Kegan Paul, 1919), 106.
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Table 2: Schmelz’s figures for the Jerusalem kaza>
Schmelz U.O. 1914 79,000 42,000 45,000 n.a. 165,000
Table 3: British Census 1922.
Muslims Christians Jews Total
13,413 (24,45%) 14,699 (23,50%) 33,971 (54,30) 62,578
Table 4: Breakdown of the figures of the British Census of 1922 within the walls.150
Muslims Christians Jews Others Total
Male 5,159 3,809 2,673 1 151 11,642
Female 4,186 3,453 2,966 n.a. 10,605
Total 9,345 7,262 5,639 1 22,247
Table 5: Breakdown of the figures of the British Census of 1922 outside the walls.152
Muslims Christians Jews Others Total
Male 2,645 3,792 14,040 489 20,969
Female 1,423 3,645 14,292 5 19,362
Total 4,068 7,437 28,332 49415-3 40,331
These tables show figures over a relative long period of time but the data 
from 1914 and 1917 show the changes in the pattern of the population during the 
transition from Ottoman to British rule. It is reasonable to argue that the urban 
population of Jerusalem in 1914 was approximately 80,000 people. The 
exceptions are represented by the estimates provided by Norman Bentwich, a 
senior British official in the British administration of Palestine and a Zionist
149 Schmelz, “Population Characteristics of Jerusalem,” 26. The figures are for the Jerusalem region 
(kaza).
150 These figure are quoted by Ronald Storrs; PC, Reel 8 , Box III, Jerusalem 1922.
151 It was a Druze; there were no Hindus living within the walls.
152 These figure are quoted by Ronald Storrs; PC, Reel 8 , Box III, Jerusalem 1922.
153 There were 5 Druses (1 male, 4 females); 489 Hindus (488 males, 1 female).
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activist, who places the population of Jerusalem at approximately 100,000 units. 
Unless one is considering the inhabitants of the city’s immediate hinterland as 
part of Jerusalem, the figure provided by Bentwich is unreliable; it is furthermore 
not clear where Bentwich gathered this data from.154 The American Consulate 
and the Arab Bureau present an estimated population of 90,000 people living in 
Jerusalem. It seems that the Arab Bureau relied on the information provided by 
the American Consul which was reported in the monthly Consular Sanitary 
Report reported on contagious diseases and deaths. The Americans included 
some villages lying around Jerusalem in the report, therefore it is not an 
exaggeration in the estimation but rather an excess.155 The figure of 80,000 
people living in Jerusalem by 1914 becomes reliable once some clear 
miscalculations are discarded. Furthermore it is necessary to consider the slow 
but constant increase in the population of Jerusalem due, mainly, to Jewish 
immigration. Fr Robinson, a clergyman of the Custody of the Holy Land, 
estimated 66,000 people living in Jerusalem in 1905.156 By 1910 according to 
Scholch we notice an increase of 5,000 units.157 According to Luncz and Bishop 
Blyth 75,000 inhabitants lived in Jerusalem by 1913, therefore another increase 
of 5,000 in less than three years thus my estimation of 80,000 inhabitants in 1914 
appears after all to be the closest to the real number of people living in the 
city.158
154 Bentwich, Palestine o f the Jews, 106.
155 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69 A, Consular Sanitary Report, Jerusalem, 6  January 1915; TNA: PRO 
FO 882, The Politics o f Jerusalem, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 29 December 1916.
156 ASV, Segr. Stato, Ajfari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa, Asia, Oceania, Pos. 102, Fasc. 69, Robinson P. on 
the situation in Palestine, 1 February 1921.
157 Scholch, “Jerusalem in the 19th Century,” 231.
158 Luncz, Eretz Israel Almanac 19, (1912/1913), 34; LP, Davidson 396, Bishop Blyth to Archbishop, 
London, 20/08/1914.
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Between 1905 and 1914 the Jewish population of Jerusalem was between 
45,000 to 50,000, representing the majority.159 In 1914 the figures of Jewish 
inhabitants in the city are quite conflicting: they ranged from 45,000 to 60,000 
individuals. According to the sources available I would suggest a figure of 
around 50,000 Jews would be a fair assessment. As in 1914 the Ottoman 
government enforced laws against Jewish immigration, the number of Jews 
moving to Jerusalem decreased although restrictions did not always work. 
Figures of 60,000 Jews living in Jerusalem, therefore, appear to be unrealistic. 
Supporting this idea is Schmelz, who states that the 45,000 Jews living in the 
kaza of Jerusalem were concentrated in the city of Jerusalem in 1914.160 
Christians and Muslims were more or less equally divided. Figures available for 
1914 are, again, conflicting. However relying on previous and later figures it 
appears that, with a total population of 80,000 people of which 50,000 were Jews, 
there were approximately 15,000 Muslims and 15,000 Christians. Considering 
that the majority of the Christian population of Jerusalem was Arab, it is 
consistent to think that mistakes could have been common confusing Arabs with 
Muslims.
The statistics available for 1917 and 1918 suggest that a sudden decrease 
of the population took place. The figure of 55,000-60,000 inhabitants in 
Jerusalem after the British conquest appears to be reliable and consistent with the 
inevitable reduction of the population caused by the war. Deportation of Jews 
and other subjects alongside the military mobilisation of Ottoman subjects may
159 See Table 1.
160 U.O. Schmelz, “Population Characteristics of Jerusalem,” 25.
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have also led to a plausible decrease of 20,000-25,000 units.161 The British, 
therefore, at their arrival found a city that had lost almost a third of its inhabitants. 
Particularly impressive is the diminution in the number of Jews which halted by 
1918 although they still formed the largest community in Jerusalem. According 
to the figures provided by the British census of 1922, we can see that the 
population of Jerusalem increased very slowly due to difficulties recovery in the 
aftermath of the war. The 62,000 inhabitants registered in 1922, are not far from 
the 55-60,000 registered in 1917, but they are considerably fewer than the 80,000 
inhabitants of 1914.
2.4.2 The people o f  Jerusalem
The figures of the inhabitants of Jerusalem suggest that it is necessary to 
find some general guidelines and cleavages that can lead us to the definition of 
the social, ethnic and religious identities of the Jerusalemites. Looking at three 
main religious affiliations I will start looking at the Muslim community. Despite 
the presence of a very small minority of North Africans and Indians, the great 
majority of the Sunni Muslims of Jerusalem were of Arab origin. Among the 
Muslim community there was also a small community of Turkish officials who 
shared religious affiliation with the local population. No Shi’a Muslims have 
ever been reported as resident in the city.162 If on one hand the Muslims of 
Jerusalem appeared as a solid monolith, on the other hand they were divided in 
terms of loyalties towards their notables and religious leaders. Ronald Storrs, the 
first British governor of Jerusalem, noted in his diary that the Muslim
161 For more details see the discussion on deportation during the war- in Chapter 3.
162 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 131.
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community in Jerusalem was unlike the Jewish and the Christian communities; 
Muslims were not subdivided into rites and denominations but into two 
partisanships loyal to the Husayni and the Nashashibi families.163
The Jewish community was the largest in the city. Nevertheless the Jews 
were not a monolithic community as they were divided by their ethnic origins 
and their degree of piety and involvement in religious activities. In terms of 
origins the Jewish community was divided between Ashkenazim and the 
Sephardim and in other groups which were smaller such as the Yemenites and 
Bukharians (both of Sephardi tradition).
The Ashkenazi Jews of Jerusalem were of central-eastern European 
origins. The name Ashkenaz was applied in the Middle Ages to the Jews living 
in Northern France and Western Germany. Eventually by eleventh century these 
Jews had moved to Poland, Lithuania and Russia. The Ashkenazim spoke 
Yiddish, a combination of German and Hebrew. Generally speaking, the term 
Ashkenazim was intended for the Jews of European, mainly German, origins.164 
The history of the Sephardim Jews is quite different. Some Jews after the 
Diaspora of 70 AD settled on the coast of North Africa, Spain and Portugal. 
After the Christian reconquista of 1492, some moved to Venice or London, 
where it was easier for them to settle, others remained under Muslim, and then 
Ottoman, rule in North Africa and other Middle Eastern areas like Palestine or
163 R. Storrs, Orientations, (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1943), 401.
164 L. Jacobs, The Jewish Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 36; “The name Ashkenaz in 
the Bible (Genesis 10:3) was identified in the Middle Ages with Germany, hence Ashkenazim, 
“Germans15.”
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Persia. Sephardim spoke a combination of Spanish and Hebrew known as Ladino. 
Most of the Jews living in the Middle East spoke Arabic.165
According to Ronald Storrs in 1917, in Jerusalem there were 16,000 
Ashkenazim and 14,000 Sephardim while the Israeli scholar Ben-Arieh for the 
year 1916 states that there were 13,446 Sephardim and 13,125 Ashkenazi Jews in 
Jerusalem.166 The Sephardim community was the largest in Jerusalem at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, but following the Jewish immigration from 
central Europe the Ashkenazim Jews increasingly became the majority.167 The 
first wave of Jewish immigration ( ‘Aliyah) started in 1882 driven by Zionist 
ideals which brought around 25,000 Ashkenazi Jews to Palestine. The second 
‘Aliyah took place between 1904 and 1914; some 40,000 Jews moved to 
Palestine mainly from Russia following the outbreak of pogroms and anti- 
Semitism.168
The Yemenite and Bukharian were two small Jewish communities the 
first from Yemen and the second from Bukhara in Central A sia .169 The 
Yemenites arrived in Jerusalem in the 1880s whilst the Bukharians made their 
appearance in the city in the late 1860s and established a small quarter.170 The 
Sephardim Jews of Jerusalem were mainly organised into independent 
communities based on the place of origin. Besides the Bukharian and Yemenite
1 6 51. Kolatt, “The Organization o f the Jewish Population o f Palestine and the Development o f its Political 
Consciousness before World War I,” in Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period, ed. M. Ma’oz, 
211-214 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975). See also E. Benbassa and A. Rodrigue, eds., Sephardi Jewry: 
a History o f  the Judeo-Spanish Community 15th to 20'h Centuries, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000).
166 Storrs, The Memoirs, 280-282; Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 357.
167 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 127-130.
168 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 137-130; D. Friedlander and C. Goldscheider, The Population o f  
Israel, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 15-18; D. Willner, Nation-Building and 
Community in Israel, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 30-38.
169 Bukhara is a city o f nowadays Uzbekistan; most of the Bukharians moved at the beginning of the 20th 
century to United States and some to Palestine.
170 The Bukharian quarter is today populated by Ultra Orthodox Jews. Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 278 and 
363.
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communities among the Sephardim, there were the Jews from Kurdistan, 
Damascus, Georgia, Persia and Morocco. Among the Sephardim Jews of 
Jerusalem, it seems that subdivisions were conceived along geographical origin 
but the general Sephardim identity united them when necessary as in the case of 
the distribution of the halukka (organised collection of funds in Europe and 
America for the indigent Jews of Palestine). The money sent from the Jewish 
communities outside Palestine to the Sephardi leadership was divided in three 
parts according to different needs like municipal expenses or support to religious
171scholars.
With a few exceptions, all the Jews of Jerusalem belonged to one of these 
communities or kollelim (Jewish community defined according to the particular 
religious rite followed). However Ashkenazi were also organised according to 
country of origin like the Sephardim and sources of financial support.172 It was 
among the Ashkenazim that a full range of orthodox, ultra-orthodox, Hasidism 
and Agudists, who refused to use Hebrew for any purpose expect prayer, and 
eventually secular Jews, were to be found.173 The Jewish community of 
Jerusalem was therefore atomised into a countless number of groups and sects. 
Membership to these groups ranged from several thousands to several families 
like the Karaites Jews, an ancient sect composed of around fifty people at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.174
Christianity as well, in Jerusalem was largely affected by the same 
atomisation that affected the Jewish communities. Some of the Christian
171 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 283.
172 Kolatt, “The Organisation of the Jewish Population,” 214-215.
173 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 292-294.
174 Ibid, 351-363.
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denominations were defined according to geographical provenance, others 
according to the religious tradition. The three main Christian communities of
I 7SJerusalem were the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox Church and the Latins. 
The question of the Christian Churches during the war time will be discussed 
separately. Nevertheless in the context of the current analysis of the population 
of Jerusalem it is important to stress who these Christians were. The Armenian 
community was composed mainly of clergy up until the years of the war; in fact 
lay Armenians were not allowed to settle permanently in the Armenian convent 
area.176Armenians were among the first pilgrims to visit Jerusalem after the
1 77fourth century. The Armenian quarter located in the old city was used 
therefore as shelter for pilgrims and visitors. After the British conquest of 
Jerusalem there was a consistent flux of the survivors of the massacres of 1915 in
1 7 5 2Eastern Anatolia, 20,000 Armenians reached Palestine as refugees.
If the Armenian Church represented a solid and monolithic institution, the 
cases of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Latins were quite different. The 
Greek Orthodox Church represented the majority of Christians in Jerusalem. In 
1914 out of 15,000 Christians, there were approximately 7,000 Greek 
Orthodox.179 The large majority of the Greek Orthodox laity and the lower clergy 
were of Arab origins, whilst the hierarchy was ethnically Greek. The Arabs were 
not involved in the administration of the Church at a higher level; therefore a
175 A. O’Mahony, “The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: A Historical and 
Political Survey,” in The Christian Communities o f Jerusalem and the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony, 4 
(Cardiff: University o f Wales Press, 2003).
176 A. Sanjian, “The Armenian Church,” in The Christian Communities o f Jerusalem and the Holy Land, 
ed. A. O’Mahony, 58 (Cardiff: University o f Wales Press, 2003).
177 See Chapter 4 for more details. See also K. Hintlian, Histoiy o f  the Armenians in the Holy Land, 
(Jerusalem: St. James Press, 1976).
178 H. Hagopian, “The Armenians o f Jerusalem and the Armenian Quarter,” in Christians in the Holy 
Land, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 125 (London: The World of Islam festival Trust, 1994).
179 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, p. 193.
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conflict between the two groups developed in the middle of the nineteenth 
century and continued to exacerbate relations between the tw o.180 Another 
interesting feature of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem was that in the 
nineteenth century, Russia had assumed the role of protector of the Orthodox 
population of the Ottoman Empire.181 This was indeed a political manoeuvre 
which allowed Russia to exert more influence over Istanbul. With the end of both 
the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Greek Orthodox community of Jerusalem 
went through a period of great uncertainty, exacerbated further by serious 
financial difficulties.
The Catholic community was not the largest in Jerusalem, but it was 
regarded, as the most powerful. Before the war there were approximately 4,000 
Roman Catholics and 500 Uniate Catholics.182 Among the Catholics there were 
Arabs, although not in the same number as those belonging to the Greek 
Orthodox Church; other members of the church included clergy and laity from 
many different countries. The majority of the Catholics in Jerusalem were of 
Latin rite, however a good number of Catholics belonged to Unite Churches of 
Oriental rite, like the Armenian Catholics, the Greek Catholics, and the 
Maronites. A second split in the Catholic Church is represented by the place of 
origins.
The European countries through the protection of their subjects in 
Palestine attempted to influence both Ottoman and Church politics in the region. 
France was by tradition the protector of Catholic interests in the Holy Land. 
However, the other governments did not refrain from intervene in local issues on
180 O’Mahony, “The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land,” 17.
181 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 86-87.
182 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 193.
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an ad hoc basis to protect their own interests. The majority of the Catholics were 
Italian, French, Spanish, and Austrian but there were clergy and laity virtually 
from all over the world. Indeed the very meaning of Catholic as “universal” is a 
term perfectly fitting for Jerusalem.
Other Christian communities were living in Jerusalem, some of them very 
small like the Ethiopians and the Copts; however relative newcomers such as the 
Protestants and Anglicans were both numerically and socially relevant. The 
German Protestants and the English Anglicans started to establish their presence 
in Jerusalem in 1841, with the establishment of a Bishopric, but after its 
dissolution in 1887, both Anglicans and Protestants established their own 
institutions. In 1914 there were about 1,500 Anglican/Protestants in the city.183 
They were mainly concerned with missionary and social activities directed 
towards the population of Jerusalem. Though there were some conversions 
amongst the Arab population, the Anglican-Protestant communities were mainly 
composed of German, English and American citizens who had moved to 
Jerusalem animated by religious sentiments.
A second group of residents were members of the Ottoman administration. 
Though there are no official statistics regarding the members of the Ottoman 
establishment living in the city it may be assumed that before the war there were 
1,000-1,500 individuals.184 Apart from the different religious authorities residing 
in the city, there was a tiny, but powerful community representing foreign 
countries. Not only were there Consuls, or Consular Agents, who will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters, but also members of the Ottoman
183 Ibid, 193.
184 Ibid, 135.
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Debt Administration, the institution which had since 1881 managed the Ottoman 
finances. There were also members of the Zionist Organisation who were 
investigating the possibility of Jewish immigration in Palestine. The majority of 
these individuals, though not settled on a permanent basis invested money and 
resources whilst in Jerusalem as in the case of the early British consul J. Finn, 
others established businesses. Businessmen of French, British, German, Italian 
and American nationality were also part of the Jerusalem environment; if Jaffa 
was the main commercial centre, it was in Jerusalem where the political game 
was played; therefore traders had to have offices and representatives in order to 
lobby the Turkish and then the British governments.185
The analysis of the population of Jerusalem from 1905 to 1920s has 
highlighted a complex and rapidly changing picture with a clear pattern which 
points towards the growth of the Jewish population. The early modern history of 
Jerusalem was first marked by its re-establishment on the world map as a 
primary religious and political centre in the early nineteenth century as a result of 
the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, the rule of Muhammad ‘ Ali and then by the 
emergence of the Jewish question on the international stage which had profound 
reverberations on Palestine. The changing structure of the population of 
Jerusalem brought on the one hand new opportunities of economic development 
and of modernisation; however on the other hand the emerging new social 
composition of the city was responsible for newer and stronger endeavours 
among the different communities living in Jerusalem.
185 A discussion o f the foreign presence in Jerusalem will be presented in Chapter 5.
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Illustration 3: T he W ailing Wall
2.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to show how modernity was brought to 
Jerusalem through the means of administrative reforms in the late Ottoman 
period, both under Egyptian and Ottoman rules. The reforms promoted first by 
Muhammad *Ali and Ibrahim ‘Ali and by the Tanzimat reformers aimed mainly 
to centralise and reorganise the empire. Eventually it was up to the local 
governors to implement these reforms becoming agents of modernisation. 
Besides governors, local notables also became agents for change in Jerusalem as 
they played the role of intermediaries between the Ottoman establishment, 
foreigners and the local population. Last but not least, the most powerful agents 
of modernisation were European consuls and individuals, a point which will be 
discussed further in Chapter Five. It was the rise of European interest in the
,86 Copyright The Matson Photo Service. Jerusalem.
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region that brought dramatic changes as European presence meant direct 
influence over the Ottoman administration but also economic integration in the 
world market. It would be, however, reductive not to stress the significance of 
the Ottoman reforms and simply to attribute the modernisation process to 
European agents. Although Europeans played a crucial role, this chapter has 
shown the important role played by administrative reforms in the transformation 
of Palestine, and Jerusalem in particular, from a remote province of the empire to 
the centre of Ottoman relations with European governments. The creation of new 
urban institutions as a result of centralisation brought the elites and the educated 
population of Jerusalem much closer to the political centre of the Ottoman state. 
The late Ottoman period also marked the emergence o f  a local intelligentsia and 
Jerusalem became very much the centre of cultural and intellectual ferment due 
to the large presence of foreigners.187
The second part of the chapter was concerned with demographic change
in the late Ottoman Empire, throughout the war period and the period of British
military rule. Modernisation and centralisation had a stabilising effect on
Jerusalem’s demography as this meant relative stability and security for its
inhabitants. From this perspective we can appreciate the demographic growth
which began with the Tanzimat era. Yet, Jerusalem also experienced a growth of
the population due to Jewish immigration and increasing western presence. As
for the First World War and in its aftermath the analysis of statistics is more
complex partly as a result of inconsistencies in source materials. Demography
also, to an extent, has proved to be an agent of modernisation. In fact from the
late Ottoman period to the British occupation the very presence of newcomers
187 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 59.
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such settlers, scholars, tourists, pilgrims and businessmen helped the city to turn 
into a modem urban space.188 These newcomers or foreign residents will be very 
much the focus of Chapters Four and Five and the statistics presented in this 
chapter will substantiate the discussion about these historical actors as agents of 
modernisation and change in Jerusalem.
188 Pappe, A History o f Modern Palestine, 32-33.
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3 The W ar and the British conquest o f Jerusalem
“The sacred armies, and the godly knight,
That the great sepulchre of Christ did free,
I sing; much wrought his valor and foresight,
And in that glorious war much suffered he;
In vain 'gainst him did Hell oppose her might,
In vain the Turks and Morians armed be:
His soldiers wild, to brawls and mutinies prest,
Reduced he to peace, so Heaven him blest.”
Torquato Tasso 
(Jerusalem Delivered, Canto I, St. 1)
The very last phase of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem corresponds with the 
establishment of a military administration upon the city, following the opening of 
the hostilities between the Central Powers and the Entente in 1914. The Ottoman 
Empire in the summer of 1914 was not ready for the conflict. Since the country 
was not mobilised for the war effort, the CUP therefore declared armed 
neutrality. This chapter will show how the transition from Ottoman to British 
rules occurred and it will discuss the various reactions to this historical event 
which inaugurated a new phase in the history of Jerusalem. The opening section 
of this chapter studies how the mobilisation process, enforced by the joint 
Turkish and German commands, worked and affected the human, material and 
ideological infrastructures of Jerusalem. At the beginning of the war, the British 
did not consider the Eastern front of the military operations of any value. The 
Palestine campaign and the following conquest of Jerusalem, in the early days of 
the war, were not planned in advance by the British policy makers. What then led 
the British army to occupy Jerusalem? How did they prepare the military and 
propaganda campaign for the city? What was the value of Jerusalem in British
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eyes but also those of the Allies? What kind of reactions developed after the 
British conquest of Jerusalem by the local population; as well as those by the 
British and other international actors? The chapter then shifts its focus from the 
war mobilisation to that of some aspects of the social and political life in the city 
during the war in relation to religious and local political institutions.
I will then review a theme that became popular among the British public 
after the occupation of Jerusalem: the conquest of Jerusalem as the final chapter 
in the crusades. The British press began to portray the conquest of the Holy City 
as the fulfilment of the crusades; Allenby had eventually entered the city that had 
been precluded to the English hero Richard Coeur de Lion. The explosion of the 
“Crusading mania” came as a logical conclusion to a carefully staged campaign 
an artificial product of the war propaganda.1
3.1 Preparation fo r war, mobilisation o f  human, material and ideological 
resources
War is a condition of belligerency between actors that begins usually 
some time before with the process of mobilisation, except in cases of pre­
emptive strikes. In modern times, this process entails not only the mobilisation of 
the army, but also that of material and ideological resources. As part of the
mobilisation process every country involved in the Great War created agencies to
0 _control the flow of information and to monitor public opinion. The Ottoman 
Empire, from the establishment of a constitutional regime by the Young Turks in 
July 1908, had to face many military challenges coming from outside and within
1 Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 87-88.
2 J.M. Winter, “Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent,” in First World War, ed. IT Strachan, 216 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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the Empire. For almost the entirety of the decade of the Young Turks and CUP 
rule, the Empire was under military mobilisation. As a result of the war with 
Italy in 1911-1912 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Ottoman government 
lost a great portion of its territories. Yet it survived, and eventually, in order to 
avoid isolation, the Ottomans sought allies in Europe. When the First World War 
broke out, Istanbul remained neutral, but by November the Empire was forced to
•j
enter the war alongside their German ally. One of the main problems of the 
Ottoman Empire was its heavy military and economic dependence on the 
European powers. As soon as the war broke out the economy of the Empire was 
completely paralysed; as the Ottoman Bank ran short of cash, the main cities of 
the Empire experienced a shortage of commodities, soaring prices and a general 
increase in the cost of living.4
Though the Ottoman Empire did not possess a proper institution dealing 
with intelligence and propaganda, symbolism was exploited in the process of 
mobilisation, mainly with the purpose to justify the war. Sacred images and 
words were going to be exploited by all European countries; the British for 
instance appealed to the image of the crusade against the evil German enemy and 
her allies; so too did the Ottoman Empire when it declared openly a Jihad (holy 
war) on 11 November 1914. The German General Liman von Sanders, 
responsible for improving the efficiency of the Turkish army, was ordered to stay 
in Istanbul by the German Headquarters in Berlin and to promote feelings against 
Britain. Furthermore, a special team was formed under the command of Max von 
Oppenheim, a German intelligence officer, in order to organise rebellions in
3 F. Ahmad, “War and Society Under the Young Turks,” in The Modern Middle East, eds. Hourani, 
Khoury and Wilson, 126 (London: LB. Tauris, 1993).
4 Ibid, 133.
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Muslim countries, loyal to the British, working in alliance with German 
Zionists.5 With the CUP coup of 1913 the Ottoman Empire underwent a process 
of Turkification of the administration and the educational system although in the 
previous years Abdiilhamid II had attempted to integrate the Arab subjects of the 
Empire. Despite antagonistic policies against the Arabs, such as the compulsive 
use of Turkish language for official messages sent throughout the Empire, the 
general resentment towards the foreign powers felt by the Arab local population 
before the breakout of the war was stronger than the disregard for the Turkish 
officials and was exploited to gather momentum. On 9 September 1914, the CUP 
unilaterally abolished the capitulations, the veiy symbol o f Ottoman submission 
to European powers. At last, the Empire had become a sovereign state.6 If on one 
hand the Arabs disliked foreign presence they were also suspicious of the Jihad 
called by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet V in November 1914. Eventually, the 
population of Jerusalem, scared by the effectiveness of Turkish policies, showed 
support for the CUP government. The complexity of the positions can be traced 
through an intelligence report written by a resident of Jerusalem, Anis El-Gamal, 
who left the city for Egypt in the first weeks of mobilisation; El-Gamal said that 
the inhabitants of Jerusalem had a strong desire for British occupation.7 If it was 
not tempting enough to fight alongside the Turks, many locals conscripted in the 
Ottoman army viewed this war as an occasion to disrupt the plans of the Zionists, 
who had started to ensure the establishment of Jewish colonies and settlements in
5 R, Ovendale, The Origins o f the Arab-lsraeli Wars, (London: Longman, 1992), 17. See also L. Von 
Sanders, CinqAnds de Tnrquie, (Paris: Payot, 1923).
6 Ahmad, “War and Society Under the Young Turks,” 134.
7 TNA: PRO FO 882/14, Intelligence News, Cairo, 20 September 1914. Though this report is o f great 
interest, it is should be read with suspicion as it was written very early and any suggestion of occupation 
was quite premature; on the other hand it shows how the British exploited this report to underline the 
attitudes of the locals towards the British. It is not clear whether Anis el-Gamal was working for the 
British.
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Palestine. This new type of Jew began to settle in Palestine at the end of the 19th 
century. They were different from the Jewish population of Jerusalem; they were
n
halutzim (pioneers). Arab opposition to these new Jews grew in strength at the 
beginning of the war.9 In August 1914 the Mutasarnf, aware of the local feelings 
towards the Zionists, insisted with the Ministry of Interior on: “the necessity of 
the strict application of the rules on the Jewish immigrants and watch all their 
moves carefully.”10
Palestine was far from the core of the Empire, but it became strategically 
important because of the border with Egypt, which, as it had been under British 
control since 1882, was regarded by the Turco-Germans as enemy territory. A 
few days after the beginning of the hostilities in Europe, in August 1914, the 
process of mobilisation, which had started throughout the Empire, began to 
affect Palestine. Movements of supplies and military equipment started as early 
as May 1914. Since the internal communications were very difficult and slow, 
the Ottomans moved most of their resources through the coastal line while still a 
neutral power. This advantage, however, lasted a very short time. In fact as soon 
as the Turks became one of the warring parties, the British naval fleet prevented 
the Ottoman navy from operating alongside the coast. In May 1914, the 
American consular agent in Jaffa, Glazebrook, was requested by the consul in 
Jerusalem to investigate a shipment of munitions from Istanbul, apparently 
delivered to the city.11 The American official replied that there were rumours that 
munitions were delivered to the port of Jaffa and then moved to Ramleh or
8 B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 5.
9 Ibid, 6 .
10 OA, DH.EUM. 4 §B 23/5, Macid §evket to Minister of the Interior, Jerusalem, 15 August 1914.
11 NARA, Consular- Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to American Consular Agent, Jerusalem, 4 May 1914.
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Jerusalem.12 The Consular agent gathered some information from the customs of 
Jaffa and reported that: “cases were found containing altogether about 4,000 
empty cartridges for three different kinds of rifles, Martini, Mauser and so called 
Montenegro rifles. The cartridges were seized by the custom authorities and the
1 3matter reported to Constantinople by wire.” It is clear that the Ottomans were 
trying to cover up the movement of military equipment towards Egypt which had 
become an extremely sensitive imperial border.
From August 1914 the mobilisation of material and ideological resources 
started to affect Jerusalem involving all the civilian population. Officially, the 
Empire was still neutral in the conflict, but the CUP government knew that this 
condition would not remain. The first step the Ottomans took in order to 
establish the framework for the mobilisation for war, was to declare martial law. 
On 3 August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem Macid §evket issued the following 
document:
“1. Martial law has been declared in the district of Jerusalem, owing to the 
proposed mobilisation of troops.
2. The military authorities have undertaken to preserve peace from now on.
3. Whoever disobeys the orders of the Government or disturbs the peace will be 
court martialed.
4. Carriage of arms and firing inside the town is forbidden.
5. Whoever hides in his house deserters or animals or does not give information 
of their whereabouts, if  it is known, will be court martialed.
6. Those who wish to go away must apply to the military bureaus where they are 
registered and obtained a permit. Whoever attempts to travel away without permit
12 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Consular Agent to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 6  May 1914.
lj NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Consular Agent to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 6  May 1914.
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will be conducted to the court martial, even if he is not subject to military
5,14service.
The enforcement of public security was obviously paramount but it is also clear 
that the imposition of the martial law was conceived as a first measure to enforce 
conscription. On 8 August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem made a general call 
to arms for all men born between 1872 and 1893, including Ottoman subjects 
employed by foreign consulates. Besides the Muslim subjects of the Empire, 
Jews and Christians, who were Ottoman citizens, were called to arms too. By the 
order of the Minister of War, Jews and Christians up to forty five years of age 
were called for military service. In theory they could pay an exemption tax 
{bedel-i askeri) of thirty Turkish Liras and an extra tax of ten Turkish Liras for 
munitions. In practice, the sum requested was high and almost impossible to pay 
considering the economic conditions of urban population.15 It seems, however, 
that Christians were making strenuous efforts in order to pay the exemption tax.16 
The enrolment of the hoops was carried out by the local gendarmerie under the 
control of the municipality. In the first stages of the conscription process recruits 
were sent to Damascus, where the Headquarters of the 4th Army Corps was
1 7stationed. Ottoman authorities also did whatever they could in order to find 
those who avoided military service; military police searched for deserters in 
public and private premises. Some people managed to hide throughout the war
14 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Governor o f Jerusalem, 3 August 1914; ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 
498, Conte Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 7 August 1914.
15 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 12 August 1914.
16 LP, DAVIDSON 398, p. 38, Mr. Renwick to Lord Bryce, 25 September 1914.
17 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 7 August 1914.
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and they reappeared only once the war had ended. The punishment for those who
1 Q
were caught was flogging.
The mobilisation process meant not only the conscription of men but also 
the imposition of strict measures to control the local civilian population and 
foreign citizens. In late August 1914 it seems that the military authorities were 
relatively successful in their efforts while the process of conscription was 
gathering momentum. Apparently 16,000 new recruits were gathered at Nablus.19 
In the beginning, the Islamic appeal to fight alongside the Caliph’s army elicited 
positive responses from the Muslim population. However it seems that other 
factors played a role: fear of punishment and as stated above, a reaction to the 
incoming Jewish immigration.
The finances of the Empire were in poor shape. The outbreak of the war in 
Europe brought serious disruptions to trade, causing state revenue to fall sharply.
onEventually the army faced a shortage of funds and provisions. In this respect, a
parallel concern of the military authorities of Jerusalem was the requisition of
food for the war effort. Food was rationed; in the prisons, for instance, inmates
0 1received only three small loaves of bread daily and water. It can also be argued 
that, as the majority of the population in 1914 was not Muslim, the Ottoman 
authorities tried to capitalise on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects through taxation 
and confiscation of any kind of commodities.22 To an extent the Ottoman 
authorities showed a measure of leniency towards some subjects as suggested by 
the sixth point of the declaration of martial law. Yet this apparent good will
18 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 47.
19 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to American Agent in Beirut, 18 August 1914.
2 0 F.A.K., Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” in Decisions for War 1914, ed. K. Wilson, 250 (London: UCL 
Press, 1995).
21 A. Forder, In Brigand’s Hands & Turkish Prison 1914-1918, (London: Marshall Brothers, 1919), 18.
22 LB, Davidson 398, Memorandum Archbishop, 7 October 1914.
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concealed an order to cash in as much money as possible coming from the 
exemption tax from non Muslim subjects.
In August 1914 the Governor of Jerusalem addressed the foreign consuls 
informing them that according to orders received from the Ministry of War, 
military equipment, such as weapons and gunpowder, would be confiscated from 
foreign subjects. The governor stressed that these orders also applied to animals 
which were crucial as a means of transport and in case of need could have 
provided additional food supplies.23 The Italian consul Senni reported that the 
M utasarnf asked for assistance from the consulates of the neutral countries in 
order to carry out the orders, but this invitation was disregarded by the foreign 
consulates.24 Indeed the consulates were concerned with the protection of their 
interests and those of their subjects. A few days after the proclamation of the 
martial law, the Italian consul noted that the economic crisis was worsening by 
the day. Furthermore, he reported that commerce had completely halted and at 
the same time the cost of living was increasing to a very fast rate as noted 
earlier.25 The prices of all commodities, then, began to rise. Basic foods like rice 
and beans increased by 40 % and 50% and coal for domestic use increased by 
50%.
23 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69, File 824, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 8  August 
1914.
24 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 29 August 1914.
25 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 7 August 1914.
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Table 6: Increase of the cost of living 1914.
Articles Prices before War Prices in November 1914 Increase
Meat 0.74 0.96 30%
Rice 0.177 0.247 40%
Sugar 0.247 0.389 57%
Beans 0.265 0.43 50%
Petroleum 10 Gallons 1.52 2.23 46%
Coffee 1.16 2.05 84%
Potatoes 0.124 0 . 2 1 2 70%
Italian Pasta 0.398 0.637 60%
Alcohol 0.627 1.06 6 6 %
Coal per Ton 15.44 23.015 50%
(The prices are given in U.S. currency)26
The indigenous traders, who were mainly Christians and Jews and specialised in 
the sale of soap, oil and tourist souvenirs, were suffering a great deal of distress. 
Muslim traders, mainly involved in the sale of agricultural products and general 
foodstuffs, experienced the worst. In fact many had not only been dispossessed
77of their goods, but they were also conscripted.
The military authorities also seized buildings and open spaces, mainly for 
military purposes. As troops needed accommodation, hospitals, schools and 
guesthouses for pilgrims were converted into barracks or into military infirmaries. 
The Franciscans of the Custody of the Holy Land reported in September 1914 
that local authorities had seized convents and hospices. Furthermore they had 
ordered the closure of the Franciscan schools both in Jerusalem and generally in
26 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 69/A, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 17 November 1914.
27 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 29 August 1914.
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the Holy Land.28 With the arrival of about forty cannons in the same month the 
urban landscape changed radically as war machinery required space for 
manoeuvres.29 The seizure of buildings was also part of a policy adopted by 
Cemal Pa§a, the military governor of Syria based in Damascus who was overall 
in charge for Palestine. Cemal indicated urban “refurbishment” as his third 
priority in Syria, after the supervision of the war operations and internal 
security. A building belonging to the Greek-Catholic Church of St. Anne in the 
Old City of Jerusalem was turned into an Islamic school with the purpose to 
show a restored Ottoman authority over the city; also monuments were placed 
under renovation and restoration.31
Part of the process of mobilisation was the imposition of censorship in 
order to avoid the circulation of anti-Turkish propaganda. Local newspapers, 
such as the Arabic al-Karmil and the Hebrew ha-Ahdut were closed and their 
publisher arrested as they were accused of publishing anti-Ottoman articles.32 
Besides that, Turkish authorities shut down the post offices ran by European 
countries such as France, Britain but also those of the allied countries of Austria 
and Germany who were serving both the local population and the foreign 
visitors. The only postal service left was that ran by the Ottomans. German and 
Austrian services, as a consequence of the abolition of the capitulations and the 
assertion of full sovereignty, were closed too. The main Ottoman policy was to
28 ASV, Segr. Stato. Affari Eccl., Africa Asia Oceania, Pos. 13 Fasc. 5, Senni to Italian Foreign Minister, 
11 December 1914.
29 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, 498, Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 5 September 1914. According to 
the Italian consul 40 cannons were delivered to Jerusalem and others were expected.
30 H. Kayah, “Wartime Regional and Imperial Integration o f Greater Syria during World War I,” in The 
Syrian Land: Process o f  Integration and Fragmentation”, eds. T. Philipp and B. Schaebler, 301 (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998).
31 Ibid, 303-304.
32 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 38.
33 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Macid §evket to Glazebrook, 22 September 1914. Also M.J. Lagrange, 
“A Jerusalem Pendant la Guerre,” Le Correspondent, February, 1915, 646.
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centralise the service with the purpose of putting an effective control on it. In 
September 1914, Macid §evket in writing to the Ministry of the Interior in 
Istanbul complained that the British were distributing, in closed envelopes, 
notices warning the population: “that Muslims in India and Egypt are satisfied 
with British rule and that they are Anglophiles.” 34 Propaganda of this kind 
became common and censorship was tightened throughout the conflict. The 
military and civil authorities also required all foreigners to register their names in 
police stations with their families.
The Ottomans entered the war in November 1914 with a great degree of 
uncertainty regarding the future. After the great celebrations staged by the 
Ottoman regime both in Istanbul and Jerusalem, which followed the declaration 
of Jihad against the infidels of France and Great Britain, people went back to 
their daily activities with pessimism and anxiety.36 The process of mobilisation 
was over as the war was in fact coming.
3.2 The real value o f  Jerusalem at the beginning o f  the war
There are at least two questions in relation to the political and strategic 
significance of Jerusalem in the context of the First World War. First we need to 
understand why Jerusalem became a crucial focus of the war in the last stages of 
the conflict. Secondly, it is necessary to discuss how Jerusalem was involved in 
the overall military effort which engaged British troops in the Middle East. 
Jerusalem was not strategically important, as the city lay on hills of no military
34 OA, DH.KMS, 27/37, File 31, Macid §evket to Minister of the Interior, Jerusalem, 22 September 1914.
35 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69A, File 811.1, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 16 November 1914,
36 Cemal for instance allowed the cutting o f forty percent of all kinds of trees, damaging some of the local 
industries. H. Kayali, “Wartime Regional,” 300.
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value and it did not possess any key resource. We have to put aside the map of 
the Middle Eastern front and look somewhere else in order to understand the 
increasing importance of the city in British military thinking. The political and 
strategic significance of Jerusalem had its origins in the European front. Some 
major events took place during the war in Europe throughout 1917; the disastrous 
defeat of the Italians at Caporetto by the Austrians and the Germans, the Russian 
revolution (which forced the Russians to abandon the conflict) and the mutinies 
in the French army following the failure of plans by Robert Nivelle, the French 
military commander, to launch a new offensive on the Western front.37
Despite the failed offensive proposed by Nivelle, the military potential of 
the Entente in 1917 was still intact. Yet according to John Keegan and Keith 
Robbins, these events brought doubts and uncertainty amongst the British, 
French and Italian commands regarding the outcome of the war.38 Furthermore, 
on the British side there was a change in the leadership which was the outcome 
of some indecisive policies towards the war. In December 1916 David Lloyd 
George, who belonged to the Liberal Party, took over the seat of Prime Minister. 
Lloyd George sought a personal victory as a moral reward for his country so far 
involved in the conflict. The Prime Minister was a supporter of the Eastern Front. 
He believed as few others that a strong effort in Palestine and Mesopotamia 
would change the course of the war. Like-minded individuals in the Cabinet 
believed it was possible to achieve a faster and decisive victory in Europe once 
the Middle East was tackled. Lloyd George was unable to set a comprehensive
37 Robert Nivelle was nominated Commander in Chief o f the French Army in December 1916, as officer 
of artillery he planned to use new artillery tactics in order to breakthrough the German lines; nevertheless 
his plans proved to be a failure and eventually Nivelle was replaced in April 1917. See J. Keegan, The 
First World War”, (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000), 322-329.
38 See Ibid; K. Robbins, The First World War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
39 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 234.
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war strategy to this effect because of the struggle with William Robertson, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), and with some of the senior members of 
the military establishment.40 Once it was decided to proceed with the military 
campaign in the Middle East further disagreements rose in relation to the targets 
and tasks to achieve by the Expeditionary commander General Allenby.41 Lloyd 
George wanted Jerusalem to boost up the morale of a nation at war. Matthew 
Hughes without exaggerating notes that “in the space of a month [...] Allenby 
pushed forward over forty miles and took a biblical city that eluded the West for 
over seven hundred years; in almost four months of fighting [...] General Haig 
advanced five miles and captured an unknown, ruined Belgian village.”42 What 
Allenby achieved was less important in the great picture of the war against 
Germany, but indeed produced some tremendous effects in terms of propaganda 
and morale.
If  we add the material cost of the operation, in terms of men and resources, 
we may better understand the significance of Jerusalem. The Middle Eastern 
front in early 1917, as well as other fronts, was in a situation of stalemate. On 
June 28th general Edmund Allenby assumed command of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force with instructions to prepare for an offensive campaign 
during the autumn and winter.43 Lloyd George personally ordered the newly 
appointed chief of the Expeditionary Force to make Jerusalem a “Christmas 
present for the British nation.”44 Jerusalem was to be taken no matter what the
40 Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, 33.
41 General Allenby was appointed commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force early in 1917. 
Allenby will be discussed thoroughly in the following sections of this Chapter.
42 Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, 30.
43 BL, Resume o f Operation in Palestine and Arabia since 20th March 1917, in Priestland, Records o f  
Jerusalem, vol. 1, 89.
44 Bullock, Allenby’s War, 6 6 .
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cost, this was clear as far as the Prime Minister was concerned. The ideological 
and symbolic values of the city are the main reasons why Jerusalem has to 
become the object of such intense military scrutiny. The conquest of Jerusalem 
was planned and staged in order to enhance the nation’s morale.45 How to 
conquer Jerusalem was left in the hands of Allenby, who eventually proved to be 
the man for the job. The British had strategic plans for the future by the Sykes- 
Picot agreement (1916), the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915-1916) and 
the Balfour declaration (1917).46 These war time agreements proved to be generic 
as far as the set up of the future administration of the region and indeed 
contradicted each other. But it may be argued that in late 1917 the focus of 
British policy making in the Eastern front was Jerusalem.
The second step of the discussion is now to understand how Jerusalem 
was used as an ideological tool in order to fulfil the purpose of its conquest. 
Evidence suggests that the case for Jerusalem in the Foreign and War Offices 
was built as early as 1917. Although the Eastern Front was debated among 
British officials, Jerusalem had, however, become mainly a personal concern of 
the Prime Minister. It was only later in 1917 and early in 1918 that Jerusalem 
became a topic in the News Department of the War and Foreign Offices. Under 
the supervision of Mark Sykes since November 1917, this department advertised 
and capitalised on the conquest of Jerusalem as we will see later on. As early as 
the spring of 1917 the news that Jerusalem, sooner or later, was to be conquered 
by the British began to spread, thanks to propaganda campaign promoted by the 
Foreign Office, across Europe.
45 Eitan, Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign 1917-18,” 
Journal o f Contemporary History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 87-109.
46 For war time agreements see: Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace.
120
The British government was creating so much expectation that the 
Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem fell victim to this pressure. Genuinely convinced 
of fulfilling a sort of Christian “reconquista”, Rennie Maclnnes in May 1917 
wrote to the High Commissioner of Egypt asking for: “the desirability of taking 
official possession of every building erected originally as a Christian church, 
which is now used as a Mohammedan mosque.”47 Although this was in part 
Maclnnes’ personal opinion it reflected feelings shared by some representative of 
the Anglican Communion at that time.
The British, however, were much more concerned with another issue of 
religious and political character. In fact the Ottoman Sultan was also the spiritual 
leader (Caliph of Islam) of the Muslims inside and outside Ottoman lands. Early 
in the Middle East campaign there was great attention paid by the British not to 
displease the Muslim subjects of their Empire, particularly Indian Muslims, in 
any way. The British looked for Muslim support in the war against the Islamic 
Ottoman Empire; Britain also knew that the Muslims would never forgive any 
damage or disruption to the Holy Muslim shrines located in Ottoman territories.48 
A note issued a few weeks before the conquest of Jerusalem by the News 
Department of the Foreign Office, addressed to the press, clarifies how carefully 
the British intelligence moved in the Muslim world:
“The attention of the press is again drawn to the undesirability o f publishing any article, 
paragraph or picture suggesting that military operations against Turkey are in any sense 
a Holy War, a modem Crusade, or have anything whatever to do with religious 
questions. The British Empire is said to contain a hundred million o f Mohammedan
47TNA: PRO FO 141/473 Maclnnes to High Commissioner of Egypt, Cairo, 2 May 1917.
48 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 100-101.
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subjects of the King and it is obviously mischievous to suggest that our quarrel with 
Turkey is one between Islam and Christianity. ” 49
As clearly stated in the last line, the purpose of this note was to avoid in any way 
that Muslim subjects of the Empire could consider the war as a Christian-Muslim 
conflict.50 Clearly British officials were well aware that Jerusalem as a symbolic 
and ideological tool was extremely hazardous and only if it was managed 
properly, would it bring about the desired outcomes. Retrospectively, it can be 
argued that Jerusalem in the short term proved to be a winning bet. The conquest 
of the Holy City helped gather momentum for the Allies and played a crucial role 
in boosting the morale of the troops employed on the other fronts of the war. 
However, looking at the long term, the occupation of the city created more 
complex disputes rather than solving existent ones.51 Once the British started to 
administer it, the inconsistency of the war-time agreements and promises made to 
Arabs and Jews came to the fore.
3.3 The British conquest o f  Jerusalem: 9 December 1917
Having defined the value and significance of Jerusalem in military and 
political terms, we shall see how Jerusalem was occupied and how the transition 
between the Ottomans to the British took place, literally when the city “changed 
hands”.52 The British attempted twice to take Gaza under the command of 
General Archibald Murray, however he failed to achieve the goal. At the end of 
April 1917 the British Prune Minister David Lloyd George offered the command
49 TNA: PRO FO 395/152, Notice D. 607, 15 December 1917.
50 Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 89.
51 For a long term assessment of the British occupation of Palestine see: T. Segev, One Palestine, 
Complete.
521 need to thank Abigail Jacobson for this image of the “changing hands”.
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to General Edmund Allenby, nicknamed the “Bull”.53 The Palestine campaign 
therefore entered a new phase that eventually led to the capture of Jerusalem.
3.3.1 General Allenby; “the man for the job ”
When the Prime Minister Lloyd George offered the command of 
the EEF to General Allenby, in the spring of 1917, he explicitly asked Jerusalem 
to be taken as soon as possible. Allenby, eventually, proved to be the man for the 
job. Edmund Allenby was born in 1861 in Nottinghamshire, after failing twice to 
enter the Indian Civil Service, he turned to a military career. Allenby served in 
South Africa during the Boer War (1899-1902), where he demonstrated his 
qualities as field commander.54 Allenby was a religious man, so attached to the 
Bible that he chose the name Megiddo (the biblical place for the Armageddon) as 
part of his honorary titles when he was made Viscount in 1919. Allenby had a 
violent temper and a very strong character; not surprisingly he was therefore 
nicknamed “The Bull”. At the outbreak of the First World War he was made 
commander of a cavalry division on the Western front. He took part in the second 
battle of Ypres and in October 1915 took over the British Third Army but at the 
battle of Arras in 1917 he failed and eventually he was replaced. As mentioned 
above in 1917 Allenby was appointed commander of the EEF; he made his name 
popular with the conquest of Jerusalem in 1917 and Damascus in 1918 and with 
the Battle of Megiddo (the traditionally acknowledged site where the 
Armageddon would take place), which was fought in September 1918. In the
5 3 R.D. Adelson, “The Formation of British Policy Towards the Middle East 1914-1918” (PhD thesis, 
Washington University, 1972), 353; A. P. Wavell, Allenby Soldier and Statesman, (London: George G. 
Harrap, 1946), 14.
54 Bullock, Allenby‘s War, 63.
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eyes of his contemporaries, but also of posterity, he turned out to be the modem 
“crusader” par excellence.55 He was an impressive and dramatic figure, who 
personally benefited from being the conqueror of the lands of the Bible.56 After 
his return to England in 1925, he travelled the world extensively and in 1936 he 
was appointed Rector of Edinburgh University. Allenby remained in the Middle 
East as High Commissioner of Egypt and Sudan until 1925 when he retired. 
Edmund Allenby died in London in 1936.57
What General Allenby brought to the Middle Eastern front was a new 
strategy. When Allenby reached Egypt from London it was still not clear how far 
he should go into Palestine but he prepared himself for the third strike on Gaza 
after General Murray had attempted to take the city twice.58 Allenby was to 
change the strategy employed by his predecessor. Rather than a direct attack 
against the city of Gaza he was to strike the village of Beersheba first. The plan 
was to outflank Gaza, so that the British army could attack on two fronts and to 
secure water supplies,59 Allenby’s strategy was of mobile warfare. He relocated 
the headquarters from Cairo to the battlefield near Rafah, a border crossing 
between Egypt and Palestine, close to Gaza.60 The Gaza breakthrough, which 
began on 30 October 1917, consisted of an elaborate plan employing cavalry, 
infantry and artillery. The original plan was that once Beersheba was taken, the 
British would then take Gaza on the flank. However because of a shortage in 
water supplies the attack was delayed giving room for the Turkish army to
55 Hughes, Allenby and British Strateg}>, 13.
56 A  similar, but more detailed opinion is expressed by Hughes, 13,
57 For the biography of Allenby see: B. Gardner, Allenby, (London: Cassell, 1965); Wavell, Allenby 
Soldier; Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy.
58 Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, 31.
59 Ibid, 45; Bruce, The Last Crusade, 115.
60 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 112.
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escape.61 The Turkish soldiers were not able to cope with the new mobile warfare 
adopted by Allenby’s army and did not deploy a flexible defence system as it has 
been suggested by the German military advisors. This proved disastrous for the 
Turkish forces. 62 Allenby was very careful about supplies and logistics, 
particularly about water, a precious commodity in the Palestinian desert.
Transport was a second crucial factor. Allenby at first relied on the 
cavalry but eventually it proved not to be suitable as horses needed large water 
supplies and were unsuited to the uneven terrain of Palestine.63 Hughes states that 
the cavalry was caught between Gaza and Beersheba unable to pursue the 
retreating Turks as they lacked waters for the horses.64 Eventually the British 
turned to rail transport. Rather than building new rail tracks, the British exploited 
the existing Turkish railway lines.
In the meantime at home the Prime Minister pushed for a decisive advance 
towards Jerusalem. While on the ground Allenby wanted to ensure he could be in 
a position to support his army in the advance with water, weapons and other 
supplies.65 By mid-November 1917 the British were moving towards Jerusalem. 
As Allenby was planning the capture of the city, he wished to avoid fighting in 
its proximity as he was fearful of damaging sacred buildings in Jerusalem and 
being labelled as the on who spoilt the Holy City.
61 Ibid, 115; Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, 56.
62 Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, 48-50.
63 Ibid, 56-59.
64 Ibid, 57.
65 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 154.
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3.3.2 The battle fo r Jerusalem in London 1917
Parallel to Allenby’s operations in Palestine, the Foreign and War Offices 
in London were discussing the future asset of Jerusalem. In this section we will 
follow the debate among the members of the different Governmental offices a 
few weeks before the occupation of the city. Most of the policies adopted in 
relation to Jerusalem were indeed a reflection of the war-time agreements 
mentioned earlier. Mark Sykes was the key policy maker who attempted to 
consistently connect policy making in relation to Jerusalem with policy making 
in relation to the wider Middle East. The debate in Government circles also 
shows that British policy makers were aware of and sensitive to the tensions 
between the different religious communities in the city. Their primary aim was 
therefore to avoid any clash between the Christians and Muslims, but also 
between the different Christian denominations. To this effect as early as July 
1917 the Archbishop of Canterbury, under the suggestion of the Foreign Office, 
wrote to the Bishop in Jerusalem, Rennie Maclnnes who was a resident in Cairo 
from 1914, about the desirability in the case of British conquest of Jerusalem, to 
send formal greetings to the other Christian denominations represented in the
• j 6 6city.
A few days after Allenby’s army took Gaza in early November 1917, the 
Prisoner of War Department in London wondered if any one of General 
Allenby’s staff was aware and had knowledge of the religious complications 
surrounding the question of the Holy Places.67 In November 1917 Mark Sykes, 
now advisor to the Cabinet on Middle Eastern affairs, acknowledged that
66 TNA: PRO FO 141/773, Archbishop to Bishop Maclnnes, London, 18 July 1917,
67 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Prisoner o f War Department to Lord Robert Cecil, London, 8  November 
1917.
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problems might have occurred, however he stated that: “I believe myself that 
rows about the Holy Places are usually of Turkish origin, and I do not apprehend 
people will desire to indulge in immediate fights.”68 In this important document 
Mark Sykes advocates some of the main policies which were to be enforced after 
Jerusalem surrendered. Two spheres, according to this report, were crucial to 
bear in mind: the local dimension and the international one. Sykes proposed that 
the Christian places were to be guarded by men accustomed to police work. 
Secondly, he proposed that a British political officer with executive military 
authority should supervise the maintenance of order in the city. As regards to the 
Muslim shrines, Sykes proposed that the Aqsa Mosque was to be handed to a 
representative of the King of Hejaz, Sharif Husayn, and a military cordon was to 
be established around the perimeter of the mosque. Furthermore, non-Muslims 
were not to be allowed to enter the area of the Temple without a proper pass 
released by the political officers and countersigned by the King’s
69representatives.
Under the excuse that “agent provocateurs may be left behind” Sykes 
proposed to purge the city of any enemy influence, mainly represented by 
Christian clerics of German and Austrian citizenship, and to allow a degree of 
control over religious institutions on the part of French and Italian 
governments. Sykes also proposed that the city was to be placed under military 
administration and martial law, so as to avoid Franco-Italian complaints. Under 
martial law, France and Italy would not have been able to compete for the control 
of religious and educational institutions. French and Italians were given the right
68 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes Report, London, 13 November 1917.
59 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes Report, London, 13 November 1917.
70TNA: PRO FO 371/3061 Report of Mark Sykes on 13 November 1917.
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to take charge of those institutions where the majority of the clergy was French 
or Italian. Lastly, Sykes suggested that a register of clerics from countries on the 
opposite side of the war left in Jerusalem, was to be compiled for the purpose to 
expel Austrian and German priests, monks and friars belonging to religious 
institutions in Jerusalem.
Soon after, the Foreign Office sent Sykes’ remarks to Reginald Wingate, 
the British High Commissioner of Egypt, making a further addition. In the 
doorway of the Holy Sepulchre there was a Muslim waqf, a small religious 
endowment, which housed the Muslim family of the Nuseibeh responsible for the 
key of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In the event of the conquest of 
Jerusalem, the Foreign Office expressed the desire that the Muslim w aqf was to 
be maintained in order to respect the status quo and not to upset the Muslim 
subjects of the Empire.71 Wingate, as requested, discussed with Allenby the 
whole document. The joint document produced by the two officials which was 
subsequently then sent to the Foreign Office a few days later, shows remarkable
77differences from the points made by Sykes. Wingate and Allenby noted that 
there would be no representatives of the King of Hejaz in Jerusalem. More 
importantly, the appointment of a representative of the King of Hejaz in an 
official position in Jerusalem, could give rise to aspirations which were in 
contrast with the provision of the Sykes-Picot agreement, according to which 
Jerusalem was to be placed under an international administration. Therefore, 
Allenby and Wingate proposed that the Mosque of Omar and the other Muslim 
Holy Places should be come under the control of Muslim troops, namely Indians.
71 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Foreign Office to Wingate, London, 17 November 1917.
72 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Wingate to Foreign Office, Cairo, 19 November 1917.
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Secondly, Allenby proposed the appointment of Colonel Borton Pasha, former 
Postmaster-General of the Egyptian Postal Service, as military governor of 
Jerusalem in charge of the administration.
This debate came to a close three weeks before the actual occupation of 
the city when the War Office formalised the main policies to be adopted for its
73administration. This was announced in the form of a note prepared by the War 
Office as guidelines for the announcement to be made by the Prime Minister on 
the occasion of British entiy in Jerusalem. In this note the suggestions made by 
Wingate and Allenby with regards to the Muslim Holy Places were taken into 
consideration. Non-Muslims would not be permitted to pass the cordon 
established around the Mosque of Omar without permission from the political 
officer and the Muslim official in charge of the Mosque. Internal security was to 
be the primary task of the newly occupant force. Whilst the question of the 
presence of one representative of the King of Hejaz was completely dropped, the 
policy makers in London felt that they had to go an extra length in order to 
strengthen their position in front of the Muslims as they could not afford to upset 
the many Indian Muslim subjects of the Empire. Therefore, the Tomb of the 
Patriarchs at Hebron, Rachael’s tomb and other holy shrines were to be placed 
under Muslim control.74
In mid-November 1917 in London the occupation of Jerusalem was 
considered only a question of time. Available sources have highlighted the
73 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, War Office to Headquarters Cairo, London, 21 November 1917.
74 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, War Office to Headquarters in Cairo, 21 November 1917. Only the points 
different from the first drafts are reported. “Prime Minister wishes to make first announcement of  
occupation o f Jerusalem in House o f Commons in following terms. (1) Manner in which you were 
received by the population. (2) That you entered Holy city on foot. (5) That Mosque of Omar and area 
around it has been placed under Moslem control. (7) That Tomb at Hebron has been placed under 
exclusive Moslem control and guards established at Bethlehem and on Rachel’s tomb. [..] Please wire me 
in above terms as far as you may be able to comply with them.”
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divergences between the War Office and the Foreign Office. The former 
advocated military occupation of the city as at that time the future of Palestine 
and the war as a whole was unclear. In contrast the Foreign Office was already 
working towards the consolidation of a strong civilian rule. Moreover the 
commitments taken with the Balfour Declaration meant that a military 
occupation could have been only a transitional administration. The Foreign 
Office in early January 1918 pressed Wingate for more propaganda material to 
be sent in to London as it was necessary to create support for a lasting British 
presence in Palestine and Jerusalem75
3.3.3 “Genisalemme Liberata ”
Between 1565 and 1575 the medieval Italian poet Torquato Tasso wrote 
the epic poem entitled “Gerusalemme Liberata” (Jerusalem Delivered). Tasso 
related the adventures of Godfrey of Bouillon and other crusader knights who 
fought the first crusade that ended with the capture of Jerusalem in July 1099. 
Godfrey of Bouillon became a popular hero, the protagonist of many chansons de 
geste written since the twelfth century.76 Little more than eight hundred years 
later General Allenby was portrayed as the heir of Godfrey of Bouillon. The title 
of a short movie filmed during the official entry of Allenby in Jerusalem was 
highly symbolic: “With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby the
77Conqueror.” The Times defined the occupation of Jerusalem as the “most 
memorable event in the history of Christendom.” Both Allenby and Godfrey de
75 TNA: PRO FO 371/3383, Foreign Office to'Wingate, London, 2 January 1918.
76 See T.S. Asbridge, The First Crusade: a New History, (London: Free, 2004); M. Foss, People o f  the 
First Crusade, (London: M. O’Mara Books, 1997); A. Maalouf, The Crusade Through Arab Eyes, 
(London: A1 Saqi, 1984).
7 7 IWM, Film and Video Archive, IWM 145.
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Bouillon entered popular imagery as the conquerors of Jerusalem, the heroes who 
had defeated “the infidels.”78
Jerusalem was conquered by Godfrey de Bouillon after a siege with the 
help of a movable tower.placed under the walls; Allenby also brought with him a 
new strategy of mobile warfare. Godfrey de Bouillon and Allenby also share a 
common fate as Christian conquerors of Jerusalem. Godfrey entered the city and 
immediately faced the internal divisions among the Christians. Similarly Allenby 
had to face rising tension among the different ethnic and religious communities 
of Jerusalem as we will see later.79
Some scholars have depicted the conquest of Jerusalem as a personal 
enterprise of Allenby; others have pointed out that London pushed for a quick 
advance. Cyril Falls, in his recollection of the military operations in Egypt and 
Palestine, and the Marquess of Anglesey in his history of the British cavalry, 
gave the whole credit of the conquest of Jerusalem to Allenby, stressing 
Allenby’s determination.80 Anthony Bruce suggests how political pressure played 
a crucial role in pursuing military operations on the Palestine front.81 As I have 
shown earlier, it was the political establishment of the Foreign Office and the 
Prime Minister himself who planned and pushed for the final advance which led 
to the capture of Jerusalem. Allenby’s troops halted their march towards 
Jerusalem after Gaza and Jaffa were secured. Troops were tired and fresh 
supplies were urgently needed; particularly water. However, Allenby saw the
78 See for instance IWM, Film and Video Archive 45, “With the Crusaders in the Holy Land. Allenby: the 
Conqueror”, 1919; see also The Times (London), December 11, 1917. The debate over the “Crusade” 
theme will be discussed further down in this chapter and also in chapter 7.
79 For Godfrey see T.S. Asbridge, The First Crusade, 316-319; for the ethnic/religious divisions o f the 
city see Chapters 5 and 6 .
80 C. Falls, Militaiy Operations Egypt and Palestine, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1930); The Marquess of 
Anglesey, A Histoiy o f the British Cavalry, vol. 5, (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).
81 Bruce, The Last Crusade.
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COapparent disorganisation of the enemy and decided to press to Jerusalem. As 
Allenby wished to avoid close fighting to the city, as opposed to his predecessor 
Godfrey de Bouillon, he planned an elaborate siege, which proved to be a more 
difficult tactic than a direct attack.83 The XXI Coips was to advance through the 
main road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, while the 52nd Division and the Yeomanry
iL
Mounted Division advanced north of Jerusalem. The 75 Division was to join 
them as it approached Jerusalem in order to cut the Nablus-Jerusalem road. The 
operation started on 19 November but the following day it was delayed by a 
heavy rain storm that caused great distress to all the troops. These troops were 
equipped with summer uniforms and not prepared for the cold and wet weather.
nA
The winter clothing was yet to become available. The Turkish troops were 
scattered across the Judean Hills which surrounded Jerusalem. The German 
General Erich von Falkenhayn, who replaced General Friederich Kress von 
Kressenstein on 5 November 1917, adopted a strategy of survival. He left few 
contingents as rear guards on the hills surrounding Jerusalem with the purpose of 
delaying British advance, giving time to the Ottoman Seventh Army to organise 
for a proper defence of the city. On 24 November Allenby halted the operations 
as it was necessary to move supplies from Gaza to the first line and to give some 
respite to the troops whilst replacing the XXI Corps with the XX Corps which 
was stationed on the coast under the command of Lieutenant General Philip 
Chetwode. Von Falkenhayn seized this opportunity and organised a counter
82 Field Marshal Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book o f the Turkish Front 1914-18, (London: 
Pan Books, 2003), 212-222.
83 A, Bruce, The Last Crusade, 155. A direct order to the XXI Corps stated: “No operations are to 
undertaken within a six miles radius o f Jerusalem”. Quoted in The Marquess o f Anglesey, A Histoiy o f  
British Cavahy, 205.
84 A. Bruce, The Last Crusade, 156.
85 Ibid, 157.
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offensive based on a “shock tactic”. His troops began to strike the British forces 
on 27 November but by 3 December the Turco-Gennan troops were forced to 
halt their offensive.86
The deployment of the XX Coips became pivotal in the final battle for 
Jerusalem. On 3 December under the command of Chetwode the British high 
rank officials, met in the Judean Hills and planned the capture of Jerusalem. The 
plan was to cut the main roads which connected the cities of Hebron to 
Bethlehem and to Nablus, using the Jaffa road to deploy the artillery. The 
Turkish army was left with only one possibility to escape the city, from the South. 
Between 3 and 7 December the units involved in the attack took position while 
the Turkish Seventh Army was entrenched in the hills west of Jerusalem. Von 
Falkenheyn knew that the fate of Jerusalem was a matter of time and since 7 
December had started to evacuate German and Turkish troops from the city 
where rumours of the British advance spread rapidly. Von Falkenhayn informed 
the Spanish Consul Ballobar that the Turks, at the beginning of December, were 
planning the expulsion of foreigners and Jews.87
On 7 December everything was ready on the British side for the second 
assault on Jerusalem. Despite the cold and the heavy rain the British were able to 
surround Jerusalem. On 8 December the Turks began to withdraw from the city, 
more out of fear of the encroaching British troops, rather than as result of British 
military operations, alongside the German and Austrian officials. The Turkish 
Governor and the German and Austrian consuls also fled during the night.88
86 Ibid, 159; Bullock, Allenby's War, 91; Falls, Military Operations, 235-236.
87 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 230.
88 Ibid, 234-235.
133
Nothing was left; the Turkish governor of the city, Izzet Pa§a, was the last civil 
official to leave before dawn with the help of Mr. Vester of the American Colony.
In the meantime, the 60th and 74th Divisions were operating on the Jaffa- 
Jerusalem road; the 53rd Division was not far from Bethlehem, whilst the 
Worcestershire Yeomanry and the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment were 
expected to be the liaison of the 60th and the 53rd Divisions; the 179th Brigade of 
the 60th Division began the advance towards Jerusalem on the night of 7 
December.89 They were not aware of the Turkish retreat and they were possibly 
more concerned with the bad weather conditions and with the probability of a 
fight the day after.
No fighting took place inside Jerusalem, and by 9 December the city was 
free from Turkish and German troops. The last Turkish soldier is said to have left 
Jerusalem early in the morning through St. Stephens or Lion’s Gate.90 The battle 
for Jerusalem was over.
89 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 160; Bullock, Allenby’s War, 92-93.
90 TNA: PRO 395/237, “The Last Days o f Jerusalem under the Turk”, V. Jabotinsky, 4 February 1918; 
The Palestine News (Jerusalem), March 7, 1918.
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M ap 2: T he battle for Jerusalem
3.3.4 "A dramatic incident o f  war"91: the surrender o f  Jerusalem
It took until late December for the British army to secure Jerusalem from 
Turkish counterattacks. As Jerusalem was occupied its surrender became an 
ideological tool in British hands and not surprisingly, this is reflected in the 
different accounts on the occupation of the city. The mayor Husayn Salim 
Effendi al-Husayni “delivered" the city to the British on 9 December but this
91 Falls. Military> Operations, 252.
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official occupation was staged two days later, by Allenby and the Foreign and 
War Offices. In this section I shall first provide a different perspective on the 
surrender of Jerusalem as a “dramatic incident of war” by concentrating on the 
dynamics of the surrender which preceded Allenby’s official entry. Secondly I 
will briefly compare and contrast the official narratives employed in the account 
of Allenby’s entry in Jerusalem.
The slow surrender of Jerusalem began on the morning of 9 December 
when before leaving the city alongside the withdrawing Turco-German troops, 
the Governor of Jerusalem Izzet Pa§a met the mayor al-Husayini and handed him 
the decree of surrender addressed to the British commander which stated:
“To the English Command. Since two days howitzer shells are falling on some places 
in Jerusalem which (city) is sacred to all nations. (Therefore) The Ottoman Government, 
for the sole purpose o f protecting the religious places, has withdrawn her soldiers from 
the city. And she installed officials to protect the Holy Place such as the Holy 
Sepulchre and the Aqsa Mosque with the hope that the same treatment (of the place) 
will also continue from your side. I am sending this letter to you by the acting 
Mayor. ” 92
The mayor decided to keep the document and he simply read it to the British. 
Husayn al-Husayini, alongside the other notables of the city, fearing that if the 
Turkish army returned they would be branded as traitors.93 For their part the 
Ottoman authorities saw to it that Holy Places were left guarded, a course of 
action which underlined the religious value of the city. Ottomans wanted to 
rescue their religious credentials as both Sultanate and Caliphate had not been 
yet abolished. Germany and Austria were Christian countries and had an 
international image to protect at home as well. German and Austrian troops left
92 T. Canaan, “Two Documents on the Surrender of Jerusalem,” The Journal o f  the Palestine Oriental 
Society’ 10, no. 1 (1930): 27-32.
93 Ibid, 28.
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the city quietly without unnecessary devastation. Real-politick and religious 
concerns played a major role in the undertaking of these decisions.
The events that led to the surrender of the city are clearly evident in the 
chaos which followed the collapse of Ottoman rule, but also are evidence of the 
crucial importance of the notables as the “local” intermediaries par excellence as 
explained in the previous chapter.
Early on 9 December the mayor of Jerusalem Husayn Salim Effendi al- 
Husayni, delegated by the governor to surrender the city, went to the American 
Colony, a Christian institution located outside the city walls to the East, and 
knocked at the door of the Spafford, the founder family and manager of the 
Colony. As the American Colony was active in the relief of the local population, 
the mayor became a close friend of the Spafford. He announced that he was 
going to deliver the letter of surrender, left to him by the Governor of Jerusalem, 
for the English troops. Lady Spafford, excited by the news received, warned him 
not to go without a white flag as a symbol of truce.94 It is not clear whether this 
was a genuine suggestion in order to avoid incidents or simply Lady Spafford, in 
classical orientalist mode believing that the Mayor had no understanding of the 
rules of military surrender.
This was the first step of one of the several surrenders that took place on 
that day as the military and civilian authorities collapsed. Although public order 
was maintained by the municipal police, it was difficult to control the movements 
of the population. Civilians left Jerusalem looking for supplies and seeking help 
from the invading army as soon as residents realised that the city was abandoned 
by the German-Turkish troops. Wasif Jawhariyyeh, a local resident, reported that
94 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 255.
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some people were cutting down the Ottoman telephone lines and taking them 
home.95 Jerusalemites were looking for food, water, clothes and animals as 
suggested by the Conde de Ballobar. Furthermore he noted that along Jaffa Road, 
outside the walls, pillage was the main activity of the Jerusalemites: “everything 
suitable to be taken was stolen.” The Spanish diplomat also reported that 
municipal police were rather helpless and did not intervene.96 The police forces 
were aware that as soon as the British were to take over, pillaging would stop.
Whilst wandering around the city, it was one of these civilian groups who 
first met two British soldiers, Private Church and Andrews, who, as cooks were
07looking for “some heggs for their hofficers”. They were sent by their superiors 
to look for some fresh supplies like milk or eggs and apparently had lost their 
way.98 The Mayor, accompanied by a small party, called by the crowd attempted 
to deliver the keys to the city to them but they refused and returned to their 
battalion. Apparently on their way back other civilians met the two privates and 
informed them that the city desired to surrender.99
Of course this episode sounds quite amusing, and quite likely did not 
sound heroic or reasonably epic enough to be officially reported. The wanderings 
of the official surrendering party and the civilians around the city were almost 
bizarre. While the crowds of Jerusalem were busy looking for any suitable 
supplies left outside the walls, the Mayor with the decree of surrender in his 
hands was still looking for British troops, with the purpose of officially
95 A. Amireh, “My Last Days as an Ottoman Subject,” Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 9, (Summer 2000): 
31-32.
96 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 236.
97 V. Gilbert, The Romance o f the Last Crusade, (London: Appleton & C., 1928), 166. Gilbert reported 
the name “Murch” rather than “Church”, however it seems plausible the correct spelling is “Church”, 
considering that all other sources used this last name.
98 Falls, Military Operations, 252.
99 Ibid, 252.
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surrendering the city. Following the first unfortunate meeting with the two 
British soldiers, al-Husayni and his party met Sergeant Hurcomb and Sergeant 
Sedgewick of the 219th Battalion London Regiment on outpost duty, who refused 
to accept the surrender of the city. On one hand, the soldiers were not of the 
proper rank to accept the surrender and on the other hand, they were not sure of 
the identity of the Mayor. The third meeting between al-Husayni and British 
soldiers was with Major Barry and Major Beck.100 Eventually, they contacted 
their superiors and the commander of the 303rd, Royal Field Artillery, Lieut - 
Colonel Bayley who met the notable party. The meeting was somewhat of bizarre 
as Bayley walked towards al-Husayni and “there he was with three chairs in a
i nirow on the road.” Bayley sat down with the mayor on one side and the chief of 
the municipal police on the other as the mayor read for the first time the act of 
surrender. Lieut.-Colonel Bayley first telegraphed Major-General Shea and then 
arranged the occupation of some of the key buildings inside the city.
At the same time Brigadier General Watson, commander of the 180th 
Brigade, arrived on the spot and also accepted the surrender of Jerusalem from 
al-Husayni. However, this particular event, in the same way as the “other” 
surrenders, was cancelled from official reports. An order was issued to the effect 
that evidence should be destroyed including photographs and negatives of the 
Brigadier General Watson. Only evidence regarding General Allenby was to 
be recorded. Around noon Major-General Shea was ordered by General
100 Ibid; Bertha Spafford Vester quoted also Major Cooke as being present to the meeting, however from 
the sources available it appears Major Cooke arrived later and was order to take over the post office.
101 IWM, Bayley Papers.
102 A zealous soldier saved some of these pictures for apparently no reason. The pictures mentioned are 
conserved at the Imperial War Museum, London, in the photographic collection. Segev, One Palestine, 
Complete, 54; argues that when Shea learned that pictures were taken o f Watson he immediately ordered 
that the negatives be destroyed.
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Chetwode commander of the XX Corps to take over the city. After a short 
surrender ceremony he did so in the name of General Allenby, commander of the 
EEF.103 After four hundred years of Turkish rule, Jerusalem was delivered to 
British forces.
In comparison with the development of the events discussed earlier, the 
British government issued only one short official document on the circumstances 
of the surrender of the city which detailed the involvement of a parlementaire 
who was sent by the enemy on 9 December,104 It is difficult to elaborate a 
particular official narrative, in fact apart from the bizarre events that will be 
discussed later, Jerusalem was won with no actual fight as the city was 
abandoned by the Turco-German troops. As discussed above the occupation of 
Jerusalem was a powerful political symbol to be exploited at home for public 
consumption. The fact that there are no official reports on the early attempts on 
the part of the mayor to deliver the city, clarifies the high symbolic value 
attached to the city by the British.
General Allenby made his formal entry into the city following plans which 
had been carefully staged by Sykes. He entered Jerusalem on foot, as opposed to 
the German Emperor Wilhelm II who in 1898 had entered the city riding a horse. 
The Daily Mail reported the event somewhat flamboyantly: “As a conqueror 
General Allenby entered Jerusalem on December 11 with more simplicity and 
true dignity than Kaiser Wilhelm did when he presented himself as a blend of 
Cook’s tourist and Envoy o f  A llah”105 Allenby was followed by a procession of 
British military officials, two small Italian and French contingents and
103 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 162-163; Falls, M ilitaiy Operations, 254.
104 TNA: PRO FO 141/473, Press Communique No. 137, Cairo, 12 December 1917.
105 Daily Mail (London), December, 1917. Press cuttings from Allenby’s Paper, 4/3.
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representatives of the religious communities. He then read, in several languages 
including English. French, Italian. Arabic and Hebrew, the proclamation of
U,B-feTbI C B .B H 0 L E E M A
PO K A E C TB O  XPHCTOBO
SIZtzzy 0&t?btin*s
S o u v cu it occu p ation  e fc ru ta ttm  luj tftc IBiitwA.
<fcoc*p> on Stefcnnterp, ISMT.
martial law, stressing the British would confirm and maintain the existing 
customs in relation to the Holy Places.106
Illustration  4: 1917 C h ristm as Postcard
3.4 Jerusalem conquered: local British and international reactions
The occupation of Jerusalem had important local, regional and 
international repercussions and elicited responses across the world. Inside the 
city the inhabitants of Jerusalem endeavoured to come to terms with foreign 
occupation. Far from Palestine, the reactions of British policy makers were
l<H' TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, General Allenby Reports. Jerusalem. 11 December 1917.
107 Free Copyright; the postcard was addressed to “Elena” as in the back but no more details are given.
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consistent with the agenda they had put forward before the occupation, yet the 
British troops and public opinion in the United Kingdom eventually reacted in a 
variety of ways. The question of the reaction of the international community to 
the British occupation is also extremely important considering that in accordance 
with the agreement negotiated during the war, Jerusalem was to be placed under 
international administration.
S.4.1 Finally fi*ee from the Turks
Regardless of their background, the Jerusalemites generally welcomed the 
British Army, as ultimately the regime of the CUP was over. The process of 
Turkification which had started before the war, the mobilisation of resources for 
the military effort and war conditions exacerbated the relationship between local 
residents, both indigenous and foreigners, and their Turkish rulers.108 The streets 
of the city became crowded, packed with joyful people; people who, at least in 
the first stages of the British occupation, genuinely and warmly welcomed the 
British troops.109 According to a dramatic statement of Conde Ballobar: “The 
popular enthusiasm was spontaneous and terrific. Every British soldier was 
followed by an unbelievable crowd that touched them and their horses, they 
admired them as heroes.”110 Major Vivian Gilbert, marching through the old city 
was impressed by the warm welcome of the locals: “The narrow streets were 
packed with towns-people, old men and women and children, all wild with
108 TNA: PRO FO 882/14, “The Politics of Jerusalem”, 29 December 1916; ACTS, “Cronaca di Terra 
Santa”, Fr. E. Castellani.
109 Conde Ballobar, Diario, 237.
110 Ibid.
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delight and dressed in their best to greet the victorious army.” 111 Although 
jubilant, the Arab population both Muslims and Christians were looking for a 
justification for supporting a new foreign occupation. Although the imagery of 
the Crusade was almost forgotten in Muslim memory, they nonetheless were 
forced to confront the mounting crusading mania which was spreading through 
the British press in Britain and the local Christian churches.112
In the aftermath of the occupation, British propaganda endeavoured to 
make the new rulers acceptable to the Arab Muslim population. The Foreign 
Office also sought to stage the British entry in Jerusalem in accordance with a 
Muslim story which claimed that a prophet would enter the city in order to end 
Turkish rule while the waters of the river Nile would flow into Palestine; the 
British were carrying water from Egypt to Palestine through a pipeline. As for 
the prophet’s story, an anagram was made with Allenby’s name that was 
miraculously transformed into al-Nabi (the prophet).113 However, the Foreign 
offices’ planned pipeline proved not to be feasible, in fact it looked quite bizarre 
and artificial. In Britain Allenby was also presented as a Muslim conqueror as 
suggested by a headline of The Times “Saladin entered [Jerusalem] in triumph as 
General Allenby enters it to-day.”114 This comparison evoked the compassionate 
and pro-Muslim stance of the British general as furthermore, another connection 
between ancient prophecies and the British conquest of Jerusalem was found in
111 Gilbert, The Romance, 174.
112 There is an interesting debate about the memories of the Crusades in the Muslim imaginary; originally 
the Muslims looked at the Crusaders as ifrang, westerners, therefore not in religious terms; it was only 
later with the arrival o f the Zionists and the imperial policies of the British that the Muslims evoked the 
ancient memory o f the Crusades. See P.M. Holt, The Age o f the Crusades, (London: Longman, 1986); J.P. 
Berkey, The Formation o f  Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); see also D.R. 
Woodward, Hell in the Holy Land, (Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 2006), 138-141.
113 Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 98-99; B, Brian, The First World War and 
British Military Histoiy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 192.
114 The Times (London), December 11, 1917.
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the Bible as the Book of Daniel (Ch. 12, verse 12) states: “Blessed is he that 
waiteth and cometh to the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days.” This 
passage was promptly understood by some Christians but also some Muslims as 
the fulfilment of a prophecy as the year 1335 of the Muslim era (hijira) 
corresponded to the year 1917 of the Gregorian calendar.115
In 1917 there were great expectations among the local population. The 
Christians especially hoped to enjoy more freedom under the aegis of a Christian 
power. The Arabs envisaged a possible inclusion in an Arab state following the 
awakening of Arab sentiment after the Arab rebellion led by Sharif Husayn of the 
Hejaz in 1916. The Jewish population was indeed waiting for a more tolerant rule 
whilst the Zionist expected to profit from the change of regime as in fact a few 
weeks before the British occupation of Jerusalem, the British government issued 
the Balfour Declaration which raised hopes for the creation of a National Jewish 
Home in Palestine.
Despite popular furore and expectations, the Catholic clergy were 
sceptical about the British occupation. The Franciscans, for instance, feared that 
the city rather than liberated was simply passing under Anglican rule. They had 
hoped for a Catholic power to take over the administration of the city.116 Besides 
the Custody of the Holy Land, Wasif Jawhariyyeh, an Arab Christian (Greek 
Orthodox) conscript in the Turkish army, who remained in the city after the 
Turco-German troops left, provides an interesting perspective on the changing 
attitude of Arab residents who had some nationalist inclinations. He noted in his 
diary: “I remember this day [of the British occupation] to have been a very happy
115 A. Bluett, With Our Army in Palestine, (London: Andrew Melrose, 1919), 222; Gilbert, The Romance, 
178.
116 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, 8  December 1917.
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one for the people. You could see them dancing for joy in the streets,
117congratulating each other on this happy occasion”. As far as Wasif was 
concerned however, the “honeymoon” did not last long. As the diary was written 
later in the 1940s, there is no doubt that his narrative was affected by the clashes 
of the 1920s and 1930s between Arabs and Jews, in fact from the same diary, 
Wasif Jawhariyyeh assess British occupation with the following words: “We did 
not realize then that this damned occupation would be a curse, not a blessing, for 
our dear homeland.”118
One last section should be dedicated to the British men who occupied 
Jerusalem. The first reaction of British troops as they entered the city was of 
strong emotion; some of them felt part of a great mission, others felt like new 
crusaders. W.T. Massey official correspondent of the London newspapers with 
the EEF noted that “not a great proportion would claim to be really devout men, 
but they all behaved like Christian gentlemen.”119 Nevertheless it was necessary 
to stress both to the population and to the troops themselves that British troops 
were not conquerors but liberators. In this connection a notice was posted on the 
city walls soon after its conquest:
“The British troops have entered the Jerusalem not as conquerors but as liberators, and 
their advent has been joyfully welcomed alike by Moslems, by Christians and by Jews.
By this historic stroke, Jerusalem has been freed from the shadow o f an age-long tyranny, 
and a prosperous future has been opened up for the virile and intelligent races who inhabit 
the soil o f Palestine. ” 120
The Military did not know yet that they were to stay for a long period eventually 
becoming a long lasting occupying force.
117 Amireh, “My Last Days,” 31; also S. Tamari, “Jerusalem’s Ottoman Modernity: The Times and Lives 
o f Wasif Jawhariyyeh,” Jerusalem Quarterly File, Issue 9, (Summer 2000).
118 Amireh, “My Last Days”; Tamari, “Jerusalem’s Ottoman Modernity,” 7-9.
119 W.T. Massey, How Jerusalem Was Won, (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 201.
120 LP, H5672 J4 4, Document 12.
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3.4.2 Response in Britain to the occupation o f Jerusalem
In Britain Jerusalem represented the Biblical focus of Christian life. 
Furthermore, Jerusalem was the city that had been precluded centuries earlier to 
the national hero Richard Coeur de Lion (the Lionheart) who, in the attempt to 
re-take Jerusalem from Salah al-Din in 1192, never reached Jerusalem. The 
popular press celebrated the news of the conquest of Jerusalem with great 
headlines as the one of the Daily Telegraph who celebrated Allenby as the hero 
who accomplished the feat which Richard Coeur de Lion, our Crusader King, 
just failed to achieve.121
The Foreign Office aimed to strengthen the effects of this event in terms 
of propaganda while the War Office was concerned with the continuation of the 
military campaign in Syria and Palestine. From the Foreign Office Sykes wrote 
to the British headquarters in Cairo: “If we have full and detailed information [on 
the occupation of Jerusalem] we can get much atmospheric advantage wherever 
these influences [propaganda on Vatican, Zionist, Orthodox] have effect.”122 The 
idea was to create a “mediatic” effect in Britain. In early 1918 Sykes invited the 
News Department to send correspondents to Palestine in order to write articles on 
the history, politics and society of Jerusalem. Through these articles Sykes 
proposed to “spice up” the case in order to exploit the capture of Jerusalem in 
order to support the British cause. It seems Sykes was setting up the ground, 
looking for support for the Balfour Declaration. The conquest of Jerusalem was 
also important as it boosted the morale of British troops deployed on all war 
fronts but also of all military and civilians involved in the war. W.T. Massey
121 Daily Telegraph (London), December 12, 1917. Press cuttings from Allenby’s Papers 4/3, Liddle Hart 
Centre from Military Archives, King’s College, London.
122 TNA: PRO FO 371/3388, Sir Mark Sykes to Clayton, London, 14 January 1918.
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claimed that “the capture of the Holy City by British arms gave more satisfaction 
to countless of millions of people that did the winning back for France of any big
19Btown on the Western front.”
The British Jews also rejoiced as highlighted by The Jewish Chronicle in 
London: “The capture of Jerusalem illumines with the picturesque grim
1 94battlefields of the world.” Vladimir Jabotinsky, a leading Zionist and future 
leader of a prominent paramilitary organisation {Haganah) which operated 
during the Mandate period, published many articles in the British press, 
suggesting the close involvement between the British Foreign Office and the
19SZionist leadership. His first article was published in The Times in February 
1918 and dealt with the last days of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, stressing the 
positive effect of the British occupation in opposition to the weak and inefficient 
Turkish rule. This article left religious issues aside and refrained from 
mentioning words such as crusade or crusaders in order not to alarm the Muslim 
public opinion belonging to the British Empire.126 In another article published 
few months later, Jabotinsky criticised the despised the old Jewish communities 
of Jerusalem as they contributed to the lowering of “Jewish prestige in the eyes 
of the British” and as they resisted the activity of the Zionist Commission which
123 Massey, How Jerusalem Was Won, 190.
124 The Jewish Chronicle (London), December 14, 1917.
125 Vladimir Jabotinsky was born in 1880 in Odessa (Russia). He studied in many European countries and 
in 1903 joined the Zionist Movement. Until 1914 he worked as journalist in Russia, and then he became 
correspondent o f war from Egypt. Between 1915 and 1917 Jabotinsky conducted a campaign for a 
creation of a Jewish legion under British command. In 1920 he was involved in the Nebi Musa riots as he 
created a self defence armed unit {Haganah). Tried and convicted by British authorities he travelled 
across Europe and then moved to the United States. He became the promoter o f revisionist movement 
within the Zionism. He died in 1940 while campaigning for the creation o f a Jewish army to fight the 
Nazi. For biographical details see Y. Benari, Zeev Vladimir Jabotinsky, (Tel Aviv: Jabotinsky Institute, 
1977); J.B. Schechtman, The Life and Times o f  Vladimir Jabotinsk)>, vol. 1, (Silver Spring MD: Eshel 
Books, 1986).
126 TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, “The Last Days o f Jerusalem Under the Turks”, February 1918.
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1 onhanded out the funds available as war relief. Jabotinsky openly criticised those 
Jews belonging to the old Jewish communities who lived off alms collected, the 
Halukka. He was also critical of those Jews whose only function was to say 
prayers before the Wailing Wall. This article also tells us of the mounting tension 
among the Zionist Commission and the “Halukka Jews.” The Zionist 
Commission wanted to show that Jews were different from this stereotype and 
that the new Jewish style was represented by the Zionist settlers in Tel Aviv and 
Rehovoth.128
3.4,3 International views on the British capture o f  Jerusalem
As suggested by a telegram of the War Cabinet sent on 13 December 1917 
“the capture of Jerusalem [...] is an event of historic and world-wide
19Qsignificance.” It is not surprising how events in Jerusalem attracted the interest 
of many governments around the world as the British occupation of the city had 
long term strategic and political consequences for the future o f the Middle East. 
The main concern of this section is to discuss the international responses to the 
British occupation of the city, particularly in its immediate aftermath.
The Christian Churches and the Christian Powers who had interests in 
Jerusalem officially welcomed British rule. The Greek Orthodox Church in 
London wrote in December to the Archbishop of Canterbury praising: “The great 
achievement of the fall of Jerusalem fills [...] the glory and honour [of] the brave 
British army fighting for the liberty of Nations and of Justice.” 130 In many
127 TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, “No Idlers”, July 1918.
128 TNA: PRO FO 395/237, Jabotinsky, Ibid.
129 Bruce, The Last Crusade, 165; Gardner, Allenby, 160-161.
130 LP, Davidson 400, Greek Church in London to Archbishop, 11 December 1917.
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European countries church bells rang in order to celebrate the return of the city to
101
Christian hands. The Italian and French governments began a campaign to 
secure control of the Catholic institutions of Jerusalem and Palestine. While the 
British occupation of the city raised the issue of the traditional protection over 
the Catholic population exercised by the French government, the Italians were 
keen on extending their influence as much as possible. In December 1917 the 
Italian Ambassador in Paris wrote to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The 
British occupation of Jerusalem has given new strength to the question of the 
French protection of the Catholics in the Middle East. [...] We should be ready to
1 39defend our rights when times will come.” In a discourse delivered to the 
Parliament, the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando underlined the 
desirability of Italian and French cooperation in order to define mutual rights in
1 33the future asset of Palestine and Jerusalem. Nevertheless French and Italian 
interests had a different nature, in fact the French besides the control of the 
Christian institutions were also interested in the future of the Middle East as 
France was one of the Powers who had territorial ambitions in the region in 
accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916; on the other hand Italy yet 
had not expressed large colonial interests in the region.
In France a Te Deus was sung in Notre Dame of Paris and a thanksgiving 
prayer was recited in the Mosque of Nogent de Marne in the suburbs of the 
French Capital in order to praise the deliverance of the city from Turkish rule. 
The French Government supported these public celebrations but as the British,
131 LHCMA, Allenby’s Paper, The Universe, 21 December 1917.
132 MAE, Archivio Politico e Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Italian Ambassador to Italian Foreign Office, Paris, 
24 December 1917.
133 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl., Sti-aordinari, Africa Asia Oceania, Pos. 53(2), Fasc. 34, On. Orlandi, 
12 December 1917.
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Government, it was concerned not to give the impression that the occupation of 
Jerusalem was a sort of Christian victory over the Muslims. In relation to this the 
Quay d’Orsay, the French Foreign Office, issued a letter stating that Jerusalem 
had not been conquered but freed from Turkish misrule. Eventually some French 
Muslim troops were employed as guardians of the Muslim holy places in 
Jerusalem.134
Pope Benedict XV following his strict policy of neutrality in the conflict 
forbade celebrations in Vatican City. The Secretary of the State Cardinal 
Gasparri, explained this course of action with the necessity to keep strong ties 
with all belligerents, clearly also a strategy which aimed to ensure to the Vatican 
a prominent position in any post-war settlement. At this time the attention 
towards Jerusalem was also as a result of the position of some Catholic clerics 
resident in the city. As the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Camassei had been 
deported to Damascus by Turkish authorities earlier in 1917, the Congregation of 
the Propaganda Fide (the Catholic institution dealing with the Catholics around 
the world) informed the Vatican that Cardinal Dolci, the Apostolic Delegate in 
Turkey, was working in order to free the Latin Patriarch and for the Catholic
■jo/:
community in Jerusalem as a whole. Obviously other Christian non-Catholic 
communities like the Abyssinians appealed directly to the Foreign Office. They 
expressed their delight for the British conquest o f Jerusalem but voiced their 
anxiety with regard to their co-religionists still in the city.137
134 R. Laurens, La Question de Palestine 1799-1922, (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 374-375.
135 Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 22.
136 ASV, Segr. Stato Guerra, Propaganda Fide to Cardinal Gasparri, Rome, 14 December 1917.
137 TNA: PRO FO 141/666. British Legation to High Commissioner Egypt, Addis Ababa, 31 December 
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Among the most prominent players in the international stage was the 
Zionist movement. In December 1917 Chaim Weizmann, President of the British 
Zionist Federation since February of the same year, wrote to Herbert Samuel, a 
member of the British cabinet who, in 1920 became the first British High 
Commissioner for Palestine, refuting rumours that the Zionists had decided to 
relinquish any claim on Jerusalem. In the same letter it is clear that Zionist 
claims over the city relied on the numerical strength of its Jewish inhabitants who
1 3Qconstituted the majority of the urban population.
The reactions on German and Austrian sides reflected their position in war. 
In Germany the popular press understandably presented the British victory as a 
moral, rather than a military achievement. The Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten, 
a popular paper published in Bavaria, underlined the moral importance of the 
conquest of Jerusalem together with the Kolinsche Volkszeitung, published in 
Cologne, emphasised: “for the British the capture of Jerusalem is undoubtedly a 
success, but it is more of a moral than of the Military significance.” 140 The 
Fraltfurter Zeitung stressed the undeniable political value underplaying the 
military achievements of the British Army.141 The Austrian Neue Freie Presse 
showed a degree of optimism when it published an article which stated that: 
“though regrettable in itself it [the loss of Jerusalem] will bring no change into 
the main lines of struggle.”142 In reality the British conquest of Jerusalem had
138 CW Papers, Vol. VIII, Letter 25, to Herbert Samuel, London, 12 December 1917.
139 See figures reported in Chapter 3.
140 Quoted in ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl Stt'aordinari Africa Asia Oceania, Pos. 53 (2), Fasc. 34, 
Osservatore Romano, 14 December 1917.TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, W. Towley to Foreign Office, The 
Hague, 12 December 1917.
141 Quoted in ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Africa Asia Oceania, Pos. 53 (2), Fasc. 34, 
Osservatore Romano, 14 December 1917.
142 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, W. Towley to Foreign Office, The Hague, 12 December 1917.
151
serious military repercussions as it allowed the British army to march towards 
Syria in the following months.
3.5 The “End o f  the Last Crusade ”?
It has already been discussed that there was a great propagandists value 
attached to Jerusalem as showed by the careful planning by the British 
Government in staging this event. The questions under discussion here however 
are the origin and the outcome of this propaganda in relation to Jerusalem.
In Britain, the idea of the war as a “holy war” appears to have originated 
in the Church environment. It was the sermons of the Anglican Bishop 
Winnington-Ingram in London and the articles of the editor of the nonconformist 
paper the British Weekly, William Robertson Nicholl (a close friend of Lloyd 
George), that labelled the conflict from the beginning as a holy crusade.143 
Considering defeat as a punishment for sin, victory in the war was to come with 
the redemption of the combatants.144 The Crusader spirit was to be the means to 
obtain redemption. It would be, however an exaggeration to consider the crusade 
idea as the main image portraying the war; however since the successes of the 
Palestine campaign and the capture of Jerusalem, the allusion of a “new” or a 
“last” crusade became widespread among the British public.145 First hand 
accounts of the campaign in diary form were published. The feeling spread of 
being party to something important, to be part of the fulfilment of an 
eschatological project. It was necessary to report the events and to recollect the 
memories o f those moments. Most of those diaries bore titles referring directly to
143 Siberry, The New Crusaders, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 87-88.
144 Ibid, 90.
145 Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda,” 87.
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the crusades: The Aussie Crusaders, Khaki Crusaders, The Great Crusade, The 
Modern Crusaders; none of these books, however, resembled the diary of a 
crusader, of someone fighting in the name of God as they looked more like 
chronicles of war.146 Captain Adams, once it was announced that Jerusalem had 
been occupied, reported a bottle of wine was opened in order to celebrate the 
occasion suitably.147
Alternatively these people used the word crusade as synonymous with 
holy war. Crusade comes from the Latin word “Cruciare” which means to mark 
with a cross, and has a particular Christian connotation, whilst holy war, on the 
other hand is not unique to Christianity as both Islam and Judaism have forms of 
holy war.148 Crusade and holy war are different from the idea of “just” war as 
they have their own justification while the just war requires a set of conditions to 
be satisfied; “Deus Vult” (God wills it) was the cry of the first crusaders. 149 
Some Englishmen became convinced that the Great War was a struggle between 
the Christian civilisations as opposed to the German Teutonic savagery. It has 
been suggested by Bar-Yosef that the Crusading theme was confined and 
available only to the upper classes as a consequence of their higher education.150 
Indeed the knowledge of the Bible was more spread than that of the Crusades; 
the Holy Land was more associated with vernacular Bible culture than with 
memories of medieval conquest of Palestine.151 However sermons, press and 
propaganda made the Crusade theme, more popular and accessible to the public.
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Poems and songs talking of the war as a last crusade became a normal feature.
One example is the collection of Songs o f the Last Crusade, written by Ella
McFayden in 1917. It is interesting to look at a poem she wrote in 1915, well
before the Palestine campaign where even the members of the Saint John
ambulance service, based in England, part of the Red Cross, had been defined as
Crusaders:
“Among the shifting chances / o f intake, siege and fray;
Time’s ever green romances / Can never pass away;
Where desert foes are halted / And bared the Turkish blade 
Today the Cross, exalted / Leads out the Last Crusade.
O f old the Hermit pleaded / By market-square and street;
The humble ploughman heeded / the seigneur left hi seat;
Then Antioch was shaken / Edessa fell our gain,
Jerusalem lay taken / by Godfrey o f Lorraine.
Now ‘gainst the Unbeliever / old paynim fields upon,
The Red Cross o f Geneva / leads out thy knights, Saint John!
Our manhood holds thy measure / thy work goes forward yet;
Rest well and take thy leisure /  great soul o f Jean Valette!
From treacherous invader / from scathe in filed o f fight,
God guard my young crusader / Geneva’s swordless knight.
The hospitallers’ daring / was worthy all men’s cheers,
But what o f these men faring / unarmed among the spears?
They chase no proud ambition / no gilded, glad emprise;
Then consecrated mission / among the stricken lies;
‘Mid Bedouin of Dervish / or that more hated foe,
Where’er men need their service / the Knights o f mercy go.
The prayers o f those that love them / be more than shield or balde 
Spread thou thy might above them: / God bless the Last Crusade.” 152
If  indeed the knowledge of the Crusades was reserved for a small section of 
society, the war and the media disseminated this idea to a larger public who in
152 E. McFayden, “The Last Crusade — 1915” Songs o f  the Last Crusade, (North Sydney: Winn & Co., 
1917).
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times of crises turned its attention to mystical, prophetical and miraculous 
beliefs.153
As shown, the origins of the crusading theme are to be found alongside the 
genesis of the war itself; however the Palestine campaign did indeed act as a 
catalyst and the crusading theme was boosted and expanded. This popular theme 
then came to be exploited and feared at the same time; exploited as part of the 
official propaganda and feared as it may have damaged the relations with the 
Muslim component of the British Empire. Despite this, however, the Crusade 
theme was very strong after the war, it appears that it then faded away quite 
rapidly. The British soldier Cecil Sommers, writing his memoirs, differentiated 
himself from the numerous other war diaries talking explicitly of the Crusade 
theme. Sommers wrote to his daughter: “Your Grandmother, who is apt to 
sentimentalize, will tell you that Daddy was a crusader.” 154 Indeed Sommers 
recognized that the Crusader comparison was quite impossible on the real ground, 
but he acknowledged the power of this particular idea, Sommers went further 
claiming that in idealistic terms, every soldier, who was a butcher or a baker 
before the war, became a temporary crusader, regardless of being employed in 
France or Palestine or in any other front of war.155 Sommers, having reached 
Palestine wrote: “This morning I woke up to the old familiar sound of the guns. 
So far I have been on a Cook’s tour. Now, I suppose I become a Crusader.”156 
The Crusading metaphor was deeply rooted in the education, imagery and even 
genealogy, as some looked back to their family history looking for crusader
153 Marrin, The Last Crusade, 136.
154 C. Sommers, Temporary Crusaders, (London: John Lane, 1919), v.
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ancestors, that once properly stimulated could arise easily. It is therefore not
1surprising that a myth was eventually born.
Looking at the literature of the time it appears that the Crusade theme was 
mainly a feature of British belief and propaganda as the examples of Crusading 
mania in other countries are almost entirely unheard; the only exception is the 
collection of letters written by a French officer, then translated into English,
iro
under the title A Crusader- o f France. There are examples of Crusading 
literature among the Australian, New Zealander and South African components 
of the British Army like the South African Khaki Crusaders and the Australian 
The Aussie Crusaders. 159 However they all shared the common history of 
Richard Coeur de Lion that indeed forged part of British identity. The temptation, 
for chroniclers but also for the military establishment to use the success of 
Allenby as the final victory of Christianity over Islam, remained a temptation 
which proved to be too much and out of touch with the real context of the war.160 
A real contentious Christian-Muslim context was never set up in the battlefield; 
Allenby himself underlined many times the crucial role played by the Muslim 
members in the Palestine campaign, like the Egyptian Camel Corps. 161 
Nevertheless at the same time he often turned to Bible images advancing into 
Palestine. Allenby added to his title of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of
Felixstowe the name of Megiddo, following the military success at the Biblical
1 (\)place of the Armageddon.
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Illustration  5: "At last my dream s com e tru e" 163
3.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to show the directives which guided the 
transition from Ottoman to British rule of Jerusalem. The British occupation of
163 Punch (London), Vol. 153, December 19, 1917. The cartoon shows Richard Coeur de Lion watching 
Jerusalem.
the city was a pivotal event in the history of Jerusalem. Three main themes have 
been discussed in this chapter. The first is that of the mobilisation of human, 
material and ideological resources prompted by the Turco-German military 
authorities since the beginning of the war. In contrast, on the British side the 
emphasis has been placed on propaganda and how the British authorities sought 
to exploit a possible victory and occupation of Jerusalem. It is clear that the 
British government intended to use the occupation of the holy city in order to 
boost the morale of their nation and to increase their prestige vis-a-vis the 
enemies like Germany and the Ottoman Empire but also vis-a-vis France, Italy 
and Russia.
Plans for the military conquest and occupation of Jerusalem by the British 
Army under the command of General Allenby have been discussed focussing 
less on military issues and more on political and propaganda issues emerging 
with the closing victory over the Ottomans in Palestine. It is evident that the 
occupation of the holy city was carefully staged in London showing the political 
and ideological magnitude of this event. In this chapter the British occupation of 
Jerusalem has been assessed in the short period, focussing on the immediate 
reactions of the local population, the allies and enemies of the British. 
Jerusalemites hoped that the new rulers would solve some of their most urgent 
problems, lack of food and general resources. Yet both Allied and Central 
powers focussed on the symbolic value of this event.
The last part of this chapter discusses the particular theme of the crusades. 
It shows how this theme appeared in Britain in late 1917 was mainly the creation 
of the Anglican and Non-Conformist Churches in relation to the “evil Germany”
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that was eventually exploited in some fonn by the British government whilst 
staging the propaganda supporting the Palestine campaign and the occupation of 
Jerusalem. This “mania” was short-lived and did not lead to the creation of any 
long-lasting policy making. The “holy war” was fought far from Palestine, in the 
trenches of the Western front where the news of the capture of Jerusalem was 
welcomed and led to the emergence of a strong imaginary in relation to the holy 
land.
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4 The Christian Churches during the W ar
“Pray for the peace of Jerusalem:
They shall prosper that love thee.
Peace be within thy walls,
And prosperity within thy palaces.”
(Psalm 122:6-7)
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the political and social role of the 
Churches belonging to various denominations from the beginning of the 
twentieth century until 1920. The aim of this chapter is also to highlight the 
changes in their own structures, in the relationships vis-a-vis the local population 
and amongst themselves that took place from 1914 to 1920. The first part of the 
chapter provides some historical background in order to set the stage to measure 
the changes brought about by the war and British occupation. Such background 
focuses on the history of the Christian Churches, the relationship between the 
Churches and the Ottoman authorities, the competition with the European Powers 
for the control of the Holy Places, and the Status Quo and the capitulations which 
were the most important political features of Christian Jerusalem until 1914. The 
second part of the Chapter focuses on the war period and of the creation of the 
Christian-Muslim associations which united the Arab population of the city and 
were the expression more of the followers than of the religious institutions. This 
case clearly marked the renegotiation of local alliances between the different 
religious groups of Jerusalem as a consequence of the war and the British 
occupation of the city. The case study of the Custody of the Holy Land concludes 
the chapter detailing developments which affected this institution in the 
aftermath of the war, particularly in 1918 when the Custody re-built its influence
160
both in the city and on the international stage. This case study aims to highlight 
the effects of the war on the microcosm of this strong and influential Christian 
institution suggesting to use this example as a pattern for the study of other 
Christian institutions in the city.
Illustration 6: Holy S ep u lch re1
4.1 The Christian Churches o f  Jerusalem in history
In 1914 the Christian Churches of Jerusalem were an integral part of the 
social, political and religious landscape of the city. However since the very 
beginning of the Christian era. Christianity was divided. In the fourth century the 
Roman Emperor Constantine revolutionised the history of the Christian church. 
With the edict of 313, he gave legal recognition to the faith, moved the imperial 
capital from Rome to Byzantium. 2 Constantine also called for the first 
Ecumenical Council of 325 held at Nicea that endeavoured to respond to the 
threat of heresy and divisions. The Council discussed the nature of Jesus in 
relation to God and produced the Nicene Creed, a statement of belief agreed by 
all participants. The Council was unable to prevent the schism within the Church
1 Copyright The Matson Photo Service. Jerusalem.
: T. Ware, The Orthodox Church, (London: Penguin Books, 1963). 18-19; Colbi, Christianity. 16.
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which soon after became divided into a number of denominations. 3 As 
Christianity was declared legal, contest for the control of the Holy Places began. 
Because Jerusalem was the place where Jesus lived and died, a special status was 
granted to the city by the first Christian communities as the city was the seat of 
the first Christian Church headed by St. James.4 -
In 451 at the council held at Chalcedon a Christological dogma was 
approved, affirming that Christ possess two natures, divine and human. 
Alexandrian, Syriac, Armenian and other churches did not accept this dogma, 
and proclaimed only one nature (monophysitism), the divine one. Some churches, 
like the Coptic, the Syrian and the Armenian, eventually, adhered to a third 
Christological formula that proclaimed the single nature of the Word of God.5 
The Council of Chalcedon recognised also five major Episcopal Sees as having a 
priority status and among these was Jerusalem.
Possibly, the greatest schism in Christian history took place in 1054, when 
the Church of Constantinople split from the Church of Rome: the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church were bom. Since the schism of 
1054 the history of the Catholic Church in Jerusalem was separated from that of 
the Greek Orthodox, especially after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of 
Jerusalem by the Crusaders in 1099. The Catholic Church began to implement 
policies of latinization of the local Church damaging the Eastern (Greek speaking) 
Churches. Most of their clergy were banned from the Holy Sepulchre and from 
other places and the Greek Patriarchs of Jerusalem were exiled to Cyprus in 1291
3 L. Kenneth Scott, A Histoiy o f  Christianity, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954), 153-157.
4 C. Wardi, “The Latin Patriarchate o f Jerusalem,” Journal o f the Middle East Society 1, no. 3-4, (Autumn 
1947): 5.
5 A. Pacini, “Glossary,” in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East, ed. A. Pacini, 348 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998).
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after Acre was lost to the Muslim armies.6 It seems that the local population, 
Greek as well as Latin, accepted the authority of the new Patriarchate.7
When Salah al-Din entered Jerusalem in 1187, the Latin Patriarch left 
while the Christian Orthodox population was allowed to stay and eventually the 
Orthodox Patriarch moved back to the city.8 The Latin Patriarchate moved to 
Ptolemais (St. John of Acre) until 1291 when the Crusaders were expelled from 
the city by the Mamluks.9 In this period the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem became very close to Constantinople and to the Byzantine tradition. 
When the city fell in the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1453 the Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem began to suffer and became destitute. As the Mamluk government was 
no longer able to rule Palestine the area was occupied by the Ottoman Sultan 
SelimI 1517.
After the Latin Patriarchate had moved, first to Cyprus and then to Rome 
in 1374, it was only with the Franciscans that the Catholics recovered a foothold 
in Jerusalem. Although the history of the Custody of the Holy Land will be 
discussed in more detail below; it is important to underline that it was the visit of 
Saint Francis of Assisi in 1219 to Jerusalem that slowly re-opened the doors of 
the city to the Latins. With the Bulls “Gratias Agimus” and “Nuper Charissimae”, 
Pope Clement VI in 1342 granted the Franciscans the guardianship of the Holy 
Places. The Franciscan institution became known as the “Custody of the Holy 
Land” which was lead by a Custodian called “Custos.”10
6 Colbi, Christianity, 39.
7 Ware, The Orthodox Church, 59.
8 S. Khoury and N. Khoury, eds., A Survey o f the Histoiy o f the Orthodox Church o f Jerusalem, 1st ed. 
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9 Wardi, “The Latin Patriarchate,” 6 .
10 Colbi, Christianity, 62.
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Jerusalem was also the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate whose history 
goes back to the very beginning of Christianity as in fact Armenia declared 
Christianity as the state religion in 301 and Armenian presence in Jerusalem date 
to same period. In the nineteenth century the Armenian Apostolic Church (which 
was headed by a Patriarch) was, despite its small size, on par with the Greek 
Orthodox and Latins as custodian of the Holy Places in virtue of its ancient 
tradition in the city.11 Armenians have lived in the city since the fourth century 
when pilgrims from Armenia flocked to Jerusalem to venerate the sacred sites. 
Their long settlement in Jerusalem is reflected in the presence of an Armenian 
quarter in the city.12
By 1912 the 15,000 Christian who lived in Jerusalem belonged to the 
following denominations: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Catholic, 
Greek Catholic, Armenian, Copt, Ethiopian, Syrian, Anglican and Protestant.13 
The size of the city’s Christian communities did not determine their political and 
religious influence. Rather, it was the degree of control exercised by their clergy 
and the European Powers over the Holy Places which determined their 
importance. The Copts for instance were a very small group but held the right to 
hold hanging lamps in the Holy Sepulchre (at least from the sixteenth century), 
the possession of a small chapel behind the aedicule from the thirteenth century 
and the right to organise a procession on Good Friday in the church; all this gave
11 Ibid, 101; H. Hagopian, “The Armenians of Jerusalem and the Armenian Quarter,” in Christians in the 
Holy Land, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 115 (London: World o f Islam Festival Trust, 1994); A. Sanjian, 
“The Armenian Church and Community o f Jerusalem,” in The Christian Communities o f Jerusalem, ed. 
A. O’Mahony, 57 (Cardiff: University o f Wales Press, 2003).
12 Hagopian, “The Armenians o f Jerusalem,” 116; Hintlian, Histoiy o f the Armenians, 1.
13 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 193.
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them a status never achieved by the larger Anglican community, which until this 
day does not enjoy such rights.14
Since 1187 when Salah al-Din re-conquered the city, Christians and Jews 
were granted the status of dhimmi, protected people as people of the book, ahl al- 
kitab. Islam established the legal superiority of Muslims over dhimmi but granted 
privileges of protection over non-Muslim subjects.15 As long as Christians 
accepted Muslim rule, they were allowed to practise their religion and to control 
matters regulating personal status. Christians were limited in their expressions of 
religiosity in the public arena. Restrictions were imposed on the display of 
Christian symbols, like the Cross, and very strict laws regulated the construction 
and restoration of churches. Christians were also excluded from military service, 
they were not allowed to carry weapons, and had to pay a special tax. These 
limitations set their legal and social inferiority in Jerusalem as well as across the 
Dar al-Islam.16
When in 1517 Selim I conquered Jerusalem, Christians remained second 
class subjects, but their condition improved considerably. The Ottomans 
consolidated their status of dhimmi through the establishment o f the millet system, 
a semi independent religious organisation for ahl al-kitab communities, which 
granted legal recognition to these particular religious communities throughout the
1 n
empire. In the beginning only four millets were recognized: the Muslim, Greek 
Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish. The Catholics were nominally part of the Greek
14 S.P. Colbi, Christianity in the Holy Land, (Tel Aviv: Am Hassefer, 1969), 105-106; O.F.A. Meinardus, 
The Copts in Jerusalem, (Cairo: Costa Tsoumas & Co., 1960), 70-72.
15 See D. Chevallier, “Non-Muslim Communities in Arab Cities,” in Christian and Jews in Ottoman 
Empire, eds. B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. 2, 159 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1982).
16 Pacini, Christian Communities, 3.
17 For a debate on the definition of Millet see R.H. Davison, “The Millets as Agents o f Change in the 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire,” in Christian and Jews in Ottoman Empire, eds. B. Braude and B. 
Lewis, vol. 2, 319-337 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1982).
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Orthodox millet. Rapidly the Christian millets increased in number due to the 
pressure of the religious authorities and of the various European countries.18 Each 
community was responsible for the allocation and collection of taxes, for the 
educational system and for religious matters. The millet organisation applied only 
to Ottoman subject as foreigners were under the jurisdiction of the capitulations 
from the sixteenth century.19 The millet system lasted until the end of the 
Ottoman rule, although it witnessed considerable transformation in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries as a result of the Tanzimat reforms, CUP rule and the 
Balkan Wars.20
The Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholics indeed represented the largest 
and more powerful Christian communities in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The Armenian Church grew in importance during the war as 
a result of the fierce conflict between Ottomans and Armenians which ended 
with massacres and forced deportation of Armenians throughout the Empire 
including to Jerusalem. The following sections will highlight the relations 
between the Patriarchs and the Ottoman administration on the one hand and 
between the Churches and their European protectors on the other. It also focuses 
on the competition over the control of the Holy Places and the influence of the 
clergy over the urban population.
18 Pacini, Christian Communities, 5.
19 A. O’Mahony, “Church, State and the Christian Communities and the Holy Places of Palestine,” in 
Christian in the Holy Land, eds. M. Prior and W. Taylor, 15 (London: World o f Islam Festival, 1994).
20 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 345.
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4.1.1 Patriarchates between the Ottomans and the European Powers
The new Ottoman rulers did not alter the historic relation between the 
Orthodox Patriarchate and Istanbul and the former became closely linked to the
ry -I
Ottoman administration. At the beginning of Ottoman rule the authorities of 
Jerusalem supported the Orthodox Church against the Latins who were identified 
with the European powers. In the seventeenth century the Ottoman Sultans also 
restored some possessions and rights to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate which
on
had been given to the Catholics by local authorities. In 1605 Sultan Ahmet I 
issued a firman giving the Greek Orthodox the control of the northern part of the 
Calvary in the Holy Sepulchre and another firman of 1637 issued by Sultan 
Murad IV gave the Orthodox the possession of the Stone of Unction and of the
OO
whole Calvary. At the same time, however, the residence of the Patriarch was 
moved from Jerusalem to Istanbul consolidating the tight links between the 
Patriarchate and the Ottoman state.24 The appointment of the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem was decided by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople; the latter 
was dependent on the Ottomans.
The Ottoman administration tended to play the Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches one against the other. It was like a pendulum swinging according to the 
interests of the Ottomans and also according to the pressure of the European 
powers.25 Since the Ottoman occupation of Jerusalem the Catholics looked for 
support from Venice, Genoa, Austria and eventually from France which emerged
21 Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,” 38-39, The Orthodox Church supported the Ottoman 
authorities thus making a sudden transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule of Istanbul.
22 Ibid, 39.
23 Colbi, Christianity, 6 8 .
24 Roussos, The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,” 39.
25 See the alternate events that affected the Orthodox and Catholic communities in Colbi, Christianity, 65- 
77.
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to be the protector of Catholic interests in the sixteenth century, following the 
stipulation of capitulations. For much of its long history the Greek Orthodox 
Church was not under the influence of the European powers, but from the early 
eighteenth century Russia strove to become the protector of the Orthodox 
subjects of the Ottoman Sultan.27
After the Treaty of Kiisuk Kaynarca which was signed in July 1774 and 
marked the end of the Russo-Turkish war (1768-1774), Russia accomplished its 
goal. In 1845 a Russian protege, Cyril, was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem an 
event which sealed the entry of Russia in the religious politics of Jerusalem. This 
coincided with the return of Jerusalem on the European stage: in 1847 Pope 
Pious IX re-established the Latin Patriarchate in the city while the first Protestant 
missions started to operate in Palestine. Following these events the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, resident in Istanbul, was forced to move back 
to Jerusalem in the mid eighteenth century following Russian pressure.28 It was at 
the end of the nineteenth century that a conflict between the Arab laity and the 
Greek hierarchy became apparent and eventually exploded violently with the 
deposition of the Patriarch Cyril in 1872 by intrigues of the Russians that caused 
the stirring up of the local Orthodox Arab laity.29
The history of the Catholics in Jerusalem was linked to the politics of the 
European powers much more consistently than in the case of the Orthodox 
Church. The capitulations, commercial treaties between the European powers and
25 W. Zander, “On the Settlement o f Disputes About the Christian Holy Places,” Israel Law Review 8,
(1973): 332.
27 Roussous, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,” 41; Colbi, Christianity, 73.
28 Colbi, Christianity, 78; Klioury and Khoury, A Survey, 121; Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate,” 41.
29 D. Tsimhoni, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem,” Asian and African Studies 112, no. 1, 
(March 1978): 78-84; A. Bertram and J.W.A. Young, eds., The Orthodox Patriarchate o f  Jerusalem, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 25-33.
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the Ottomans which were first signed in 1536, granted privileges to foreign 
traders and diplomats but did not cover religious affairs. Yet the European 
governments took advantage of these treaties in order to intervene in religious 
issues. The capitulations gave the French government the moral duty to
* ‘l lintervene and to protect the Latms and particularly the Franciscans from 1740. 
Furthermore, from the Ottoman conquest of Palestine in the sixteenth century the 
question of the control and possession of Holy Places became an international 
question. The Franciscans, the only Catholic representatives in the city were not 
only a monastic order, but also a political actor. As Franciscan friars came from 
various European countries they could appeal to their own governments thus 
projecting the Custody of the Holy Land and the order onto the international 
stage.32
Catholics in Jerusalem competed with the other denominations for the 
control of the Holy Places. However, unlike the Orthodox Church, they did not 
experience any substantial intestine struggle in the nineteenth century.33 While 
the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem was controlled by the Greek clergy, 
Ottoman authorities and by Russian diplomas, the Catholic Church was 
paradoxically freer from any direct interference. In fact, despite the attempts on 
the part of European governments at controlling the Custody, the Franciscans 
managed to maintain a good balance. This situation changed in 1847 when Pope 
Pious IX re-installed in the city the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, who became 
honorary from the fourteenth century, and named Monsignor Giuseppe Valerga
30 See M. Piccirillo, ed., La Custodia di Terra Santa e VEaropa, (Rome: II Veltro Editrice, 1983).
31 B. Collin, “La Francia e la Custodia di Terra Santa,” in La Custodia di Terra Santa, ed. M. Piccirillo,
74 (Rome: II Veltro Editrice, 1983).
32 N. Moschopoulos, La Terre Sainte, (Athens, 1956), 10; Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 6 .
33 As showed earlier within the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem there was an intestine struggle 
between the local Arab followers and the Greek hierarchy.
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as Patriarch.34 Many voices were raised against this decision as the Franciscans 
saw the newly appointed Patriarch as a duplication of their activity and as a 
rival. In the mind of the Vatican, the Patriarchate was mainly meant as a 
political institution by the Vatican, its duties and activities had not been fixed at 
the time of its re-establishment in order to avoid any clash with the Custody. 
Catholics were generally not regarded as a local community but mainly as a 
foreign enclave, despite their use of the Arabic language.36
From the mid nineteenth century until the outbreak of First World War 
several Catholic institutions established many seminaries, convents, hospices, 
schools, orphanages and also small factories throughout Palestine in an attempt
■ 57
to establish a stronger control over the Holy Land. They were particularly 
• active in promoting pilgrimages which were a great source of income.38 Like all 
the other Churches, Catholic institutions survived thanks to the contributions 
coming from European countries and from America. The Custody of the Holy 
Land through commissariats (local branches) opened throughout the world and
*50was able to collect the money which supported their activities. Catholic 
institutions ran charitable activities for the poor and towards the end of the 
Ottoman era were the richest in Jerusalem. This situation was to change with the 
outbreak of the First World War as it will be explained below.
Since the Ottoman conquest of Armenia in the sixteenth century, the 
relationship between the Armenians and Ottomans were strained. The Ottoman
34 A. Possetto, II Patriarcato Latino di Gerasalemme, (Milan: Crociata, 1938), 25.
35 Colbi, Christianity, 94.
36 O’Mahony, “The Christian Communities o f Jerusalem,” 7.
37 Possetto, II PaMarcato Latino, 562-568; Franciscans, Cnstodia di Terra Santa, (Jerusalem: Franciscan 
Printing Press, 1951).
38 For the question o f pilgrimage see Prior, “Pilgrimage to the Holy Land,” 171.
39 Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 6-7.
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government forced all the high echelons of the clergy residing in Armenia to be 
under the control the newly established Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople 
(Istanbul). The Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem which was established in the 
fifth century eventually accepted the authority of Istanbul.40 The Armenian laity 
of Jerusalem never exceeded one thousand people under Ottoman rule. Following 
the clashes between the Ottoman army and the Armenians in east Anatolia at the 
end of the nineteenth century, their number rose as many Armenian refugees 
arrived in Palestine and took permanent residence in the Armenian quarter.41 In 
Jerusalem, the relationship between Armenians and the Ottoman establishment 
were relatively peaceful. Both represented a small minority of the population and 
to the Ottomans as well to the Arabs the Armenians did not represent a major 
threat. Even in 1915, when the Turkish army came into direct conflict with the 
Armenians living in north and northeast of Anatolia, it seems that the 
communities of Jerusalem were not subject to persecution and physical threats.42
40 Sanjian, “The Armenian Church,” 63.
41 Ibid, 67; Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 193.
42 See Sanjian, “The Armenian Church”; Zurcher, Turkey, 119-121; for a survey of the Armenian 
question see D. Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’,” Middle Eastern Studies 
12, (January 1976): 99-107.
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Illustration  7: Jerusalem  and M ount o f  O lives43
4.2 Features o f  Christian Jerusalem: Capitulations and Status Quo
The position of Christianity in Jerusalem was defined by the capitulations, 
which were treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries and 
the Status Quo, a set of rules which regulated the ownership, control and 
management of the Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem.
4.2.1 The Capitulations and their abolition
The capitulations were bilateral treaties between sovereign states, but also 
unilateral concession granted to groups of merchants, which in the Ottoman 
Empire started to be signed in 1569 with an agreement between the Sultan and
43 Copyright The Matson Photo Service. Jerusalem. Likely beginning o f the twentieth century.
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the King of France Francis I.44 Known in Turkish as ahdname or imtiyazat, the 
capitulations had precursors in the early Muslim tradition to the Fatimid and 
Mamluk governments, 45 The first capitulations were mainly commercial 
agreements which allowed French citizens the right of residence and trade in the 
Ottoman Empire, allowing them to enjoy rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction in 
the Empire.46
After the French signed capitulary treaties other European countries 
followed the example. In the sixteenth century the Ottomans granted England 
and Holland capitulary rights; later in the eighteenth century capitulations were 
also granted to Austria, Sweden and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 47 Overall 
the Capitulary regime first favoured the Ottomans but it became increasingly 
disadvantageous as it was exploited by the European powers. Originally the 
capitulations granted the Ottomans an opportunity to share the benefits of world 
trade, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with Florence, Genoa, Venice, 
Netherlands, France and England. 48 The capitulations allowed European 
countries to maintain consular posts in Ottoman territories but the same was not 
granted to the Ottomans who started to establish representatives in Europe only 
at the end of the eighteenth century.49 The rise of a stronger Europe from the 
fifteenth century coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire and the capitulations mirrored this situation in the nineteenth century
44 Pacini, Christian Communities, p. 342; Colbi, Christianity, 67; A.H. De Groot, “The Historical 
Development o f the Capitulary Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the 15th to the 19th Centuries,” 
Oriente Moderno 3, (2003): 596.
45 De Groot, “The Historical Development,” 577.
46 J.B. Angell, “The Turkish Capitulations,” The American Historical Review 6, no. 2, (January 1901): 
256.
47 M.H. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 7.
48 D. Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 187.-188.
49 Ibid, 228-229.
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when the capitulary regime became the most important instrument of economic 
and political penetration in the Empire.
In Jerusalem the capitulary regime affected the foreigner communities 
living in the city, mainly in the religious sphere. From the mid nineteenth century 
as the Europeans renewed their interest in the Holy Land the British government 
opened the first consulate in Jerusalem during the rule of Muhammad ‘Ali. It was 
the beginning of the arrival of a considerable number of European and American 
citizens. They were not simply Christian pilgrims as they planned to settle in the 
city and to start to work as physicians, teachers and businessmen.50 Under the 
protection of the capitulations and of the foreign consulates, educational and 
health institutions were built by European entrepreneurs and governments. The 
capitulations granted Europeans substantial cut in tax and customs duties and 
extraterritoriality rights.51
Capitulations were considered by locals as a restrictive measure and an 
interference of foreigners in several areas. By the late 1914 Jerusalem services 
like post offices and higher education were in the hands of the Europeans, who 
promoted their own interests. In the summer 1914 the Ottoman government used 
the outbreak of the war in Europe to abolish the capitulary system throughout the 
empire. In September 1914 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the foreign 
embassies of Istanbul a note stating that the capitulations were going to be 
abolished from the 1st of October. In Jerusalem Macid §evket, the Governor of 
the city wrote to the foreign consuls informing them of the closure of the foreign
50 See Ben-Arieh, The Old City.
51 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 202-203.
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post offices which was tantamount to the abolition of the most visible capitulary 
privileges.52
The Imperial order which abolished the capitulations was read to the 
people of Jerusalem in an official ceremony held in the garden of the 
municipality. After the Governor read the document, Said al-Husayni, a local 
member of the Ottoman parliament, delivered a speech on the value of this 
measure but also invited the crowd to show respect for the foreigners. As 
elsewhere in the empire the abrogation of the capitulations was hailed as the 
beginning of a new era. Religious orders, foreign clergy and laity had to deal 
with this new situation without relying on any foreign help.54 Among the 
Christians, panic spread rapidly, as demonstrations against the Europeans started 
to be staged throughout the city.55 During the mobilisation for the war, Ottomans 
occupied schools and hospitals, which were previously under the protection of 
the European governments.
4.2.2 “Peace” among Christians: the Status Quo, origins and developments
The so called “Status Quo55 of the Christian Holy Places was the result of 
treaties and customary practices which regulated the right o f control and access 
to the Christian places of worship in Jerusalem, and more generally in the Holy 
Land, between the various Christian Churches. These rights reflected both the 
divisions between the Churches and the external support granted to them by the
52 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, 22 September 1914, Jerusalem: 
“With the abolition o f the capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, the foreign offices will have to close on 
the morning o f 1 October 1914.”
53 ASMAE, Serie Politica P, Busta 498, Conte Senni to Italian Embassy in Istanbul, 20 September 1914, 
Jerusalem.
54 Christian Churches relied on incomes coming from pilgrims and remittances from foreign countries; 
however Churches also established local enterprises.
55 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 63.
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European powers.56 The Status Quo was progressively settled by the issue of 
several documents during Mamluk rule and of firmans in the Ottoman times, the 
last promulgated in 1852 which confirmed the state of affairs existing in 1757. 
The codification of these agreements into a body of official regulations was only 
proposed during the drafting of the charter for the British Mandate in Palestine in 
early 1920 and included as Article 14 which envisaged the appointment of a
zn
special commission in order to define the rights and claims on the Holy Places.
As early as 1690 the Latins were granted a superior status in the Holy 
Sepulchre by a firman which confirmed the politics of the switching pendulum as
ro
explained earlier. In 1757 Sultan Osman III promulgated a new firman re­
establishing the rights of the Greek Orthodox Church on their possession which 
they claimed were looted by the Catholics in 1689. This firman was carried to 
Jerusalem by a special functionary with the purpose to enforce it directly.59 It 
clearly re-established the authority of the Orthodox Church and it became the 
corner stone of the future regulations issued by the Ottoman government on the 
holy places.60 In the mid nineteenth century Ottoman policies aroused much 
controversy between the Greek Orthodox and Catholic clergy and European 
Powers tried to intervene.61 After a thorough investigation Sultan Abdulmecid in
56 W. Zander, Israel and the Holy Places o f Christendom, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1971), 45.
57 For the whole history o f the early documents and Ottoman firmans see P. Baldi, The Question o f the 
Holy Places, vol. 1, (Rome: Typographia Pontificia, 1919); see also W. Zander, Israel and the Holy 
Places o f Christendom.
58 Colbi, Christianity, 69.
59 Moschopoulos, La Terre Sainte, 201.
G0 Colbi, Christianity, 71; B. Collin, “Questione e Problema dei Luoghi Santi,” in Custodia di Terra Santa, 
eds. Franciscans, 81-86 (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1951).
61 To this extent see the episode reported by Baldi, The Question o f the Holy Places, 89-91.
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1852 despatched a firman to the Governor of Jerusalem, Vizir Hafiz Ahmet 
Pa§a.62
This firman established the rights of several Churches in relations to the 
Holy Places, and it confirmed to a large extent the course of policy advocated in 
1757 by Osman III. The question of the Holy Places led to a major European 
conflict in Crimea between Russia on the one side and Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire on the other. As a result of this conflict, the Status Quo received formal 
recognition at the Conference of Paris in 1856, later confirmed at the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878.64
When General Allenby entered Jerusalem in December 1917 he confirmed 
existing provisions in order not to upset the balance between the Christian 
communities. The text of the proclamation read as follows:
“ [ . . . ]  Since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three 
of the great religions o f mankind and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers 
and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many 
centuries, therefore,. do I make it known to you that every sacred building, 
monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or 
customary place of prayer o f whatsoever form of the three religions will be 
maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to 
whose faith they are sacred [.. .]”65
The British authorities were fully aware of the complexity and instability 
of the balance between the Christian Churches of Jerusalem and the international
62 The full text of the Firman dated 8  February 1852 is available in: B. Collin, Pour tine Solution des 
Liuex Saints, (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1974), 30-32.
63 R. Heacock, “La Palestine dans les Relations Internationales 1798-1917,” in De Bonaparte a Balfour, 
eds. D. Trimbur and R. Aaronsohn , 37-39 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2001).
64 R. Lapidoth, “Gerusalemme: Aspetti PoliticI e Giuridici,” in La Questione di Gerusalemme, ed. P. 
Pieraccini, 39 (Bologna: II Mulino, 2005).
65 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Allenby’s Report, 11 December 1917.
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dimension attached to the issue. As early as 1915 the De Bunsen Committee, as 
discussed in Chapter One, discussed British policies in the Middle East 
recommending that the Holy Places should be placed under international 
control.66 The committee suggested separating the question of Palestine from the
rn
question of the Holy Places. Mark Sykes, who had also been member of the De 
Bunsen Committee, was aware that the Italian and French governments would 
compete for the control of Catholic institutions. In November 1917 he proposed 
to keep the city under martial law in order to avoid direct confrontation between 
French and Italian diplomacy but also to give them direct control over their 
unmixed institutions. These were Christian institutions with a clear majority of 
their members belonging to one specific country.68 British officials were aware 
that the Status Quo could become a trap, a net without escape as the granting of 
rights to a confession was likely to trigger the objection of another Church and of 
European states.
4.3 Christian Churches facing mobilisation and war
As explained in the previous chapter the process of mobilisation for war 
began in the early summer 1914 when the Turkish authorities imposed martial 
law. After the abolition of the capitulations on several occasions the Austrian and 
German representatives intervened on behalf of the Christians.69 As noted by the
66 TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, London, 8  April 1915; see also Nevakivi, 
Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 19.
67 TNA: PRO CAB 27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia: “They [the British] desire to repeat that 
they see no reason why the sacred places of Palestine should not be dealt with as a separate question.” 29.
68 TNA: PRO FO 371/3061, Sykes, 13 November 1917.
69 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, 1917.
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German consul Brode the local Catholics and possibly also other Christian
70denominations were pro French.
The first Christian groups to be affected by the war were the Anglicans as 
they were citizens o f an enemy power living on Ottoman soil. The Church 
Missionary Society and the London Jews Society were advised by the Foreign 
Office to remove their missionaries in September 1914.71 As a result, the 
Anglicans were the only Christian residents to abandon the city before it was 
occupied by British troops in 1917. While Ottoman officials seized Anglican 
buildings and possessions, members of the Church moved to Egypt. The newly 
appointed Rev. Canon Rennie Maclnnes, who succeeded Blyth as Anglican 
Bishop in Jerusalem in 1914 also settled in Cairo. Upon his appointment, 
Bishop Maclnnes began to work to establish a relief fund for the Holy Land.73 
Despite being banned from Ottoman territory, the Anglicans maintained contacts 
in Jerusalem with Arabs converted to Anglicanism and the so-called Hebrew 
Christians, a group of Christians supporting Jewish immigration to the Holy 
Land, who supplied vital information to British intelligence.74 Although the 
followers of the Anglican Communion were not a significant number, they 
provided many services to local communities particularly schools and hospitals. 
St. George’s College, where local children played cricket and football, was
70 ISA, RG 67, 419/86, German Consul report, Jaffa 11 December 1914.
71 LP, Davidson 398, Renwick to Lord Bryce, Jerusalem, 25 September 1914.
72 LP, Davidson 396, Archbishop, 28 September 1914.
73 T. Hummel, “Between Eastern and Western Christendom: The Anglican Presence in Jerusalem,” in The 
Christian Communities o f  Jerusalem and the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony, 160 (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2003).
74 Ibid, 160-161.
179
turned into a military camp leaving Jerusalemite children without a popular 
playground.75
Late in 1914 the Turkish authorities ordered that all religious orders were 
to abandon their convents and to gather in residences in Jerusalem where it was 
possible to control them more easily.76 The Franciscan Casa Nova and St Saviour 
Convent hosted members of different religious congregations present in the city. 
The last Ottoman governor of Jerusalem described in these terms the situation of 
the Christian institutions in Jerusalem: “At the beginning of the war churches 
were respected and even sealed up, but later, as Turkish officers took possession 
of them, robberies of church ornaments, robes etc. began.”77
The Greek Orthodox Church was particularly affected by the war. The 
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate at the outbreak of the hostilities found itself in 
financial straits. The pilgrimage, which was its main source of income halted and 
the Patriarch was forced to borrow increasing sums of money.78 During the war 
the Patriarchate borrowed more than 100,000 French Lira from individuals and 
institutions including Almiso Zarfudhaki in Alexandria (a Greek Orthodox 
businessman), the Credit Lyonnaise and the Greek and Russian governments. 
Russians diplomats were expelled from the city as Russia joined the war against 
Turkey. They did not return to Jerusalem following the Bolshevik revolution.79 In 
the meantime the Christian Orthodox population, who were mostly Ottoman
oa
subjects, had to pay a heavy exemption tax in order to avoid military service.
7 5 1.M. Okkenhaug, The Quality> o f Heroic Living, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 44.
76 Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 19.
77 TNA: PRO F 0 3 7 1/3388 Clayton to Sykes, 16 January 1918 see also Khoury and Khoury, A Survey, 
196-198.
78 Tsimhoni, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate o f Jerusalem,” 84.
79 Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate”, 44.
80 LP, Davidson 398, Renwick to Lord Biyce, Jerusalem, 25 September 1914.
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The political crisis between the Arabs and the Greek hierarchy intensified during 
the conflict as attempts made on the part the Arab laity and lower clergy to take 
control of the Patriarchate were counteracted by the Greek hierarchy.81 Because 
of the financial constraints, Patriarch Damianos secretly sold land to the Zionists. 
The financial question left the Church quite inoperative during the three years of 
war. Evidence suggests that the Arab laity worked towards the protection of local 
interests, while the Greek upper hierarchy tried to save ecclesiastical properties 
from requisition of the Ottoman authorities. Although Greece remained neutral,
on
Turkish officials began to look suspiciously at the Greeks living in Jerusalem.
Religious functions were celebrated as usual despite the distress. In April 
1915, the Spanish Consul Ballobar witnessed the religious procession of the Holy 
Fire led by Patriarch Damianos. Ballobar noted that the procession was not as 
animated as in the past, because of the absence of pilgrims from outside the 
Empire.84 By 1917 the celebrations for the Greek New Year were mainly 
restricted to Ottoman officials and the high clergy. The laity celebrated with great 
sobriety given the high prices of essential food stuffs and other goods caused by 
the general paucity of provisions.85 Financial help from Orthodox private donors 
and associations based in the United States came after repeated appeals from the 
Patriarchate through the American Consul Dr. Glazebrook.86 The worst came in
81 Tsimhoni, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate o f Jerusalem,” 84-85; Bertram and Anton, The Orthodox 
Patriarchate o f Jerusalem, 95-112; Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem,” 44-46.
82 TNA: PRO FO 371/4000, Pro Memoria, London, 7 August 1918: “The Greek Brotherhood o f the Holy 
Sepulchre in Jerusalem had found itself in severe financial straits, which were temporarily relieved by 
means o f loans at usurious rates. It is now established that a syndicate o f rich Jews have been buying up 
the bonds o f these loans with the object of foreclosing on the termination of the present moratorium, and 
of thus becoming masters o f the property held by the Greek Church for centuries past.”
83 Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate o f Jerusalem,” 44-45.
84 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 97 and 176.
85 Ibid, 176.
86 NARA, Consular' Post, Vol. 75, Glazebrook to American Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 23 June 1916: 
“Sometime ago I wired State Department in interest o f Greek Patriarchate asking that needs o f his
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July 1917 when Greece finally joined the war against Turkey and Russia was 
shaken by the Bolshevik revolution. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem was left 
completely alone. As an institution which was under the control of the Ottoman 
authorities when the Ottomans retreated from the city they ordered also the 
Greek Patriarch to leave and they left the institution under the control of the 
Greek clergy. The Latin Patriarch Mons. Camassei shared the fate of his Greek 
Orthodox counterpart, as he was deported in November 1917. The Latin 
Patriarch appealed to the German General Von Falkenheyn but the Ottomans 
were determined to carry out the deportation order. Cemal Pa§a himself visited 
Mons. Camassei and forced him to leave for Nazareth.88
Some Christian groups coped quite well during the war. They survived 
and offered services to their co-religionists and to the local population. Despite 
not being part of any ecclesiastical establishment the members of the American 
Colony, who were mainly Protestants, offered their services to the population
OQ
regardless of the religious affiliation. The American Colony raised funds from 
the United Stated and then worked to alleviate the refugees and the wounded. 
The American Secretary of State in 1915 instructed the Consul Glazebrook to 
investigate whether the American Colony was in need of funds as they operated 
several soup kitchens and fed more than two thousand people every day.90 Early 
in 1917, when it became known that the United States was to join the war against
community be made as public as possible in America. This appeal brought no result and Patriarch is again 
urging me to call attention o f members o f Greek Orthodox Church America to dire financial distress of  
this Patriarchate. I leave to your good judgement best way o f effectively bringing to American public this 
deserving appeal.”
87 Tsimhoni, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate o f Jerusalem,” 85.
88 Possetto, II Patriarcato Latino, 431-432.
89 For a survey on the American Colony see: M. Shamir, “’Our Jerusalem’: Americans in the Holy Land 
and Protestant Narratives o f National Entitlement,” American Quarterly 55, no.l, (March 2003): 29-60; H. 
Dudman and R. Kark, eds., The American Colony, (Jerusalem: Carta, 1998).
90 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Secretary o f State to Glazebrook, Washington D.C., 22 December 1915. 
B. Vester Spafford, “Jerusalem, My Home,” National Geographic 126, (December 1964): 838.
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Germany, German officials started a campaign against the Americans residing in 
Jerusalem.
When the United States declared war on Germany in April the soup 
kitchens ran by the American Colony were closed leaving the poor people to die 
from starvation and disease.91 Bertha Vester Spafford and her husband, the 
leaders of the Colony, met Cemal Pa§a, the minister of the Marine and 
Commander of the fifth army, asking him to allow them to assist the wounded. 
Until then the American Colony was the only institution which had the funds to 
continue charitable work. Cemal accepted the offer and left them the Grand New 
Hotel, inside Jaffa Gate, at their disposal as hospital. Apart from attending to the 
sick and wounded, members of the American Colony made sure that burial 
traditions were respected: Jews would not be buried by Muslims nor Catholics by 
Greek Orthodox.92 As soon as the city was occupied by the British army, the 
Colony sought the support of General Shea and twenty truck loads with food and 
medical supplies were sent soon after from Egypt to Jerusalem. The American 
Colony was soon to be involved in the “Syria and Palestine Relief Committee”, 
an Anglican institution founded by the Anglican Bishop Maclnnes which was 
based in Cairo with the purpose to help the reconstruction of Jerusalem after the 
war. Considering the stringent religious and social character of the American 
Colony, evidence suggests that the work of the Colony has always been 
genuinely impartial as they worked towards the wellbeing of the people 
regardless of religion, nationality and politics, a very peculiar characteristic in 
Jerusalem.
91 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 246.
92 Ibid, 243-244.
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Among the small Christian communities of Jerusalem, was the Ethiopian 
Church, an ancient institution, dating back to the first centuries of the Christian 
era, which claimed a small chapel in the church of the Holy Sepulchre at least
no
from 1172. During the war the Church was handed over to Turkish officers, and 
one building was converted into a hospital.94 According to a British report 
written soon after the occupation of the city, the Abyssinian community, both of 
Catholic and Orthodox rites, were in good conditions, relatively untouched by 
deportations and disease.95
During the war thousands of Armenians were deported from Anatolia to 
Palestine because of the bloody conflict unfolding in Anatolia between 
Armenians and the Ottoman army. Some of them reached Palestine in extreme 
condition of need.96 Allegedly, as a result of the friendship between Cemal Pa§a 
and the former Armenian Patriarch Maghakia Ormanian, the Armenian residents
07of Jerusalem were not forced to leave Jerusalem. In 1916 when epidemics of 
typhus and cholera hit the city; it appears that the Armenians living close to the 
Church of the Holy Archangels suffered particularly.98 In the aftermath of the 
war about 10,000 Armenian refugees arrived in Palestine; "m any Armenians 
suivivors were gradually moved to a camp in Port Said.100 About 4,000 were 
accommodated in Jerusalem.
93 Colbi, Christianity, 107.
94 TNA: PRO FO 141/666, British Legation Addis Ababa to Sir Reginal Wingate, Addis Ababa, 31 
December 1917.
95 TNA: PRO FO 141/666, Arab Bureau to British Legation Addis Ababa, Cairo, 15 January 1918.
96 LP, Davidson 397, Maclnnes to Archbishop, Jerusalem, 7 May 1918.
97 Sanjian, “The Armenian Church,” 6 8 .
98 J.II. Melkon Rose, Armenians o f Jerusalem: Memories o f  Life in Palestine, (London: The Radcliffe 
Press, 1993), 79.
99 Sanjian, “The Armenian Church,” 69.
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In conclusion it is necessary to underline how Christianity was affected 
during the war and how it reacted to war conditions. All churches experienced 
distress, lack of provisions, deportation, requisition and other measures. However 
some of them were able to keep a public profile and others could only just cater 
for the basic needs of their followers. A good example of how the war affected 
Christian institutions is provided by the Custody of the Holy Land; traditionally 
the Custos was required to keep a diary which has proved to be significant in the 
historical reconstruction of the war conditions in Jerusalem. Later in the chapter 
the Custody of the Holy Land will be discussed as a case study, thus providing 
more details on the Christian institutions during the war.
4.4 The odd allies: Arab Christians and Muslims together
The war had a profound ideological impact on Jerusalem’s Christian 
communities. It was during the war that rumours concerning Jewish immigration, 
which later turned into more consistent news, were received by local Arabs with 
anxiety. When the Balfour Declaration began to become public knowledge in late 
1917, though it was only published in 1920 in Palestine, the attitude of local 
Arab Christians towards the Jews changed, as they felt threatened by Jewish 
immigration. Local Christian notables in Jerusalem joined Muslims in political, 
cultural and literary associations which opposed Jewish immigration.
Muslim and Christian Arabs acknowledged the common threat 
represented by Zionism. Despite political differences and the division among 
different Christian denominations protected by European countries the anti-
185
Zionist struggle became a crucial concern.101 The creation of Muslim-Christian 
associations was part of the development of the Palestinian national movement,
109which started to take shape during the last phase of Ottoman domination. It is
important to stress that despite the fact that Zionism shaped the national
Palestinian movement, the same movement did not emerge solely as a response
101to Zionism and to Jewish immigration. Khalidi argues that Palestinian identity 
was also the outcome of the increasing identification with the new boundaries set 
in the post First World War period.104 Nevertheless, evidence suggests that 
within months of the British capture of Jerusalem, local Muslim and Christian 
notables began to organise their response to Zionist activities.105 One of the main 
problems of these associations was the political vision of their Muslim members 
concerning the future of Palestine. Despite the importance of Christianity in the 
social and religious life of the area, Muslims tended to stress the Islamic 
character of Palestine. Some local Muslim leaders prompted Palestinian 
Christians to convert to Islam as they viewed Christianity closely intertwined 
with European interests in the region and therefore corrupted.106 Further, the 
activities of these associations were affected by the rivalries between the great 
Arab, both Muslim and Christian, families of the city such as the Husayini, the 
Nashashibi and the Khalidi.107
^ O ’Mahony, “The Christian Communities of Jerusalem,” 17-20.
102 Pappe, A Histoiy o f Modern Palestine, 56-62.
103 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 20.
104 Ibid.
105 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, 77. According to Ilan Pappe the Christian-Muslim association 
represented the first ever political party in Palestine; A Histoiy o f Modern Palestine, 80.
106 A. O’Mahony, “Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society, c. 1800-1948”, in Palestinian 
Christians, ed. A. O’Mahony, 45-53 (London: Melisende, 1999).
107 J. Gray, A History o f Jerusalem, (London: Robert Hale, 1969), 297. For the structure of the local 
Notables see Chapter 2.
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This phenomenon was not confined to Jerusalem as many committees 
including Arab emigres, both Muslim and Christian, were formed around the 
world. One of the main purposes of these groups was to lobby the British 
authorities and, outside Palestine, European governments, the United States and 
other countries. In Mexico the “Hijos de Palestine”, which included mainly 
Christians of Palestinian origins, wrote to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 
1919 asking the Patriarchate what right the Russian Jews had to possess 
Palestine.108 Similarly a group of about 4,000 Christian Palestinians living in 
Bolivia wrote to the Vatican stressing that Palestine should not be ruled by the its 
Jewish population. 109 Ultimately these associations were not particularly 
successful in attracting international support but they nonetheless suggest the 
strength of the feelings aroused around the world by the emerging Palestinian 
question among emigre communities.
The Muslim-Christian associations which operated in Jerusalem did not 
succeed in attracting global attention as suggested above. However, their 
constant lobbying and actions raised the issue of Palestine and Zionism and 
opened a serious debate among the countries with a stake in Palestine. The first 
official Muslim-Christian Association was formed in 1918 by the Arabs of Jaffa 
and Ramallah with the purpose to fight Zionism and Jewish immigration but also 
to oppose the British argument that Arabs in Palestine were divided along 
religious lines. 110 Some time later similar associations were formed in
108 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa-Asia-Oceania, Pos. 53, Fasc. 39, Committee “Hijos 
de Palestina”, to Latin Patriarchate, Mexico, 5 January 1919.
109 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari, Africa-Asia-Oceania, Pos. 53, Fasc. 39, Apostolic See 
Bolivia to Secretary o f State Card. Gasparri, La Paz, 30 November 1918.
1 !0 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 251.
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Jerusalem. u lAt least six organisations operated in the city. By 1918 the two most 
important associations were the Arab Club (al-Nadi al- ‘Arabi) and the Literary 
Club (al-Muntada al-'Arabi). By 1920 also other organisations gained relevance, 
such as the Association of Brotherhood and Chastity (al-Akh wa al- ‘Afaf), the 
Arabic Association of Ladies, the Educational Club and the Arabic Association 
of Jerusalem. These associations were chaired by notables who were at the head 
of the emerging national movement. Members of the Nashashibi family for 
instance, chaired the Literary Club while the al-Husaynis chaired the Arab 
Club.112
A Supreme Committee of the Arab Societies in Palestine was established 
in November 1919 in Haifa as an umbrella organisation to coordinate their 
activities. Writing to the Government of the United States, first made a statement 
of support towards the Allies, then they asked for the independence of Palestine, 
its territorial integrity and the prohibition of Jewish immigration.113 Despite the 
diplomatic tone of the letter sent to the American Government, it is clear that 
these associations were eager to move from diplomacy to action if necessary as 
suggested by the concluding statement: “We hereby declare that we are 
irresponsible for any trouble or disorder that may occur in this country as a 
consequence of the obvious general excitement and dissatisfaction.” 114 This does 
not mean necessarily that these associations had little control over the population; 
on the contrary it suggests that these associations would be able to control people 
and if necessary they would not stop demonstrations against British and Zionists.
111 O’Mahony, “The Christian Communities of Jerusalem,” 19.
112 TNA: PRO FO 608/96, J.M. Camp, (Asst. Political Officer), to Chief Administrator O.E.T.A. and 
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113 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Supreme Commission o f the Palestine Assemblies to the Government 
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114 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Ibid.
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A letter sent from the Literary Club based in Jerusalem to the American 
representative in the city in August 1919 shows the militancy of these 
associations as stated by the opening line: “We live as Arabs, We die as 
Arabs.”115
The same associations attempted to put pressure on other governments. In
1919, before the Versailles Peace Conference, the Supreme Committee wrote to
the Pope asking him to intercede on behalf of the Palestinian people to save their
11country from Zionists. A statement of the Committee after the Versailles Peace 
Conference, sent also to the Vatican, can be read as an attempt to provide a 
political rationale to the disturbances already taking place like the Nebi Musa 
Riots of April 1920:
“The decision of the Conference o f San Remo regarding the Arab countries 
generally and Palestine specially is to us a sentence of gradual death. We ask you 
to decide for us a quick death which would spare us all pain [...] The 
transformation of Palestine into a National Home for the Jews is a source of great 
troubles and serious disturbances in the land where the prophets lived and where 
Jesus Christ was born and crucified. Disturbances have already started in several 
towns, notably in Jerusalem on 4th April 1920. The responsibility of this is yours 
and not that of Arabs who are defending their rights and doing everything in 
order to revive their nationality. Histoiy shall blame you for your deed. [...].117 
The document mentions Jewish immigration, the Balfour Declaration and the 
Conference of San Remo, but also brings into the political scene an important 
religious element. As this letter was addressed to the countries involved in the
115 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Literary Club to American Representative in Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 20 
August, 1919.
116 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania, Pos. 53, Fasc. 40, Christian Muslim 
Association to Vatican, 21 October 1919.
117 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl. Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania, Pos. 53, Fasc. 40, Arab Committee, 
Jerusalem, 17 May 1920.
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Peace Conference, which was convened to discuss the future asset of the 
Ottoman Middle East, the petitioners underlined the status of Palestine as the 
land where Jesus lived and died; thus using Christianity in order to gain support 
for the emerging Palestinian cause.
While throughout 1919 the Literary Club among other associations 
continued to urge the Vatican to intervene against Jewish immigration, by early 
1920 the tone of their statements changed as a result of the outcomes of the 
Peace Conference.118 During a meeting held at Nablus, the Supreme Committee 
of Arab Societies decided to boycott economic Jewish activities and to publicise 
their decision both in the Arabic press and the British official news in order to 
oppose Zionist immigration.119 With the fourth anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration closing, the Zionist leadership announced a great celebration in 
Jerusalem as they did in the previous years. The Palestinian Association of Egypt, 
one of the numerous groups to emerge during the war, sent a circular 
recommending that the occasion should be treated as a mourning day and all 
Arab shops should close. This particular occasion turned out to be relatively
1 Oflpeaceful as only one Arab was killed in the Jewish quarter of the city.
The impact of these Muslim-Christian associations on urban politics was 
substantial as they were crucial gatherings which supported the evolution of 
national sentiment in the formative years of the Arab Palestinian movement. The 
role of Christian activists however, appears to have been fairly marginal as 
opposed to the role of their Muslim counterparts. The war changed inter-
118 ASV, Segr. Stato, Affari Eccl Straordinari Asia-Africa-Oceania, Pos. 53, Fasc. 42, Literary Club to 
Vatican, Jerusalem, 21 September 1919.
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120 PC, The Paper o f Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 7, Box III, Report 4613/G, Storrs, November 1921.
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communal relations between Muslims and Christians which was once of 
suspicion and at times of open conflict, into a more balanced one. Christians 
were originally over represented at the establishment of the Muslim Christian 
Associations, however by late 1920s and more so in the 1930s, Muslim notables
• •  ■ l o igained control of the nationalist movement. These associations were however 
important in so far as they sanctioned the first alliance between Christians and 
Muslims against the threat of Zionism. Although these groups increasingly 
targeted and opposed Zionism as a political movement, inevitably it created a 
great deal of tension with the Jewish residents. Nevertheless the Muslim 
Christian Associations made distinctions between local Jewish residents and 
Zionist immigrants as suggested also by a note of General Money, chief
199administrator of OETA. However tension escalated and culminated in 
episodes of violence, demonstrations and riots, like the Nebi Musa incident of 
1920. This episode, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, saw major 
clashes between Arabs (Muslim and Christian) and Jews and it may be 
considered a watershed in the history of Jerusalem as it marked the beginning of 
a latent conflict.123
4.5 The Custody o f  the Holy Land: a case study o f  the Christian Churches
Among the Christian institutions of Jerusalem one of the most rooted in 
the social fabric of the city at the beginning of the twentieth century was the 
Catholic Custodia Terrae Sanctae (Custody of the Holy Land). The Franciscan 
order was founded during the thirteenth century by St. Francis of Assisi who
121 O’Mahony, “The Christian Communities of Jerusalem,” 20.
122 TNA: PRO FO 608/99, Report by General Money, Jerusalem, 31 March 1919.
123 See Segev, One Palestine, Complete', Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, Ch. 9.
191
visited the Holy Land and established relations with its Muslim rulers. In 1217 
the General Chapter (the general meeting of the order) established the province 
of the Holy Land, receiving official status in 1342 by Pope Clement VI.124 The 
original headquarters of the Franciscans in Jerusalem was established in the 
Cenacle, however after the Ottoman conquest in the sixteenth century the 
Cenacle was transformed into a mosque and the Franciscans moved their 
headquarters to the convent of St. Saviour located within the walls in the 
Christian quarter.125 The Custody was led by the Custos Terrae Sanctae and was 
assisted by a .council. The Franciscan order always possessed an international 
character. Although since its establishment the Custos was Italian, membership 
to the council was based on nationality, with predominance of Spanish and 
French elements. In the period under discussion the Custody was administered 
by a Discretory composed of the Custos, one French vicar, one Spanish 
procurator and six members, one Italian, one French, one Spanish, one German, 
and after 1921 one British and one Arabic speaking member.126 The Custos had 
religious jurisdiction on the Catholics of Palestine, parts of Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The Custos alongside the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch and the Armenian Patriarch became responsible for the enforcement of 
the Status Quo regarding the Holy Places.
After 1914 the seat of Custos was left vacant when Fr Cimino left 
Jerusalem for Istanbul where he endeavoured successfully to prevent the 
expulsion of the Franciscan friars from the city in the following year. In the
124 G.M. Faccio, “Lettera Circolare” in Custodia di Terra Santa, eds. Franciscans, 10-13 (Jeusalem: 
Fransican Printing Press, 1951),
125 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 226.
126 Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 3.
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meantime the activities of the Custody continued while Fr Cimino then went 
back to Italy where he became General of the Franciscan order; it was only after
17 7
the war that a new Custos was appointed.
In the nineteenth century the Franciscans established the Casa Nova, a 
lodge where they welcomed pilgrims. In 1847 they opened their own printing 
press, known as the Stamperia Francescana, publishing many books about the 
region as one of their main activities was to act as guides for the pilgrims. 
Locally the Custody opened and managed some small workshops employing 
local carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers and other workers. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century the Custody employed some 150 workers belonging to the 
Arab Catholic families living in the old city. Franciscans in the nineteenth 
century established two institutes for orphans, which hosted 150 children both 
male and female, of different religious background. The Custody, furthermore, 
managed two professional schools with the purpose of teaching artisan skills to 
local residents.129 The Franciscans also assisted the poor Christian and Muslim 
families but there is no evidence of any help offered to Jewish residents. They 
owned five pharmacies where drugs were mainly given for free; they also 
distributed to the poor food, medicines and clothes on a weekly basis.130
The Custody also to manage a complex relationship with the European 
governments. The balance in the council ruling the Custody was quite fragile as 
these governments attempted through its members to influence the institution.
127 Ibid, 19.
128 Ibid, 11.
129 G. Incelli, “Le Scuole di Terra Santa,” in Castodia di Terra Santa, eds. Franciscans, 168-176 
(Jerusalem: Fransican Printing Press, 1951).
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However, it was the nature of the Custody as a trans-national organisation which 
ensured its existence throughout the centuries. The Custody, as an institution 
under the Ottoman law, was not allowed to own properties such convents, 
schools and other buildings. Only individual friars were allowed to own 
properties in their name and the choice of who should be entitled to ownership 
was taken by the Custody according to nationality. The international character of 
the Custody meant that every decision was subject to international scrutiny, but 
during the war the Custody was left somewhat to its own devices although the 
Spanish and Austrian consuls did intervene in its favour. In a report compiled 
soon after the war by the newly appointed Custos, Fr Fernando Diotallevi, we 
understand that during the war Spain, donated at least 60,000 Francs to the 
Custody, whilst the Central Powers, mainly Austria, supported the organisation
1 01
financially. When the conflict broke out the Ottomans began to seize the 
buildings and properties of the Custody that were registered in the name of
1 T9fellow brothers of Allied citizenship. The Vatican, concerned with the future 
of the Holy Land, urged the Cardinal Dolci in Istanbul to explain to the Ottoman 
authorities that an infringement upon property rights was to be considered as an 
act of defiance against the Vatican State which claimed ownership of these 
properties contrary to Ottoman provisions.
As it was customary for the Custos of the President of the Custody to keep 
a diary of events it is possible to study the Custody throughout the war. The diary
131 ASMA, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6  March 1918.
132 As explained earlier the Ottoman Law, in relation to the property of religious estates, permitted only 
individuals and not institutions to be the owners of real estates. A change took place in 1912 as it was 
permitted to own a property in the name o f an institution rather than in the name of an individual; 
however ownership was still belonging to the individual and not to the institution. See for instance Bible 
Lands 54, (October 1912), Bishop in Jerusalem Blyth: “Since the Constitution, however, these tilings 
have widened considerably, and I am now negotiating the transference o f St George’s property from my 
personal holding to that o f  the Bishop of Jerusalem.”
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of Fr Eutimio Castellani, the President of the Custody, between 1914 and 1918 is 
written in the form of chronicle and includes notes kept on a daily basis. Since 
the Ottoman government had entered the war, the Custody found itself isolated 
internationally and the main framework of action became Palestine and 
particularly Jerusalem. The financial situation of the Custody started to worsen 
as its main sources of income became no longer available. Early in September 
1914 the Custody reduced the activities of their workshops dropping the wage of
1TTtheir employees by 15%. In November the Turkish authorities ordered 
religious congregations scattered around Jerusalem to gather in the city. The 
Franciscans hosted the men in the convent of St Saviour and the women in the 
Casa Nova located in Jerusalem inside the walls. A few days later the police 
registered all names of the clergy living in the two houses.134 The police visiting 
the convents became a common event throughout the war, often for the purpose 
of seizing provisions. For instance, with the winter approaching, the military 
requisitioned coal from the Custody and their mill which started to work for five
i oc
days in order to supply the Ottoman troops in Jerusalem.
When Italy joined the war alongside the Allies the situation worsened as 
the Ottomans looked at the Vatican as an ally of the Italian government.136 
Although the Ottomans had seized schools, convents and hospitals as part of the 
process of mobilisation, Cardinal Dolci obtained the permission to reopen the 
convents in Jerusalem belonging to the Custody. However the order coming from 
Istanbul was not followed by prompt action on the part of the local authorities in
133 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, 1914.
134 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, November 1914: “3 November. [...] 24 Franciscan nuns, 19 Carmelitan 
nuns, 20 Benedictine nuns, 17 Franciscan o f the tertiary order nuns, 60 orphans and other 12 nuns came to 
Casa Nova.” “7 November 15 White Fathers came to St Saviour.”
135 ACTS, Diario di Guerra, 1915.
136 ASV, Segreteria di Stato-Giierra-111, Card. Gasparri to Card. Dolci, Rome, 3 September 1915.
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Jerusalem and most of the convents remained closed.137 The few British 
missionaries among the Franciscans and the French were ordered to leave since 
they were subjects of hostile nations,138 The Ottoman order concerned only men; 
however it further suggested that “all nuns, the women who are not nuns and the 
male children below 18 years of age, who may desire, must also be sent away out
I OQ _
of the country.” Once the undesired members of the Custody left, Turkish 
troops seized nearly all properties in the form of buildings and supplies and the 
process of mobilisation in relation to the Custody was over.
In June 1915 an invasion of locusts severely damaged the areas 
surrounding Jerusalem and also reached the city: all male from 15 to 60 years 
were ordered to hunt and kill the locusts but the order was not given to the 
clergy.140 The summer proved to be hard for the Custody as Italy joined the war 
against Turkey in late August and the Ottoman authorities ordered that all clerics 
of Italian nationality, mostly Franciscans, should leave Jerusalem. Thanks to the 
American and Spanish consuls and to the decisive intervention of the Austrians, 
they were however allowed to remain.141 To summarise in 1915 the Franciscans 
living in the city were 72 Italians, 17 Ottoman subjects, 4 Portuguese, 31 Spanish,
1 4913 Germans, 3 Americans, and 5 Dutch.
In 1916 the Custody suffered a tremendous blow. In April the pharmacy 
of St Saviour was looted and closed down and in June Turkish troops occupied 
St Saviour and Casa Nova which were converted into a hospital, leaving only ten
137 ASV, Sacra Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari-Africa, Asia, Oceania, Pos. 13. 
Fasc, 5, Card. Dolci to Card. Gasparri, Istanbul, 5 April 1915.
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rooms in the two convents for the use of Mars and nuns.143 Despite the great 
distress, the Custody continued to run a soup kitchen for the Jerusalemites. As 
the activities of the Custody were reduced drastically, the entries of the diary for
1917 also fell and mainly dealt with the news coming from outside Jerusalem. 
Understanding that the British army was not far from the city after the 
evacuation of Jaffa in March 1917 they hoped one day the British would free 
Jerusalem.
4.5.1 The Custody in aftermath o f  the war; local and international 
dimensions
As soon as the city was captured by the British forces in December 1917 
the Custody had to deal with Jerusalem’s internal situation and to re-establish its 
connections outside Palestine. One of the most urgent questions was the religious 
protectorate over Catholicity in the Holy Land that had been for a century 
granted to France. A few weeks after the British conquest the Franciscan order 
named Fr Ferdinando Diotallevi as the new Custos. The Vatican Secretary of 
State, Card. Gasparri, kept the activities of the Custody under strict control, as 
the Vatican desired to deter the influence of Italy, Spain, France and Great 
Britain which were attempting to use this institution to gain more influence in 
Palestine.144
A British report on the Italian institutions in Jerusalem compiled in early
1918 described the material conditions of the Custody. The British estimated 
damages for £10,000. The two convents Casa Nova and St Saviour did not suffer
143 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, April-June 1916.
144 Giovamielli, La Santa Sede, 4.
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any major damage during the occupation but all furniture, table linen and silver 
as well the cellars were despoiled.145 According to this report the workshops run 
by the friars were not entirely destroyed as most of them were closed during the 
war. Once Fr Diotallevi reached Jerusalem in 1918 he wrote a report for the 
General of the order Fr Cimino, the former Custos before the war. He stressed 
once again that all properties had suffered looting but also emphasised that the 
Franciscans still served one daily meal to the needy.146 Diotallevi also reported 
that the Franciscans took care of both Abyssinian and Armenian Catholics.147
Politically the Custos reported that the Status Quo was maintained and 
confirmed in its previous terms; furthermore he stated that the voice of the 
Custody was not as strong as it used to be in the past. As a matter of fact the 
Latin Patriarch was still in the hands of the retreating Turkish troops while the 
Vatican was carefully monitoring the development of the events in Palestine.
As soon as the war was over the Custody came to the forefront of 
international politics including the future of the Holy Places, the question of 
Zionism, the conflict with the Latin Patriarchate and other issues. Card. Gasparri 
in Rome genuinely believed that the administration of the Holy Places would be 
given to the Vatican, in fact he believed that an internationalisation of the city 
looked almost impossible to achieve. Furthermore he believed that the French 
protectorate over the Catholics was to expire as Palestine was now in the hands 
of the British. To this effect the General of the Franciscan order Fr Cimino sent a 
telegram to the Custos Fr Diotallevi which stated that: “Turkish domination in
145 TNA: PRO CAB 27/23 Balfour to De Salis reported to Wingate, 23 January 1918.
146 ASMAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6  March 1918.
147 ASMAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Diotallevi to Cimino, Jerusalem, 6  March 1918.
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Palestine having ceased, the ancient French protectorate has ceased also.”148 The 
British military and the Foreign Office concerned with public security invited the 
Custody and the Vatican to postpone the question. The liturgical religious 
honours (a set of religious privileges granted by the Church to individuals) 
towards the French were kept alive until 1924 despite the great opposition of the 
Custody and that of the majority of the non-French-Catholics following the 
instruction by Card Gasparri.149 In 1926 France and the Vatican reached an 
agreement to the effect that liturgical honours throughout the Ottoman territories 
could be reinstated with the permission of local governments.150 This effectively 
marked the end of the centuries old French protection over Catholics in the 
region and in Jerusalem.
The activities of the Custody have been rarely studied in the local context
as the international dimension of this institution has taken centre stage. The diary
kept by the Custos Ferdinando Diotallevi from his appointment in 1918 to 1924
is clear evidence of the predominance of international and diplomatic issues.151
Looking at Diotallevi’s diary it is possible to see that there is no mention of the
local community. The editor of the diary, Daniela Fabrizio has rightly pointed
out that relationships with both Catholic and non-Catholic Christian institutions
were the two main concerns of the Custos. One last point to underline is the
apparent lack of interest on the part of the Custos Diotallevi concerning the
1 ^ 0Zionist issue unless it directly involved the Holy Places. It was the Vatican
148 TNA: PRO CAB 27/23, From G.O.C. to C.I.G.S., Cairo, 25 January 1918.
149 Giovannelli, La Santa Sede, 27.
150 Ibid, 36.
151 D. Fabrizio, ed., Diario di Terra Santa, (Milan: Edizioni Biblioteca Francescana, 2002).
152 Ibid, 12-13.
199
and the Latin Patriarchate that became more involved in the controversies 
surrounding the Zionist question.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed three main topics in relation to Christian 
institutions in Jerusalem. This, in order to establish continuities and changes in 
the political and social roles of the Christian institutions and to show the impact 
of the war upon these institutions. First, the dual role of the Christian Churches; 
in the period preceding the war, these institutions were mainly concerned with 
competition over the control of the Holy Places and with internal issues like 
conflict between the Arab laity and the Greek hierarchy of the Orthodox Church, 
but also the internal competition for the control of resources between the 
Catholic Custody of the Holy Land and the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The 
outbreak of the war radically changed this particular context as in fact the 
attention of the various Christian denominations turned to more local issues. 
Christian institutions and clergy began to focus on the protection of their own 
clergy and properties, above all on the protection of the local population which 
was extremely weakened by war conditions.
In the second part of the chapter I argued that the war brought about 
considerable change for Palestinian Christians. One of the outcomes of the war 
was, in fact, the emergence of the Muslim-Christian Associations. These groups 
were the direct response to Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine and 
reshaped the traditional alliances which bound the notables to the residents of 
Jerusalem. In fact under an emerging Palestinian identity both Muslims and
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Christians joined their forces against the new common enemy represented by 
Zionism. The role played by Christians as national activists was, however, to 
diminish in later years as Muslim notables became the main promoters of 
Palestinian nationalism.
The dual role of the Christian institutions, dealing with local and 
international issues, mentioned above has been investigated in this chapter 
through the case study of the Custody of The Holy Land. The survey of this 
institution has given us some hints of the relations between the Franciscans and, 
in a wider context, of the Christian institutions of Jerusalem, and local Ottoman 
as well as German authorities during the war. The very study of the Custody of 
the Holy Land has also shown the dynamics of the shift from wide issues 
involving international relations to more local ones during the war and the 
reversal process soon after the end of the war and the establishment of the British 
military administration, suggesting also the possibility to use this model in the 
study of other Christian institutions in Jerusalem.
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5 Foreigners in Jerusalem
“From Bethlehem to Jerusalem is a journey of about three miles. The whole way 
is full o f vineyards and orchards. The vineyards are like those in Romagna, the vines 
being low but thick. [...] The inhabitants, I am told, number about four thousand 
families. [...] Jerusalem, notwithstanding its destruction, still contains four very 
beautiful, long bazaars, such as I have never before seen, at the foot o f Zion. [...]
Most of those who come to Jerusalem from foreign countries fall ill, owing to 
climatic changes and sudden variations of the wind, now cold, now warm. All 
possible winds blow in Jerusalem to prostrate itself before the Lord.”
(Obadiah Yareh di Bertinoro circa 1450)1
The aim of this chapter is to identify foreigners in Jerusalem and to define 
then’ legal and political status and ideological distinctiveness in order to asses 
their impact upon the socio-political milieu of the city. Foreigners living in 
Jerusalem may be defined negatively in cultural terms as they did not belong to 
local groups, they did not speak local idioms, nor did they share the same 
customs of residents.2 However, they were familiar with the environment, since 
they possessed knowledge of the local milieu, historical knowledge of the 
territory, and wanted to redefine the image of Palestine in order to include 
themselves in the same concept.3
The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss and analyse the role 
played by European and American consuls during the war period in order to 
assess how the foreign presence changed and how foreign activities unfolded in 
the specific transitional period. The consuls, it will be shown, proved to be the 
main channel through which the foreigners of the city attempted to redefine its 
image and its environment. The consuls helped make the land more accessible
1 M. Grindea, The Image o f Jerusalem, (New York: University of Rochester, 1968), 134-136.
2 Saunders, The Concept o f the Foreign, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003), 3.
3 Pappe, A History o f Modern Palestine, 33.
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and attractive for visitors facilitating travels and businesses in the Holy Land, 
they often served the purpose of their own governments and they also became 
part of the development of eschatological plans of several religious groups. It 
appears that if the Ottomans ruled the administrative apparatus of the city, it was 
the foreigner population that managed its ideological machinery as suggested by 
the import in Jerusalem of the European concept of modernity. Eventually the 
war acted positively on this process as a catalyst for rapid and radical change. 
Foreign presence in the city has proved to be a permanent feature, even during 
the war. It may be argued that foreigners did represent a strong element of 
continuity in the transitional period.
Foreigners coming from every corner of the world have crowded
Jerusalem since time immemorial, however during Islamic rule and partly during
Ottoman rule, Jerusalem was almost inaccessible although not at all forgotten in
the western world. Only a few pilgrims adventured to the bare hills of the Holy
City and it was only after the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and Muhammad
‘All’s rule (1831-1840) over Syria and Palestine that the city of Jerusalem was
suddenly re-opened.4 Jerusalem, until the mid nineteenth century, was a
destination for pilgrims travelling from Europe as well as from other Muslim
lands, seeking to experience the spiritual dimension emanating from the city.
However with the establishment of convents, hospitals, schools and new
businesses linked to foreign enterprises, Jerusalem was then projected outside its
own stage. The British government in 1839 felt that the time was ripe to open a
consulate in the city. The doors of Jerusalem were thus opened to the presence of
a new type of foreigner: no longer pilgrims but diplomats, scholars and tourists.
4 Ibid, 3.
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These newcomers had different backgrounds, purposes and ideologies; however 
all of them aimed to modernise Palestine and Jerusalem according to western 
values.5 Foreigners acted more as agents of westernisation and thus helped the 
fusion of the West with Palestine.6
5.1 Visitors to Jerusalem
Since Jerusalem became more accessible in the nineteenth century as a 
result of new means of routes and transport with faster steam ships and new 
railways in the Ottoman Empire, we can distinguish at least three kinds of 
visitors: tourists, pilgrims and scholars. If  tourists and scholars represented a 
minority of the visitors, it was indeed pilgrims who represented the majority. 
During the war the influx of visitors obviously ceased but it is of interest to 
examine them in the previous period in light of the discussion of the policy 
making adopted by the British military administration from 1917 to 1920 in 
relation to visitors which will be presented in Chapter 6.
5.1.1 Pilgrims to the Holy City
Pilgrims are a different category from tourists. It is not only a matter of 
the purpose of the visit but also a matter of the services required. For the most 
part pilgrims were also tourists, but rarely were tourists pilgrims.7 Pilgrimage is 
strictly linked to the idea of a sacred space discussed in the previous chapter,
5 Ibid, 32-33.
6 Ibid, 6 .
7 See some definition in E. Badone and S.R. Roseman, “Approaches to the Anthropology of Pilgrimage 
and Tourism,” in Intersecting Journeys, eds. E. Badone and S.R. Roseman, 10 (Chicago: University of 
Illinois, 2004).
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with the journey playing an important role in the process.8 Pilgrims to Jerusalem 
had to sometimes face long travelling distances lasting weeks and months, during 
which they prepared themselves, through prayer and fasting, for the meeting with 
the sacred.
The reasons for performing a pilgrimage to Jerusalem were numerous; 
people looking for a safe seat in the afterlife; people asking for grace and 
blessing; many were the sick travelling to Jerusalem for cure. Some were just 
looking to spend the final days of their lives near the sacred space; it was 
considered a special honour to die and be buried in Jerusalem, the very place of 
the manifestation of God. Pilgrimage was also about returning home with 
souvenirs and stories to share.9 Pilgrimages were not based on class division; 
they were taken by both poor as well as rich people.10 The Austrian and German 
emperors visited Jerusalem at the end of the nineteenth century also taking the 
opportunity to go on pilgrimage. Considering the sacred meaning of Jerusalem 
for Christians, Muslims and Jews, it is not a surprise that the city was a very 
popular destination. Christian pilgrims, from Europe and United States, 
represented the majority of the visitors at the turn of the century however both 
Jews and Muslims held their own pilgrimages too. Jews, from Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as from America, visited the city during the Passover or 
other important religious festivities while the most important Muslim religious
8 S. Coleman and J. Eisner, eds., Pilgrimage, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 6 .
9 Ibid, 6 .
10 See J. Krammer, “Austrian Pilgrimage to the Holy Land,” in Austrian Presence in the Holy Land in the 
19th and early 20lh Century, ed. M. Wrba, 66-80 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 1996).
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pilgrimage was the Nebi Musa festival, held at the same time of the Jewish 
Passover and of the Christian Easter.11
Pilgrims, throughout the late Ottoman period, were mainly Russians. The 
Russian Orthodox Church believed that Russia as a state was to play an 
eschatological role in imposing Christian orthodoxy on the world and Jerusalem
> 19would be the place for the second coming of Christ. For the Russian Empire, 
however, Palestine was also a sensitive and a strategic region which could play a
1 3crucial role in the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. The British consul 
reported in 1910 that out of 33,000 pilgrims visiting the city, 12,000 were 
Russian subjects. The second nationality was Greek with 3,500 pilgrims, 
showing the huge gap between the Russian pilgrims and those of other 
nationalities; in this respect it is worth noting that only 500 French pilgrims 
visited the city in 1910.14 The impact of these pilgrims on the city became 
increasingly apparent; pilgrims affected the urban environment, economics, 
politics, cultural and social relationships. Pilgrims were, according to the 
capitulations, under the protection of the consulates representing their own 
countries. One of the reasons of the power of the foreign consuls in Jerusalem 
derived from the protection of pilgrims. Pilgrims, most of them of poor origins, 
brought with them offers gathered before their departure for the pilgrimage. As
11 The Festival of Nebi Musa expressed Muslim reverence for the Prophet Moses; it coincided with the 
Christian Easter festivities and it consisted of many pilgrimages and marches from and to the burial site of  
Moses on the road to Jericho from Jerusalem. See T.A. Idinopulos, Jerusalem Blessed, Jerusalem Cursed, 
(Chicago: IvanR. Dee, 1991), 271-272.
12 D. Hopwood, “The Resurrection of Our Eastern Brethren: Russia and Orthodox Arab Nationalism in 
Jerusalem”, in Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period, ed. M. Ma’oz, 395 (Jerusalem: Magnes 
Press, 1975).
13 Ibid, 395-396.
14 ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911. See also Y. Ben-Arieh, 
Jerusalem in the 19th Century. The New City, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984), 304-305.
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this money was destined to the main Churches in the city, the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate supported itself mainly through the monies donated by pilgrims.15
The European powers took care of pilgrimages to the Holy Land. French, 
Russians, Italians, Austrians as well as other European nationals began to build 
infrastructures for pilgrims as a response to the needs of these people. Quite 
openly, however this was also used in order to set foot in Palestine and Jerusalem 
and influence Ottoman policies. The large presence of pilgrims in Jerusalem and 
their strategic role led to the establishment of foreign consulates in the city from 
the mid eighteenth century, which was then followed by the establishment of 
hospices and guest houses for pilgrims. For instance the establishment of the 
British Consulate in Jerusalem was a strong objective for a long time of Lord 
Shaftsbury (a member of the British Parliament and later member of the House of 
the Lords) at least from the late 1820s following a strong religious revival in 
Britain which brought up the question of the restoration of the Jews to the Holy 
Land which will be discussed in Chapter 7.16 One positive reflection of these
17policies was that the local population enjoyed most of the services provided. In 
1884 the French began to build the Hospice of Notre Dame, an impressive 
building just outside the walls near Jaffa Road. Notre Dame was by the end of 
the Ottoman administration, the largest building in the city with more than four 
hundreds rooms available for pilgrims, moreover, the French did not stop their 
activity at that; the French St Louis Hospital offered its services both to pilgrims
15 Tsimhoni, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem,” 84; Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate,” 44.
16 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 80-81.
17 Ibid, 17.
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and to the local population.18 The Franciscans built their Casa Nova hospice in 
order to host more pilgrims. The Italians through the Italian National Missionary 
Aid Society began to build a hospital, designed by the famous architect Antonio 
Barluzzi in the Renaissance style; a square tower built next to the hospital 
recalling the tower of Palazzo Yecchio in Florence.19
Russians, considering the large number of pilgrims, built from 1864 an 
entire area outside the walls close to the Jaffa Road, then known as the Russian 
Compound, it was managed according to the needs of the pilgrims.20 The 
Compound was composed of the Russian Consulate, a Cathedral, one hospital,
91three hospices for pilgrims and other buildings. Russian pilgrims were allowed 
to stay in the Russian Compound for two weeks free of charge then they were 
normally charged with a nominal sum. Other foreign governments and foreign 
private citizens contributed to the development of the facilities for pilgrims. In 
some cases the reception of pilgrims became a business. Some Jewish and 
Christian entrepreneurs from Jerusalem began to export religious artefacts, for 
both Christians and Jews. In the mid 1890s this business reached the value of
9Ttwenty thousand pounds.
18 Ben-Arieh, The New City, 284-285.
19 Ibid, 197.
20 See D. Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843-1914, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969),
21 Y. Ben-Arieh, “The Growth of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century,” Annals o f the Association o f  
American Geographers 65, no. 2 (June 1975): 263.
22 Ben-Arieh, The New City, 300.
23 G.G. Gilbar, “The Growing Economic Involvement of Palestine with the West, 1865-1914,” in 
Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, ed. D. Kushner, 202 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
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5.1.2 Tourism in Jerusalem
Tourism at the end of nineteenth century was the new fashion for rich 
Europeans and Americans willing to spend a lot of money in order to satisfy their 
spirit of adventure. The famous British travel agent Thomas Cook organised 
visits to the holy land towards the end of nineteenth century, and the first 
Baedeker Guide of Palestine and Jerusalem was published in London in 1876.24 
Tourism in Jerusalem was to be considered an elite phenomenon as opposed to 
the pilgrimage which was open to everybody. Among the tourists visiting 
Jerusalem the famous writer Mark Twain who visited Palestine and the city in 
1867. Twain, a member of a group of American travellers crossing the Middle 
East, cynically depicted Palestine as “monotonous” and “uninviting”. 25 As 
tourists, as well as pilgrims needed services: hotels began to be built by European 
entrepreneurs and private houses started to be converted into guesthouses. The 
tour operators hired interpreters and guides from among the local population. In 
1898 when the German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Jerusalem, it was a 
boom year for tourism as hotels were fully booked for weeks and visitors had to 
hire tents.26 Except in the case of the visit of the German Kaiser, tourist services 
did not have a great impact in the amelioration of the city. During the visit the 
city was thoroughly cleaned and a number of public works were carried out.
In the years preceding the outbreak of the war tourism became a more 
relevant activity, which began to affect the city in a more substantial way, 
however it should be noted that tourism was still not a large industry. According
24 For an overview of the tourist guided of Jerusalem see: E. Bosworth, “The Land of Palestine in the Late 
Ottoman Period as mirrored in Western Guide Books,” British Society fo r Middle Eastern Studies 
(Bulletin) 13, no. 1 (1986):36-44.
25 Ben-Arieh, The Old City, 56; Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 109-110.
26 Ben-Arieh, The New City, 388-389.
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to a report by the British consul Harold Eustace Satow in 1911 the tourists who 
visited Jerusalem between June 1908 and May 1909 were 5,595 with an increase 
to 7,196 in the following year but the number decreased in 1911 to 5,759 as a 
result of the Balkans Wars and the war against Italy. The consul reported that in 
1911 among the tourists that visited Jerusalem there were 1,626 Americans, 957
99British and 895 Germans. Satow in the same report stated that among the 
people that travelled through the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway in 1911, there had been 
6,700 tourists and 33,500 pilgrims travelling as second class passengers from
9ftJaffa to Jerusalem. The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway was the fastest means of 
transport in order to reach Jerusalem once travellers or goods were disembarked 
at Jaffa port. The number of tourists compared to the number of pilgrims was 
merely a fraction. Nevertheless these tourists represented a good source of 
income, according to the Jewish paper Ha-Or the shopkeepers of Jerusalem were
90waiting for British tourists who were quite generous with their purses.
On the whole, tourism at the end of the Ottoman period played a small 
role in the urban modernisation of the city, though it is undeniable that the city
*3 A
itself enjoyed some improvements. Although, as explained above, locals were 
employed in tourist services, mainly in hotels or as guides, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century tourism was not a major economic activity compared with 
the olive soap industry or the production of handicrafts which denominated the
O 1
economic life of the majority of the population. The growth of the tourist
27 ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911.
28 ISA, RG 123.1, 790/12, H.E. Satow, Report on Consular District Year 1911,
29 Quoted in Ben-Arieh, The New City, 389.
30 Ibid, 385-390; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 47.
3'Locals were employed in hotels, restaurants, hospitals, shops and transports: Cook’s, A Guide to 
Jerusalem and Judea, (London: Thomas Cook & Son, 1924); E. Reynolds-Ball, Jerusalem, (London: A.
210
industry, however, led to an increasing request of services for tourists and 
numerous tourist agencies were opened along Jaffa Road. The most popular 
accommodations located along Jaffa Road or just inside the Jaffa Gate were the 
Grand New Hotel patronized by Cook’s Agency, the Jerusalem Hotel and the 
Hotel Palestine. Souvenirs shop like the Oriental Baazar, the White Store and 
Kurt & Eftemios shop were situated near Jaffa Gate. Two British reports of 
1900 underline how the population suffered from lack of services while tourists 
were relatively well catered for.34
As the Ottoman administration did not have enough funds to deal with 
visitors, the development of the infrastructure for tourism was left to foreign 
institutions such as consulates which ultimately worked towards the development 
of their own interests. Europeans established sea routes to Palestine with fast 
steam ship, invested money in infrastructures, built hotels and organised tours; 
the local administration was in charge of courses for interpreters and guides since 
the 1890s.35 Tourism during the war was completely halted. The American 
consul stated that 500 German tourists arrived in Jerusalem in July and left in 
August and no new arrivals in the city were recorded.36
& C. Black Ltd, 1924). For a discussion of the local economy before 1914 see Gilbar, “The Growing 
Economic Involvement,” 188-210.
32 Ben-Arieh, The New City, 389.
33 Matson, Guidebook to Jerusalem, 17-18.
34 TNA: PRO, FO 195/2084, Dickson to de Bunsen, Jerusalem, 13 November 1900; TNA: PRO, FO 
195/2084, Wheeler and Masterman to Dickson, Jerusalem 13 November 1900.
35 Ben-Arieh, The New City, 388.
36 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69A, Report on Commerce and Industries o f the Jerusalem Consular 
District, Jerusalem, 15 March 1915.
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5.1.3 Scholars and explorers o f  Jerusalem
With the Napoleonic invasion in 1799 and with Egyptian rule Palestine 
was brought on the international stage as religious missionaries, explorers, 
researchers and eventually tourists began to crowd the Holy Land. Research on 
Palestine and Jerusalem was biblically oriented. The main purpose of the 
explorer, geographer and archaeologist was to study the Bible using empirical 
data gathered through surveys of the Holy Land. Although there was some 
genuine scientific interest, all this activity was meanly geared towards the 
discovery of evidence in support of the authenticity of the Bible. The first British, 
German and American explorers of Palestine in the mid nineteenth century were 
moved by the desire to better understand and analyse the Bible through the study 
of the Holy Land from a geographical and archaeological point of view.37 
Biblical archaeology used the techniques of main stream archaeology but it was 
intentionally confined to the areas relevant to the Bible stories.38 Although the 
main focus of these scholars was on the archaeology of the Old Testament, 
biblical sites relevant to the New Testament were also considered. A Protestant 
researcher, Edward Robinson, in the 1840s, gave rise to controversy on the 
authenticity of the site of the Holy Sepulchre: eventually some Protestants and 
Anglicans began to search for the place where Jesus had been buried outside the 
walls of the city.39
Different European nations competed for the exploration and study of 
Palestine in nineteenth century. In 1865 the British government founded the
37 Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land, 29.
38 S.M. Paul and W.G. Dever, eds., Biblical Archaeology’, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1973), ix.
39 Y. Ben-Arieh, The Rediscovery o f  the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century, (Jerusalem: The Magnes 
Press, 1979), 133-139.
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Palestine Exploration Fund and in 1877 the Germans founded their own German 
Society for the Exploration of Palestine.40 It was only in 1900 that the Americans 
established the American School of Oriental Research. Dominicans, of French 
nationality, founded the Ecole Pratique d’Etudes Bibliques, then to be known as 
Ecole Biblique. Other new societies were formed like the Russian-Orthodox 
Society of Palestine in 1882, or existent institutions began to devote part of their 
activity to the exploration and study of the holy land, like the Custody of the 
Holy Land.41
The role of these institutions was mainly to support archaeological 
discovery.42 The surveys carried out in the city shed light on its evolution through 
different historical periods in order to substantiate Biblical stories. The Palestine 
Exploration Fund investigated the possibility to map Palestine in 1871. By 1876 
the survey of the Eastern part of the country was completed while the map of 
Western Palestine was published in 1877.43 As early as 1870s the British War 
Office provided funds for this project since the mapping of the Jordan Valley was 
considered to be of strategic value.44 One of the main purposes of the Fund was 
to uncover Biblical sites.45 This mapping activity also became crucial in the 
process of acquiring land and claiming rights on land, houses and properties by 
Jews migrating to Palestine and Jerusalem and from mid nineteenth century
40 Krammer, “Austrian Pilgrimage,” 67.
41 See Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 86-106.
42 A.L. Tibawi, British Interest in Palestine 1800-1901, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 185; 
Ben-Arieh, The Rediscovery o f  the Holy Land, 195. The Founding meeting o f the Exploration Fund 
proclaimed the aims o f the Palestine Exploration Fund to be the investigation o f the archaeology, 
geography, geology, and natural history o f Palestine.
43 For a history o f the Palestine Exploration Fund see: J J, Moscrop, Measuring Jerusalem, (London: 
Leicester University Press, 2000).
44 Ibid, 123.
45 Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 184-198.
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Jewish organisations and Jewish private citizens began to purchase land in 
Palestine and in the city despite the legal obstacles placed by Ottoman laws.46
The impact of this search for Biblical roots was felt across Europe and 
America. Reports of discoveries were published and publicised in the press. The 
image of Jerusalem portrayed was oriental and romantic as the interest was the 
city of Biblical times, an idealised city. The scholars visiting Jerusalem were 
imbued with the romance of the archaeology and the adventure of the discovery' 
of the past.47 Nonetheless the role played by these associations was crucial in 
mapping, surveying and retracing the history of the city and in promoting new 
studies of it.
Illustration  8: T he Italian H osp ita l4”
46 Kark. and Oren-Nordheim. Jerusalem and Its Environs, 294-297.
47 Y. Ben-Arieh. “Jerusalem Travel Literature as Historical Source and Cultural Phenomenon,” in 
Jerusalem in the Mind o f  the Western World. eds. Y. Ben-Arieh and M. Davis. 29 (London: Praeger. 
1997).
48 ACTS, free Copyright.
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5.2 Foreign Consulates in Jerusalem: a background
As a result of the new and great interest in Jerusalem starting with the 
British, the European powers began to establish their own consulates in 
Jerusalem. The opening of the consulates was the answer to an increase of 
activity in the economic, social and religious spheres of the foreign subject in 
Jerusalem and in the surrounding areas. The British consulate was first 
established in 1839, in the following two decades another four consulates were 
opened; the German in 1842, then those of France, Piedmont and Sardinia in 
1843, the Austrian in 1849 and the Russian in 1858. The Americans opened their 
consulate in 1844 but it only fully functioned after 18 5 6.49 Consuls derived their 
authority from the capitulations that granted extraterritorial status to them; 
freedom of movement, trade and settlement to the consuls and their proteges. 
Consuls, normally, dealt with all aspects of the personal status of the individuals 
under their protection. Further, consulates were the seats of under consular courts, 
which dealt with all civil and criminal cases regarding foreigner subjects. 
Consuls also presided mixed courts which adjudicated cases involving Ottoman 
and foreign subjects.50
Paramount among the European powers which developed interests in 
Jerusalem from the mid nineteenth century were Britain, Germany, France and 
Russia. Britain was looking after its strategic, economic and political interests in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.51 Germany was trying to establish itself on the 
Ottoman scene as an emerging nation. From the 1840s the Prussian state and
49 M. Eliav, “The German and Austrian Consular Archives in Jerusalem as a Source for the History of  
Palestine and its Population in the Late Ottoman Empire,” in Palestine in the Late. Ottoman Empire, ed. D. 
Kushner, 372-373 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
50 Eliav, Britain in the Holy Land, 15-16.
51 See Chapter 2; Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 29-57.
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subsequently Germany supported the Ottoman Empire and favoured the 
settlement of their citizens not only Jews but also Christians in the area.52 France 
through its role as a traditional protector of Catholics in the Holy Land was 
looking to maintain influence among the local population. The Russian 
government pursued its protection of the Orthodox Church as it was trying to 
further weaken the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War. At the turn of the 
twentieth century the United States was not interested in politics or strategic 
positions but the American Consulate mainly promoted American economic 
interests and assisted American travellers, pilgrims and scholars.54 After the 
unification of Italy in the 1860s, Italians expanded their interests in Palestine and 
Jerusalem in particular, where they tried to rival with the French government for 
the protection of the Catholics.55 Spain also opened a consulate in 1854 with the 
intention of catering for the different Catholic institutions of the city. The 
situation was to change with the war. As Spain remained neutral throughout the 
conflict the Spanish consulate took over the interests of other nations. In 1917, 
after the German and Austrian troops left the city, the Spanish consul Conde 
Ballobar found himself as the only diplomat left in Jerusalem as well as the 
caretaker of the interests of all countries involved in the conflict.
52 M. Eliav, “German Interests and the Jewish Community,” in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Empire, ed. 
D. Kushner, 426-427 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
53 D. Kushner, “The Foreign Relations o f the Governors of Jerusalem Toward the End o f the Ottoman 
Period,” in Palestine in the Late Ottoman Empire, ed. D. Kushner, 301-311 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986).
54 Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land, 236.
55 S. Minerbi, “Italian Economic Penetration in Palestine 1908-1919,” in Studies on Palestine During the 
Ottoman Period, ed. M. Ma’oz, 466-482 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975).
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5.2.1 Consulates and the local Ottoman establishment
As representatives of their own government, consuls had to deal with both 
the Ottoman authorities and the local population. Their most important 
relationship was with the M utasam f of Jerusalem. Given the high rotation of 
Ottoman officials, the consuls were always careful and thorough in the 
assessment of the officials appointed to the governorship of the sancak. The main 
activity of the governors, in their dealing with the consuls, was attempting to 
circumvent the capitulations through the enforcement of measures restricting the 
free movement of foreigners or imposing special taxes on foreign business.56 
Usually the consuls had the upper hand in updating their capitulary rights. Only 
on a few occasions did the governors win their legal cases against the foreign 
consuls.
One particular case of strong friction between the parties was the Jewish 
immigration towards Palestine. Most of the foreign consulates favoured Jewish 
immigration under the umbrella of the capitulations, as in fact these Jewish 
immigrants were citizens of different European countries. The first to favour
rn
Jewish immigration were the British. Following a Christian religious revival 
during the 1820s a number of British citizens arrived in Palestine in order to 
proselytise the Jewish population through the “London Society Promoting 
Christianity”, an association whose primary aim was to convert Jews to 
Christianity.59 It was under the heavy influence of the people involved in this 
particular movement, like Lord Ashley (Earl of Shaftesbury), that the British
56 Kushner, “The Foreign Relations of the Governors o f Jerusalem,” 312.
57 Ibid, 312-313.
58 Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 31.
59 B. Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem, (London: Profile Books, 2001), 52-53.
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government started to actively support Jewish immigration towards Palestine.60 
The Ottomans attempted to counteract Jewish immigration with strict laws that 
prohibited Jewish immigration and with laws which limited and prohibited land 
and house purchases on the part of Jews. In October 1913, the local Ottoman 
authorities in Palestine were ordered by Istanbul to stop the system of issuing 
Red Papers to the Jews entering Palestine as a receipt for their passports.61 In fact 
Jews visiting Palestine were requested to leave their passport with Ottoman 
authorities in exchange of a Red Paper which granted permission to visit 
Palestine for a limited period. Despite the attempts of the local authorities, 
Ottoman governors had often to succumb to consular pressure.62 Consuls were in 
general highly critical of the Ottoman administration and dismissive of local 
government as voiced by the Italian Consul in 1896: “It is general opinion that 
the Ottomans will not obtain any efficient result from the [Tanzimat] refonns [...] 
the new administrative system will upset the population. Likely, the refonns will 
be delayed.”63
It was under the constant pressure of the consuls and foreign citizens that 
the municipality of Jerusalem worked towards the improvement of services like 
lighting, cleanliness and public security in the city. The British consul supported 
municipal efforts improving the lighting of the city but advocated the 
implementation of the capitulary regime with regards to the enforcement of
60 Tibawi, British Interests in Palestine, 33-34.
61 TNA: PRO, FO 195/2452 William Hough to McGregor, Jaffa, 27 October 1913.
62 There are many examples available regarding the attempt of the Turkish to stop Jewish immigration in 
Hyamson, The British Consulate in Jerusalem and in Eliav, Britain in the Holy Land.
63 Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land, 143; Kushner, “The Foreign Relations of the Governors of  
Jerusalem,” 313. MAE, Ambasciata d’ltalia in Turchia, Busta 239, Italian Consul in Jerusalem to the 
Italian Ambassador in Istanbul, Jerusalem, 26 November 1896.
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taxation on real-estates on Ottoman and foreign subjects alike according to the 
capitulary regime.64
Consuls also directed relations between European firms that managed the 
city’s public services and the local authorities.65 There was great competition 
among the consulates in order to win concessions from the Ottoman 
administration. In early 1914 for instance a large project was granted to a French 
company to construct a tramway line after strong and fierce competition between 
a number of European companies. The project was unfortunately halted by the 
outbreak of the war.66 At the same time another French company obtained the 
concession to fit a system of pipes in order to bring potable water to the city. In 
all these agreements the municipality of Jerusalem would acquire control of both 
services and infrastructure after a period of ten or fifteen years. 67 The 
municipality was thus trapped in a vicious circle of dependency created by the 
Capitulary System which through political means had greatly favoured the 
penetration of foreign capital. In 1906 the governor of Jerusalem Ali Ekrem Bey, 
realistically wrote to Istanbul that in a country (Palestine) where more than half 
of the population was foreign, it was impossible in questions relating to the 
municipality to consider them as though they were not existent.68
64 TNA: PRO, FO 95/2199, J. Dickson to O’Conor, Jerusalem, 31 July 1905.
65 TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139, McGregor to Foreign Office, 29 January 1914; McGregor to Foreign Office, 
29 January 1914.
66 TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139/6143, McGregor to Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 29 January 1914.
67 TNA: PRO, FO 368/1139/6144, McGregor to Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 29 January 1914.
68 ISA, RG 83/28, Ekrem Bey to Istanbul, 15 November 1906; also quoted in Kark, American Consuls in 
the Holy Land, 145.
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5.3 Foreign activity during the mobilisation process
At the moment of the outbreak of the war in Europe the city of Jerusalem 
was placed under military administration. It was not clear whether Turkey was to 
join the war and on which side; therefore once the mobilisation process started, 
the consuls undertook intensive activity for the protection of their own countries’ 
interests and proteges. Confusion was the main feature in the short time before 
Turkey joined the war alongside Germany and Austria. The mobilisation process 
has been briefly already discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the general 
conditions of the city in this particular period; in the following section we will 
see how distinctively the mobilisation process affected the foreign residents.
As soon as martial law was proclaimed in the city at the beginning of 
November 1914 the foreign consuls informed their own proteges not to interfere 
with the local military operations. All economic activities were halted affecting 
both local and foreigner inhabitants. For the few weeks between the proclamation 
of martial law and the actual declaration of war, Jerusalem was caught in a 
position of stalemate. By October, Jerusalem was cut off from the world as the 
foreign post services were closed and there was no mail delivery. The actual 
order of closure for the foreign post offices was sent by the Governor of
yfQ
Jerusalem to the consuls on 22 September. Services like electricity and water 
were reduced and only two hotels and two hospices employed small engines to 
provide for themselves. Telephones lines, previously owned by foreign 
companies, went under local Ottoman management, however the new 
management was not able to provide a proper service as the equipment necessary
69 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 231. NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor o f Jerusalem to 
Glazebrook, Jerusalem 22 September 1914: “with the abolition o f the capitulations in the Ottoman 
Empire, the foreign post offices will have to close on the morning o f 1 October 1914.”
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was stacked in Antwerp. Eventually under Ottoman management telephone 
lines never worked properly.71 Schools managed by foreigners were closed and 
only Ottoman schools were left opened.
The worst however for the foreigners was still to come; in September 
1914 the Ottoman government sent to all foreign embassies in Istanbul a note 
stating that with effect from 1st October 1914 the capitulations were to be 
considered unilaterally abrogated. Once the circular reached Jerusalem, the news 
was welcomed by the Muslim population, whilst among the foreigners and 
among the Ottoman Christians and Jews panic spread, as they feared actions 
against them.72 The people who were most affected however were the Jews, who
n'i
had normally lived thanks to the support of the haluka.
Although war was not yet declared, foreign subjects, mainly of the Allied 
Powers, were advised by their own consulates to leave the city.74 At the same 
time all consuls complained to Ottoman authorities against the abolition of the 
capitulations. Even Germany and Austria, then allied with Turkey had to accept 
the abolition of the privileges granted by the capitulations. The German and 
Austrian consuls, as a sign of protest, handed back to the Ottoman governor the 
official decree which abolished the capitulations. The American consul Otis 
Glazebrook undertook a campaign against the abolition of the capitulations 
supported by the American Ambassador in Istanbul Henry Morgenthau. The 
ambassador proved to be a strong opponent to the Ottoman decision, arguing that
70 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69/A, Deputy Consul to Trade Office, Jerusalem, 4 September 1914.
71 OA, DH.EUM.MEM. 41/19, Mutasarnf o f Jerusalem to Ministry o f Interior, November 1913; 
DH.EUM.MEM. 91/39, Mutasarnf o f Jerusalem to Ministry of Interior, 1917.
72 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 63.
73 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 6 8 , Glazebrook to American Embassy Istanbul, Jerusalem 14 September 
1914; TNA: PRO, FO 369/332, J. Morgan to Foreign Secretary, Jerusalem, 14 December 1910;
74 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 231.
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the capitulations could not be abrogated without the consents of the countries 
which signed those treaties. Even after the war, when the British took over, the 
Americans still complained against the abolition of the capitulations.76 Since the 
Americans were not involved in the outbreak of the European conflict they felt it 
was unfair to suffer the consequences of the abolition of the capitulary regime 
that had granted them considerable commercial presence in the area. The 
abolition of the capitulations was felt to be a rupture with a plurisecular tradition 
of foreign privileges in the Ottoman Empire. However, apart from a formal 
reaction from all consulates, and with the only strong opposition aired by the 
Americans, the consuls did nothing but acknowledge the Ottomans last full act of 
sovereignty.77 At this stage, the consuls endeavoured to protect some employees 
of Ottoman citizenship and called to serve the Ottoman army declaring them as 
their proteges. They also protected their own and their proteges’ properties 
through influence upon the local administrational and the local notables.
5.4 Foreign presence in the city during the war
On 3 November 1914 the British Consulate in Jerusalem received a
70telegram informing them that Turkey had declared war against the Allies. The 
British, French and Russian diplomats and residents began their operations of 
evacuation. On 30 October the Consul received a coded telegram instructing him
75 NARA, RG 59, Department o f State 711.673/69, Embassy in Istanbul to Secretary of State, 9 March 
1916.
76 NARA, RG59, Department of State 711.673/107, Oscar S. Heizer to High Commissioner in Istanbul, 
Jerusalem, 22 September 1920.
77 NARA, RG 59, Department of State 711.673/120, Memorandum, Division o f Near Eastern Affairs, 
March 1919: "Capitulations may be remodelled, (however) Turkey must be made to apply them in their 
entirety as they stood prior to their attempt to abrogate them.”
78 For instance the American Consul Glazebrook sent to Cemal Pa§a a list o f American Citizens and of 
other nationalities under his protection (120 Americans, 25 Italians, 35 English, 30 Russians, 3 Serbs). 
NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Glazebrook to Cemal Pa§a, Jerusalem, 22 July 1915.
79 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 232.
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to bum all ciphers and confidential archives; following these instructions
• * ♦ « • onWilliam Hough set a huge fire in his garden and in mid-November left the city. 
The French consul George Gueyrand and the director of the Credit Lyonnais 
Miguel Antonio Guerassimo also left the city alongside William Hough.81 The 
American consul Glazebrook took charge of British and French interests in 
Palestine.82 Most of the properties belonging to British and French citizens were 
seized by Ottoman officials after promptly being evacuated, others, mainly 
Jewish proteges of the consulates were deported to Damascus and their properties
no
either seized or demolished. Furthermore an official order of Cemal Pa§a 
claimed that all enemy subjects would be kept as hostages against the
Rd.bombardment of open ports. The same day the British and French diplomats 
departed, the Latin Patriarch Camassei, Conde de Ballobar and the Italian consul 
Senni, held a meeting in the residence of the American consul. They signed a 
document asking the Entente powers not to bombard the Ottoman open ports in 
exchange for the freedom of prisoners held by the Turks.85 Eventually the 
Turkish authorities deported the prisoners to Syria.
80 W. Hough, “History o f the British Consulate in Jerusalem,” Journal o f the Middle East Society, no. 1, 
(October-December 1946): 13-14.
81 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 64-65.
82 Eliav, Britain in the Holy Land, 91. See also TNA: PRO, FO 369/776, Hough to Sir Grey, Cairo 21 
November 1914. In this report the British consul reports the details o f circumstances o f his departures 
from Jerusalem. NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, 23 November 1914: “The 
archives of the British Consulate had already been moved to this Consulate and their premises completely 
evacuated. Likewise the few articles belonging to the Belgian Consulate had been placed under my 
charge. The Serbians have no consulate here.” NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to American 
Embassy Istanbul, Jerusalem, 2 November 1914: “French Consul now requests the Consulate to take 
charge of French interest stop.”
83 NARA, Consular Post Vol. 70, Glazebrook to Embassy in Istanbul, Jerusalem 3 February 1915: “The 
Jewish subjects of those (Great Britain, France and Russia) countries were either expelled or had to 
become Ottoman subjects.”; TNA: PRO FO 369/776, W. Hough to E. Gray, Jerusalem, 21 November 
1914: “Practically all convents, religious institutions, schools, hospitals etc., under the protection of the 
Entente Powers were seized by the Military authorities.”; ASV, Segr. Stato Guerra (1914-1918), 306, 
Card. Gasparri to Mons. Marchetti, Vatican City, 26 May 1917.
84 TNA: PRO, FO 369/776, Hough to Sir Grey, Cairo, 21 November 1914.
85 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 65.
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Remaining in the city, apart from the representatives of neutral countries 
such as Italy, the United States and Spain, were the representatives of Germany 
and Austria, the allies of the Ottoman Empire.86 These consuls had a hard task; 
they had to deal with Ottoman officials and military authorities, the consuls of 
neutral countries and to an extent with the local population. Despite being allies, 
the German and Austrian consuls, Johann Brode and Friedrich Kraus, were cut 
off from any decision making process while the Turkish officials adopted a more
R7aggressive attitude towards foreign nationals including Germans and Austrians.
5.4.1 Relief, aid and consular politics during the war
One of the main activities of the consuls in Jerusalem during the war was 
to provide relief and aid to the local population. Despite the censorship, the 
difficulties in communications and the orders coming from their own countries 
the consuls continued to play an important political role and they retained a 
patterned competition among themselves. Under war conditions the distribution 
of aid and the protection of the civilian population became the main political 
issue among the consuls. Normally relief arrived from the neutral countries via 
the port of Jaffa, through sea transports declared safe by both belligerent parts 
and then managed by the foreign consuls in Jerusalem. Notably, the largest part 
of the aid delivered, targeted the Jewish communities. The local Muslim 
community also received provisions, which were managed by a local
86 The German consul at the beginning o f the conflict was Edmund Schimdt then replaced in 1916 by 
Johann Wilhelm H. Brode; the Austrian consul was Friedrich Kraus.
87 G. Hintlian, “The First World War in Palestine and Msgr. Franz Fellinger,” in Austrian Presence in the 
Holy Land in the 19th and early 20lh Centiuy, ed. M. Wrba, 180 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 
1996).
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Commission, composed mainly of local notables. Although there is no direct 
evidence suggesting which notables were involved in this commission it is 
possible to argue that the main families of the al-Husaynis, Khalidis and 
Nashashibis were involved as in fact a member of each provided representation 
in the Ottoman parliament.89
The main activity of relief fell on the Americans who paid special 
attention to the Jewish population regardless of whether they supported Zionism 
or not, besides the ambassador in Istanbul was the leading American Jew Henry 
Morgenthau.90 A cargo organised by two American Jews, Levine and Epstein, 
landed in Jaffa in May 1915. The proportion of distribution was 55% for the Jews, 
26% for the Muslims and 19% for the Christians.91 It was the Jerusalemite Jews 
who suffered the most from the war conditions as a result of the restrictive 
measures adopted by the Ottoman government against the Jews. The Christians, 
either Ottoman subjects or citizens from other countries were under the legal 
protection of the neutral countries and also of Germany and Austria.92 The 
Austrian Consul Kraus and the Spanish consul Ballobar petitioned, without 
success, the Ottoman authorities in October 1915 in order to avoid the occupation 
of one of the Franciscan convent in the city.93 The Austrian consulate also 
worked for the relief of the Jewish population of the city, providing them with 
financial aid and food. In 1917 the Austrian consul Friederich Kraus and
88 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem 5 August 1915.
89 TNA: PRO, FO 882/14, Arab Bureau Report on Jerusalem, Cairo, 20 December 1916.
90 V.D. Lipman, Americans and the Holy Land through British Eyes, (London: V.D. Lipman, 1989).
91 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem, 29 May 1915.
92 M. Eliav, “The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem. Activities and Achievements,” Austrian Presence in 
the Holy Land in the 19,h and early 20th Centwy, ed. M. Wrba, 48 (Tel Aviv: Austrian Embassy Tel Aviv, 
1996).
93 ACTS, Diario della Guerra, Jerusalem, 11 October 1915.
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Heinrich Brode, the newly appointed German consul, prevented the expulsion of 
the Jewish population from Jaffa ordered by Cemal Pa§a.94
There were several reasons behind the race for helping the Jews. All the 
countries represented in Jerusalem had a large numbers of citizens who were 
Jewish and there was widespread feeling of anti-Semitism in these countries. The 
powerful myth of Jewish supremacy, the idea that the Jews could influence world 
politics, was well spread.95 Ultimately, the protection of the Jews was a political 
manoeuvre rather than humanitarian, though religious feelings and a particular 
theological thought that will be discussed in Chapter 7, also played some role. 
Zionism was gaining ground in Germany as well in Britain and there was fierce 
competition between countries in order to grant protection to the Jews. From the 
perspective of this competition it seems that the Balfour Declaration, issued in 
1917, did allow the British government to monopolise the Zionist cause.
The Ottomans, perfectly aware of the rising Zionist activity before the war, 
tried first to stop Jewish immigration and then to expel them from Jerusalem and 
Palestine.96 In December 1914 neutral countries were ordered to notify the Jews
07under their protection that they were to leave the country within three days. As
* QRall consuls demonstrated against this measure, it was not implemented. 
Throughout the war there were many episodes like the one just described; 
however, towards the end of the conflict Ottomans became harsher and the job of 
the consuls became increasingly difficult, they could not longer influence the 
Ottoman authorities. By the end of March 1917 Cemal Pa§a ordered the
94 Eliav, “The Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem,” 48. See also Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 197.
95 M. Levene, “The Balfour Declaration: a Case of Mistaken Identity,” The English Historical Review 107, 
no. 422, (January 1992): 76.
96 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 16-20.
97 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 29 December 1914.
98 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 69, Glazebrook to Cemal Pa§a, Jerusalem, 30 December 1914.
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evacuation of Jaffa; Ballobar complained but he could not change this decision, 
eventually the refugees were allowed to go to Jerusalem."
To help the relief activity two important organisations were established: 
the local Muslim Commission and the Central Committee for the Relief of Jews. 
The first was a local institution, as mentioned earlier, managed by the notables 
for the purpose of distributing aid and relief to the local Muslim population. It 
was under the control of the Ottomans but it was able to act quite freely.100 The 
Ottoman Governor, who was distrustful of the Arab notables, asked the 
American consul to verify whether the local Muslim commission was working 
properly and to make sure that part of the rice and sugar available would go to 
the Municipal Hospital; the hospital accepted Jews and Christians as well.101 The 
second institution, mentioned earlier, was an international body, composed of 
mainly American Jews, established by the Zionists for the purpose of helping all 
Jews, regardless of their support of Zionism, in Palestine. 102 The consul 
Glazebrook was asked by the local authorities to send them a list showing the
103payees and the amount of money sent.
The activity of this particular body was quite complex and loaded with 
strong political connotations. The Americans, as mentioned earlier played a 
crucial role. The American Consul in Istanbul Henry Morgenthau, of Jewish 
origin, was the first to appeal to American Jews after the outbreak of the war, in 
order to help all Jews living in Palestine. The British agreed to grant free passage 
to vessels carrying food, medicines and other commodities provided by the
99 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 196.
100 See, NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 5 August. 1915; 
NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 23 January 1916.
101 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, Governor of Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 5 August 1915.
102 See Lipman, Americans and the Holy Land, 253.
103 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Governor o f Jerusalem to Glazebrook, Jerusalem, 23 January 1916.
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American Jewish Committee. This agreement signed in 1915 was made on the 
condition that the distribution was undertaken with the supervision of the 
American Consul without any interference on the part of the Ottoman 
authorities.104 The effort to relieve the Jews of Palestine proved to be successful 
as it was corroborated by the enormous amount of money and other help sent. 
Reports on activities of this organisation suggest that it succeeded in restoring the 
lives of Jews, at least for 1915, to a state of normality, particularly in 
Jerusalem.105
It was also common, as far as the war condition had allowed it, for private 
citizens in the United States as well in Germany to send money directly to 
particular individuals living in Jerusalem. Normally the money was paid to the 
American Ambassador in Istanbul and then transferred to the Consul in 
Jerusalem. Then under the instructions of the private citizens who had sent the 
money, it was paid to the beneficiary.106 In February 1916 for instance the sum of 
$110 was made available to be paid to Gerschan Heyman and Neo Sheorim, two 
Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem. The money was sent first from Louis Heyman, 
son of Gerschan living in the United States, to the “Central Committee for the 
Relief of Jews Suffering throughout the War”, then from the Committee to the
1 CMAmerican Consulate in Jerusalem. The “Central Committee for the Relief of 
Jews Suffering Throughout the War” was formed in 1914 in the United States
104 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 72, American Embassy to Department o f State, Istanbul, 22 January 1915.
105 NARA, State Department Record, 867.40 -  867.4016/125, Roll No. 43, Morgenthau to Secretary of 
State, Istanbul, 10 April 1915: “Letter from Yellin dated Jerusalem March 25 states that present situation 
o f Jews very satisfactory.”
106 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Central Committee for the Relief o f Jews to Glazebrook, New York, 
10 February 1916. TNA: PRO, FO 371/2480, Foreign Office to French Ambassador, London, 16 
December 1914.
107 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 75, Central Committee for the Relief o f Jews to Glazebrook, New York, 
10 Februaiy 1916.
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and it was part of the Joint Distribution Committee alongside the American 
Jewish Relief Committee and the People’s Committee.108 The Joint Distribution 
Committee was formed in November 1914, chaired by Felix Warburg (a member 
of the Warburg banking family of German origins), with .the purpose to 
coordinate the activities of the three relief committees.109
One final example of American relief is medical aid, mainly targeting the 
Jewish communities. The American Zionist Organisation supported the creation 
of a medical unit with a military structure to be attached to the British 
Expeditionary Force in Palestine in May 1917 before the British occupation of 
the city.110 British authorities, however, considered the unit of no military value 
and the unit did not work with the troops. British acknowledged its political 
importance and furthermore they acknowledged the indirect but powerful 
American Jewish influence on the events in Palestine through the welfare 
distribution.111
Humanitarian activities, as suggested throughout the previous sections 
were closely linked to politics. Indeed the relief of the Jewish population was at 
the centre of a strong political activity in all the countries involved in the war. 
The Jews of Palestine throughout the war received constant help whilst the 
Zionist Commission was touring Europe for the purpose of looking for support 
for the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine. Zionist pressure on 
European governments, eventually, found a careful listener in the British
1 0 8 1.C. Clarke, American Women and the World War, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1918), Ch. 
XXXI.
109 D. Heddesheimer, “The First Holocaust” (Chicago: Theses and Dissertations Press, 2003), 33; see also 
M. Engelman, Fifteen Years o f  Effort on Behalf o f World Jewry, (New York: Ference Press).
110 TNA: PRO, FO 371/3057, Barclay to Foreign Office, Washington, 30 May 1917.
111 TNA: PRO, FO 371/3057, Foreign Office to Spring Rice, London, 24 July 1917. See also Lipman, 
Americans and the Holy Land, 281.
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Government and it is arguable, as it will be shown later, that the Zionist lobby
119played a strong role in the issuance the Balfour Declaration.
Consuls, besides relief and aid, also had to deal with questions related to 
the prisoners, economy and local religious institutions. Consuls were responsible
-T 1 *5
for the fate of prisoners of war as well as local political prisoners. On the eve 
of the British occupation of Jerusalem, the Spanish consul Ballobar noted his 
concern in relation to several Jews detained by Ottoman authorities because of 
their Zionist activities.114 During the war the attempts of foreign economic 
penetration in Palestine and Jerusalem did not halt. As Europeans were busy with 
the war, American firms expressed their interest in possible investments with 
some extraordinary developments. The American Film Company in 1916 asked 
the American consul Glazebrook to investigate whether it would be possible to 
invest in the film/theatre business, ignoring that a war was raging in the region. It 
appears that the war, at least in America, was felt to be very distant and should 
not interfere with trade and business. This perception changed of course in 1917 
when the United States joined the war leaving the Spanish consul, the only 
foreign representative not involved in the war, holding and protecting the 
interests of the allied countries.115
Lastly we may look at the very personal issue of consuls during the war. 
As the conflict broke out, consuls were affected just as the population, by the 
shortage of money. The American consul was in possession of some gold that 
was left under the care of the Franciscans since it was almost impossible to use or
112 A detailed discussion of the Balfour Declaration and the reasons for its issue will be discussed 
throughout chapter 7.
113 See NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 70, Consular Agent in Jaffa to Glazebrook, Jaffa, 2 July 1915.
114 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 233-235.
115 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 83, Consul Conde Ballobar, Jerusalem, 9 May, 1917.
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even to exchange it.116 The Spanish consul himself experienced lack of money 
towards the end of the war. With great bitterness Ballobar believed that Ottomans 
were not far to provide political justification for theft and robbery in order to
• 117seize the small quantity of food and medicines left.
5,4.2 Consuls o f  War: Conde de Ballobar and Otis Glazebrook
Two of the most important political foreign figures in Jerusalem during 
the war were the Spanish Consul Conde de Ballobar and the American Consul 
Otis Glazebrook. As mentioned earlier they played a crucial role in the protection 
of their own interests and the distribution of aid.
Antonio de la Cierva Lewita, later on Conde de Ballobar, was bom in 
Vienna in 1885. His mother was of Jewish origin but converted to the Catholic 
faith, his father was a Spanish military attache to the Spanish embassy in the 
Austrian capital. In 1911 Ballobar entered the Spanish consular service and then 
he was sent as vice-consul to Cuba. In 1914, when he was less than thirty years 
old, he was appointed consul to Jerusalem, which he left in 1920, when he first 
married Rafaela Osorio de Moscoso Duchess of Terranova and secondly served 
for a short period in Tangier. In 1949 the Conde de Ballobar was named once 
again consul to Jerusalem where he served until 1952. Ballobar died in Madrid in 
1971 aged 86 years.118
During his first stay in Jerusalem, the Conde de Ballobar, while still in his 
twenties, wrote a diary from September 1914 until the 27 May 1919. This diary
116 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 73, Glazebrook to Morgenthau, Jerusalem 6  August 1915.
117 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 179.
118 All personal information is from the introduction edited by Eduardo Manzano Moreno in Conde de 
Ballobar, Diario, 25-26.
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is an important source for the history of Jerusalem during the war, and 
furthermore adds depth in order to understand the consul’s perceptions, opinions 
and expectations whilst living in the city. There are three main interesting 
developments that emerged from his diary: the extremely poor attention paid to 
the local Arab indigenous population; the shift of focus from international 
questions to more local ones during the war period; a shift in his personal attitude 
vis-a-vis his official position, as he became more disillusioned as the war 
progressed.
Ballobar throughout his diary avoided granting any significant attention to 
the local population. The first reference to the local population to be found is on 
a note on 13 February 1915 in relation to the local Jew s.119 It took three months 
from the outbreak of the war for Ballobar to write a note on the locals; a clear 
reflection of his poor attention to the local inhabitants, at least in the first stages 
of his consular mission in the city. Later on Ballobar took some interest on the 
condition of the Turkish army and the development of the Palestinian front. At 
the same time, however, Ballobar continued to dine with the other foreign 
officials in the city as well as with the German commanders enjoying until the 
very end a glass of cognac with them, a sign that the war was very far from his 
mind.120
As mentioned earlier, during the war Ballobar began to shift his focus 
from international issues to more local ones. Once the communications with his 
own country and with the embassy in Istanbul began to deteriorate, he could not 
avoid turning his attention to issues regarding mainly Jerusalem and the
119 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 90.
120 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 31.
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surrounding areas. Considering that Ballobar did not speak local languages and 
did not speak English, he turned his attention to the question of the local 
Christian Churches. At the outbreak of the war he was mainly concerned with the 
protection of Spanish interests.121 Afterwards his main activity turned towards 
the protection of the buildings belonging to the Catholics and the protection of
199some of the clergy deported by the Turks. Another major shift in Ballobar’s 
view was towards the local administration. He became very close with Ottoman 
officials and towards the end of Ottoman rule was able to comment with a degree
1 99of knowledge on the Ottoman establishment.
The last great shift experienced by Ballobar was regarding his personal 
attitude towards his role. As a young diplomat, when he arrived in Jerusalem, in 
1914 on the eve of the outbreak of the war, he was confident that he would play 
an important role in defending Spanish interests, mainly of a religious nature. 
War changed many aspects; Ballobar found himself playing a different role, one 
which it is quite possible he never imagined playing starting with the episodes of 
November 1914, when Ballobar was charged with the French interests and he 
became more involved in local politics.124
At the very end of the war in Jerusalem, Ballobar played an international 
key position, as he represented all the Allied and Central powers, besides his own 
country. Despite this huge nominal power, Ballobar became quite disillusioned.
121 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 6 8 : “The Spanish monks are very upset and unless a positive answer will 
come from the ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Marquis de Lema, they will go back to Spain. I sent to all 
them their passports.”
122 Ibid, 119-120: “The Porte ordered that the Franciscan convent in Jaffa was to re open, however the 
governor o f Jerusalem is not enforcing it. Djemal Pasha is dictator o f first category.”
123 See Storrs, The Memoirs, 303-304. Ballobar made some comments to Ronald Storrs: “He (Ballobar) 
tells me the Bodies were indifferent to the fate of the city, and drank and laughed till the night before 
evacuation. Jemal was sale type but bon garcon, and Enver aimait beaucoup la boisson: Falkenhayn and 
Kress sympathiqaes.”
124 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 64-65.
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He tried hard to make sure his diplomatic mission and its work would be 
properly rewarded after the war; however the British administration along with 
the other countries Ballobar represented, simply thanked him with no extra 
reward.125
When Ballobar met the new governor of Jerusalem Ronald Storrs early in 
1918, the British official wrote in his diary: “His (Ballobar) diary, judging from 
other samples with which he occasionally favoured me, is, to my regret, not 
likely to be published in extenso during his lifetime.” 126 Unfortunately for 
Ballobar this statement turned out to be true as the diary was only published in 
1996. Ballobar played a game that was possibly over his abilities; however he 
coped with the unusual and certainly unexpected situation he was confronted 
with; it is unfortunate for him that he has not been rewarded by history.
The second consul of war to be discussed is the American consul Otis 
Allan Glazebrook. He was bom dn Virginia in 1845; he was educated at the 
Virginia Military Institute and then at the Virginia Theological Seminary. 
Glazebrook was deeply religious; he served for seven years in missionary fields 
in Virginia after the civil war. He was ordained in 1869. Glazebrook was a young 
civil war veteran who after the conflict founded the Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 
an organisation with the purpose to reunite the Southern and Northern part of the
• 197country through Christian principles.
From 1914 Glazebrook served in the American Foreign service, as he was 
a personal friend of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. It 
seems that the President directly appointed Glazebrook to Jerusalem as they
125 The British presented to Ballobar a decoration, the C.M.G. as reported by Storrs, The Memoirs, 319.
126 Ibid, 304.
127 Most of the biographical references are from Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land, 333-334.
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shared the same strong faith. Glazebrook arrived in Jerusalem in April 1914 and 
left the city when the United States joined the war in April 1917. Glazebrook 
returned to Jerusalem in December 1918 and remained until December 1920 
when he was assigned to Nice and later on to Monaco; Glazebrook died 26 April 
1931 on his way back to the United States.128
As Consul, Glazebrook played a crucial role in the city after the outbreak 
of the war. The Americans were entrusted with the interests of the British and 
French and later on of other countries represented in Jerusalem. The main 
activity of Glazebrook in Jerusalem became the distribution of relief aid coming 
from the United States destined for the Jewish communities; furthermore 
Glazebrook was ordered to take care of the American Colony. His job was 
difficult considering Ottoman scepticism of American help to Jews. 
Paradoxically at the beginning of the 1917, when it was clear that sooner or later 
the United States would join the war, Glazebrook’s activity was stopped by the 
Germans, who interrupted relief distribution activity propaganda, whilst the 
Turks allowed American relief to arrive in Jerusalem, as the same Turks and the
1 90local populations enjoyed this relief,
Glazebrook was quite different from his colleague Ballobar. The 
American consul was less mundane and less interested in the question of the 
churches in Jerusalem. They indeed cooperated, as shown by Ballobar’s notes, 
although they never became real friends and Glazebrook never crossed the line of 
acquaintance with his colleague. We have no records of any diary or collection of 
papers left by Glazebrook, a mirror of his more introspective character. He had
128 Ibid, 333-334.
129 Vester Spafford, Our Jerusalem, 239.
130 Ibid, 242-243.
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an extensive correspondence, despite the censorship, with the American Consul 
in Istanbul Morgenthau and with some American Companies eager to invest in 
Palestine. Of his relationship with Morgenthau, with the sources available, we 
understand that there was mutual respect and that Glazebrook was eager to 
follow the orders asking for intervention in favour of the Jews. This was different 
from the approach taken by the American Business community, who during the 
war continued to petition the Consul asking for perspectives of business in his 
area. Glazebrook, politely but consciously managed to explain a clear 
misinformed public that Palestine was involved in war and business was
■ t o t
closed. Glazebrook never set aside his Christian values in favour of other 
businesses.
Apart from the different personalities, Glazebrook, as opposed to Ballobar, 
represented the interests of the United States a country that looked at Palestine 
and Jerusalem particularly, mainly from a religious point of view as well as a 
land for future business. The Spanish consul was interested to protect the 
Christian churches and their properties; he was concerned with the politics of city 
while Glazebrook cared firstly for inhabitants and then for the American affairs.
5.5. The aftermath o f  the war 1917-1920
Once British military authority was established in December 1917 all 
foreign residents, mainly German and Austrian clergy in the city were put under 
surveillance.132 There were only ten Germans in the city as the others had been 
evacuated earlier. All religious clergymen of Austrian and German citizenship
131 NARA. Consular Post, Vol. 81, Glazebrook to American Film Company, Jerusalem, 9 December 1916
132 TNA: PRO, FO 371/3061, Mark Sykes, 13 November 1917.
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had also left, while German and Austrian Jews were to be recognised as Jews, 
and therefore treated as such: religious identity, in this particular case, took
1 33precedence over the national one. The American Colony promptly offered its 
services to the British military authority, while Conde Ballobar as the only consul 
in the city until 1919 became a sort of universal consul representing all the 
countries involved in the conflict.134
5.5,1 Consular missions and the British
Allenby, as supreme military authority, had to face pressing political and 
administrative issues. Italy and France wanted to be represented in Jerusalem in 
view of future talks regarding the status of Palestine and of the city itself. Apart 
from Ballobar, who was an anomaly since he also represented British interests, 
diplomatic or consular missions were not allowed to enter the city though
135travelling permits had been granted ad personam. The Italian government was 
quite anxious to send a diplomat to Jerusalem to counterbalance the influence of 
the French representative Georges Picot. The Italians, aware of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, were suspicious that the British would tolerate French activity in the 
Holy Land. To confirm Italian distrust, Allenby appointed a small French 
contingent in 1917 to guard the church of the Holy Sepulchre.136 Once again the 
battle over the religious protectorate broke out, however the British, and Allenby
133 TNA: PRO, FO 141/746/3, Lieutenant Deedes’s report, Jerusalem, 16 December 1917.
134 The history of Jerusalem during the British military rule is discussed thoroughly in chapter 6.
135 MAE, Archivio di Gabinetto, Pacco 185, Gustos of Holy Land to Foreign Minister, Cairo, 20 February 
1918. TNA: PRO, CAB 27/23, Headquarters Egypt to Foreign Office, Cairo, 25 January 1918. Ballobar 
was often defined as the universal consul in Jerusalem; the British did not want to interfere with its 
activities o f protection o f the foreigner interests, however as they did not allow any official consul in the 
city when they took over, they informed Ballobar that if  he was to leave Jerusalem he may be not allowed 
to come back in the city.
136 Gabellini, L 'Italia e VAssetto della Palestine, 39.
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in particular, were not eager to find a lasting solution to this internal conflict 
while the war was still not over. The question of the religious protectorate over 
the Catholics was only part of the quarrel as other interests were at stake,
1 'IQpolitical and economic. Only in the spring 1919 was the question partly solved, 
and the Italians were able to re open the consulate. Once the Italian Government 
confirmed the acceptance of the abolition of the capitulations and to 
acknowledge the status quo, Italian Consul, Alberto Tuozzi, was appointed to 
Jerusalem.139
Also the Americans were, later in 1919, allowed to re open their consulate 
in Jerusalem. Slowly, consular life in Jerusalem had begun to revive, though with 
some restrictions.140 Consular flags could not be exposed, at least up until 1920, 
and with the confirmation of the abolition of the capitulations, privileges of the 
foreigners were curtailed. The main work of the consuls was lobbying the British, 
issuing passports and travel documents to foreigners travelling to Palestine, 
mainly of Jewish origins and protection to the religious institutions, however on 
different terms than during Ottoman times. The Italians sought to send a political 
officer in order to look after the Italian institutions damaged during the war.141
5.6 Conclusion
Overall this Chapter has shown a number of features in relation to foreign 
presence in the city that were altered by the war in their structure but not in their 
nature. Foreign activities adapted to the new situation brought by the war but as
137 S. Minerbi, L 'Italic et la Palestine, (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1970), 157.
138 The full question cannot be discussed here, however it has been discussed quite thoroughly by Ibid; 
Gabellini, L ’Italia e I 'Assetto della Palestina.
139 Minerbi, L 'Italic et la Palestine, 248-249.
140 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 85, Glazebrook to Secretary of State, Jerusalem, 28 March 1919.
141 Gabellini, L 'Italia e VAssetto della Palestina, 41.
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suggested by the study of the various cases presented, did not stop to interact 
with the local authorities and population in the attempt to shield and promote 
their own interests. Also, the war did not stop the process of modernisation that 
indeed was partly channelled through those foreigners living in Jerusalem.
In nineteenth century following the Muhammad and Ibrahim ‘Ali 
conquest of Palestine and Syria, European powers began to show some interest in 
the region.142 This interest became apparent with the establishment of consulates, 
which became political agents who often concealed major political interest 
behind religious issues. Despite most of the visitors of the city did not posses or 
promote hidden or secondary purposes in relation to Jerusalem, as shown in this 
Chapter these foreign travellers became instruments of European powers in their 
plans regarding Jerusalem and Palestine. This Chapter has also shown how often 
foreigners shared the same interests with local residents and tended to promote 
the interests of their own countries. Some of these foreigners were also interested 
in the redefinition of the image of Palestine in order to include themselves as part 
of the local milieu. Indeed the Zionist wanted the most with the cultural, 
linguistic and political reshaping of the country in their own terms, but also 
Christians wished to change the landscape in order to build a ‘New Jerusalem’.
The second part of the chapter discusses in detail the role of foreign 
consuls in Jerusalem, particularly the American consul Glazebrook and the 
Spanish consul Conde de Ballobar, in the war period. The investigation of these 
consuls as well of consular activity of other countries like Italy during the war 
serves as evidence of the extent to which consuls were mainly political agents in
142 Y. Shalit, The European Powers' Plans Regarding Jerusalem Towards the Middle o f  the 19lh Century, 
(Berlin: K.S. Verlag, 2004), S.
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promoting the interests of their countries. It underlines the modernising role 
played by these actors through the net of relations established by consuls with 
local authorities, institutions and inhabitants. Consuls not only provided relief 
and aid for the local residents during the war but often tried to impose their own 
wishes and tastes on several areas from politics to urban planning. In light of this, 
the two case studies I presented at the end of this chapter aimed not only to be 
evidence of the consular role in Jerusalem, but I also endeavoured to present two 
almost neglected figures who proved to be crucial actors in the particular context 
of Jerusalem during the First World War.
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6 British M ilitary Rule 1917-1920 and the case o f the Nebi Musa Riots
“Urbs beata Jerusalem dicta pacis visio,
Quae construitir in coelis vivis ex lapidibus”
(7th Century)
6.1 British Military Rule
Following the conquest of the city, the British established military rule 
which lasted until 1 July 1920. From the perspective of the Arab majority the 
government of the city had passed from Ottoman rule to a new foreigner power. 
However, the British were not only Christian rulers but had also shown their 
support for Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine with the issue of the 
Balfour Declaration. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main features 
of the British military in Jerusalem, focussing on the administrative structure in 
order to observe the main continuities and changes between the Ottoman and 
British administrations, also to discuss the role of the military in relation to the 
local elites and the Zionist Commission. This chapter also focuses on the Nebi 
Musa riots of April 1920 in order to show how the military authorities dealt with 
the emerging Arab-Jewish conflict and how the riots proved to be the catalyst for 
the change of the British administration from military to civil. If  on one hand the 
civil administration of the city after 1920 has been studied extensively, the 
military administration has been reviewed as a transitional period.1 Military rule 
did not create a complex structure of government in Jerusalem but was based 
upon a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of the military 
governor Ronald Storrs. The military establishment was generally reluctant to
1 See for instance B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Segev, One 
Palestine, Complete', N. Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000).
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engage with the complex net of high politics. In Jerusalem one of the key 
characters of the British administration was Ronald Storrs. As we shall see as 
military governor Storrs ruled the city almost undisturbed between 1917 and 
1920.
6.1.1 Military rule: 1917-1920
The actual establishment of military rule in Jerusalem took place the day 
Allenby entered the city on 11 December 1917. The first military governor of the 
city was General Bill Borton, who was Postmaster General of Alexandria and 
had been involved in the Sudan campaign, later serving as governor of 
Khartoum.3 The military administration of the region was left to Allenby and 
then to the O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration). Eventually a 
Chief Administrator, who was also in charge of appointing the Military 
Governors over the five districts into which the country was divided, ruled 
Palestine in Allenby’s name.4 Three Chief Administrators held office in this 
period: Major General Arthur Money, General H.D. Watson and Major General 
Louis Bols; Allenby’s orders were dispatched through General Walter 
Congreve.5 The execution of policy was left to the War Office although it was 
acting under instructions from the Foreign Office.6 The leading principles of the 
Military Administration were drawn in the Manual o f  Military Law , compiled at
2 Segev, One Palestine, Completer, 87.
3 N. Bentwich, England in Palestine, (London: Kegan Paul, 1932), 20.
4 J.J. McTague, “The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917-1920,” Journal o f  Palestine 
Studies 7, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 57.
5 S. Huneidi, A Broken Trust, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 27.
6 Ibid, 27.
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the Hague Conference in 1907, which imposed on the occupying army the 
adherence to the principle of the status quo ante bellum.
According to international law the military administration of occupied 
territories had to preserve the status quo in order to avoid the introduction of 
changes in both procedures and legislation.8 For instance, the governor of 
Jerusalem Ronald Storrs, confirmed previous administrative arrangements and 
the former mayor of Jerusalem Salim al-Husayn retained his privileges. Yet the 
Jerusalem municipality was deprived of any real power and the mayor became a 
figurehead: the Municipal administration was charged with the task of liaising 
with the local population and the British. Quite significantly the military 
administration could not radically change the system of taxation.9 The military 
regime set up by Allenby was meant to be provisional and to last only as long as 
military reasons were prevalent but it eventually lasted two and half years.10 The 
length of the military administration mirrored the uncertainty in London 
regarding the future of the Middle East, and particularly of Palestine.
At the conclusion of the military operations the former Arab territories of 
the Ottoman Empire were divided into three military administrations. Palestine 
was part of the O.E.T.A South, ruled by the British alone. Technically the 
administration was acting under a Chief Administrator as mentioned earlier who 
received orders from the commander in chief, General Allenby, who was
7 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 20; McTague, “The British Military,” 56.
8 TNA: PRO FO 371/3384, Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918: “Turkish system of government will 
be continued and the existing machinery utilised [...]”
9 H.C. Luke and E. Keith-Roach (eds), The Handbook o f  Palestine and Trans-Jordan, (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1930), 312-315; Palestine Royal Commission, London, 1937, 112; Bentwich, 
England in Palestine, 28; TNA: PRO FO 371/3384, Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918, “Turkish 
system o f government will be continued and the existing machinery utilised [...] Chief Administrators are 
reminded that the administration is a military and provisional one.”
10 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 18.
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responsible for the general laws to enforce in the occupied territories.11 Besides 
the Chief Administrator, General Gilbert Clayton was appointed Chief Political 
Officer attached to the Expeditionary Force of Allenby.12 The Chief Political 
Officer (C.P.O.) received orders from the Foreign Office and the relationship 
between the Chief Administrator and the C.P.O. was never clearly defined.13 The 
military government was part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force therefore 
under the control of the War Office, however it is important to underline once 
again that it was up to the Foreign Office to draw the major lines of the policy 
making.14 The British govermnent in line with the Balfour Declaration, allowed a 
Zionist Commission to travel to Palestine working as an advisory body to the 
British authorities whose role and composition will be discussed below,15
The first task of the military administration was to cope with the general 
lack of food, medicines and fuel; in other words it had to cater for the needs of 
the army and of the population. The army re-established the railway connection 
through the reconstruction of the line between Jaffa and Jerusalem and food was 
brought from Egypt. Like Borton, Ronald Storrs, governor of Jerusalem from 
early 1918, had to face the immediate necessity of supplies for the city and 
decided that the distribution should be placed in the hands of the municipality. 
The activity was to be supervised by a representative of all three religious
11 Palestine Royal Commission, (1937), 112.
12 According to Ronald Storrs, General Clayton was quite optimistic and to him “no problem seemed 
insoluble” furthermore Storrs wrote that Clayton was too busy to think about the real administration of 
Palestine as he (Clayton) “was never in the way and never out of the way”. Storrs, The Memoirs, 306.
13 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 18.
14 Ibid, 19.
15 M.F. Abcarius, Palestine Through the Fog o f Propaganda, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1946), 59-60.
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communities (Muslim, Christian and Jewish) to be at some future stage delegated 
to a representative of the military governor.16
Within the boundaries and limitations of the status quo ante bellum, the 
military administration, in order to administer the occupied territories,
1 *7
established departments of health, law, finance and commerce. Health was a
priority and the Health Department started to be operative in 1918 with the
puipose to fight an outbreak of cholera and typhoid and to deal with widespread
diseases like malaria and trachoma.18 In restoring essential services, the O.E.T.A.
was assisted by the American Red Cross, the Hadassah Zionist Organisation of
America and the Syria and Palestine Relief Committee established by the
Anglican Bishop Rennie Machines.19 Their main purpose was to re-organise the
hospitals, the relief work and to improve the sanitation of the city, which in the
final stages of Ottoman control was carried out mainly by the American Colony
9n
through a soup kitchen and direct help to the inhabitants. Also veterinary
* 21provisions were made as to eliminate cattle diseases. The shortage of water and 
the lack of a proper drainage system at the moment of the occupation however 
impeded the implementation of full sanitation works needed as it was found also
99necessary to restrict the water supply. Despite this, the Royal Engineers started 
to pump water to Jerusalem from several reservoirs around the city, the problem 
of water was never solved efficiently until the 1920s.
16 TNA: PRO, FO 141/746, Military Administrator’s Report, Jerusalem 15 December 1917; TNA: FO 
141/688, Clayton to Headquarters, Jerusalem, 22 December 1917.
17 Palestine Royal Commission Report, Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 
1937, 113,
18 Annual Report o f  the Department o f Health, Government o f Palestine, 1921, 1-7.
19 Bentwich, England in Palestine, 29.
20 Annual Report o f  the Department o f Health, (1921), 1.
21 Palestine Royal Commission Report, (1937), 113.
22 Ibid.
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In the legal sphere the British appointed a Senior Judicial Officer, who 
exercised control over the courts and land registers, eventually also working as 
legal adviser to the chief administrator.23 Ottoman criminal and civil law was 
largely maintained. Although Arabic became the official language of plea in the 
courts, the business of the courts was carried out in English with simultaneous 
translation into Arabic and Hebrew.24 A court under the authority of the 
municipality was also established dealing with minor criminal offences. 
Religious courts were maintained but they had jurisdiction only in matters 
regarding personal status such as registration of marriages, birth and deaths, and 
it also solved disputes which concerned Muslim Waqfs 25 Overall, the military 
administration preserved the Ottoman system of courts but reduced their number 
and size in terms of personnel. The only court of appeal in the region was 
established in Jerusalem, composed of two British officials and five local.
Former Ottoman State schools were slowly re-opened and the first 
measure taken was to replace Turkish with Arabic as the medium of instruction. 
Hebrew was only used in Jewish private schools as in the Jewish educational 
institution Alliance Israelite Universelle. The military administration in 1917 
appointed Major Williams, of the India Civil Service in order to rebuild the 
educational system, eventually he was replaced by Major Tadman of the
97Egyptian Ministry of Education in October 1918. Non-govemmental schools 
continued to function and they offered religious and technical education. 
According to a report of the Palestine Zionist Office (the name of the Zionist
23 Report on Palestine Administration, Government of Palestine, London, 1922, 84-85.
24 Luke and Keith-Roach, The Handbook o f Palestine, 213; Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 31.
25 Luke and Keith-Roach, The Handbook o f  Palestine, 213-219.
26 TNA: PRO, 141/688, Samuel to Curzon, Jerusalem, 20 November 1920.
27 A.L. Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine, (London: Luzac & C., 1956), 23-25.
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Commission during the Mandate) at the end of 1919 there were 94 Jewish 
educational institutions: 32 kindergarten schools, 45 primary schools, 8 
secondary schools, 4 business schools, 1 school of music.28 Government schools 
were mainly attended by Arabs as these classes were taught in Arabic, though
90also in some Christian schools Arabic was used as medium of education. The 
Zionists established a school system which became a parallel of public education, 
though were attended only by Jewish students.30
In order to carry out the work of reconstruction of basic infrastructures, 
funds were needed. According to Ashbee, the Civic Advisor of the Military 
Administration, the works of reconstruction first to be carried out in Jerusalem 
were sanitation, health service, engineering and scavenging, it would then be 
necessary to think about the preservation of the Holy City.31 Nevertheless the 
military administration was not entitled to change the system of taxation and it 
proved quite difficult to collect revenues to pay for the reconstruction works 
from a starving population. As noted by Storrs the immediate liabilities of 
Jerusalem far exceeded the assets.32 The principal source of revenue remained 
customs duties, house and land tax, tithes, animal tax, fees of court and surplus 
from the Post Office. The British administration modified the method of 
collection and abolished the most vexatious and oppressive imposts like the 
temettu (a professional tax imposed mainly on merchants and artisans), a number
28 D. Fabrizio, La Battaglia delle Scitole in Palestina, (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2003), 18.
29 J.S. Bentwich, Education in Israel, (London: Routledge, 1945), 17-18; N. Nardi, Education in 
Palestine, (Washington DC: Zionist Organization o f America, 1945), 22-23.
30 Luke and Keith-Roach, The Handbook o f  Palestine, 240-242.
31 C.R. Ashbee, A Palestine Notebook 1918-1923, (London: William Heinemann, 1923), 79.
32 Storrs, The Memoirs, 308.
3j Luke and Keith-Roach, The Handbook o f Palestine, 222-223.
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of licensing fees and at last the tax substituting the forced road labour.34 Apart 
from the budget, the military administration introduced the Egyptian currency as
*5 c
the Turkish Lira lost all its value and it was declared illegal. The new currency 
did not win public confidence as some locals expected the return of the Turks. 
Later in 1918 the Foreign Office in accordance with the Treasury ordered a 
removal of the restrictions on the Turkish paper;36 however people were no 
longer interested in the old currency as the Egyptian paper money slowly gained 
the confidence of the public. This, to an extent, implied that people had realised 
the Turks would never come back to Jerusalem and that the British were likely to 
stay for a while or longer.
The military administration also worked towards the re-establishment of 
commerce and industry. After six months of British rule, commerce was lively 
thanks to financial grants by the British military administration to the local 
entrepreneurs. 37 Ronald Storrs in person endeavoured to support the
establishment of local industries. The British administration developed a legal 
and economic framework into which business could expand, however 
investments mainly belonged to the private sector. In the process of establishing 
a framework for the commerce and industry, Storrs in 1918 founded the 
Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce but at the same time the military
administration prohibited, temporarily, the import of articles like salt, printed
34 Ibid, 222 and 227. See also Report on Palestine Administration, (1922), 3; S.J. Shaw, “The Nineteenth- 
Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies, no. 6  
(1975):13: “[...] local roads were constructed by the fief holders and tax farmers, mainly by force labor 
which they were able to impose on the cultivators living nearby through law and tradition.”
35 TNA: PRO, Tl/12286, General Routine Order, 18 January 1918.
36 TNA: PRO, Tl/12286, Foreign Office to Clayton, London, 7 November 1918.
37 Conde de Ballobar, Diario, 252; “The sheets are honestly clean and the commerce, almost inexistent 
during Turkish rule, was livelier and die farmers coming to the city in order to sell their products are 
helped.”
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matter, cotton, copper and other materials in order to promote local industries. 
Licences for the import of these goods were eventually issued, after the payment 
of the necessary fees, by the administration m Jerusalem. After the foreign 
consuls were permitted to return in 1919, their activity as promoter and 
intermediaries of their own countries5 industry restarted. The American consul 
Glazebrook replied to a request o f information from an American firm about the 
situation of the transport in Jerusalem in 1919. Glazebrook stated that there were 
no private cars in the city and only a few bicycles, but he forecasted large 
possibilities in the time to come. 40 Glazebrook also replied to an American 
enterprise interested in the cinema business. In this particular case the consul was 
more pessimistic, he told the American firm that there were three cinemas in 
1919 in Jerusalem, but that they could not afford to buy films at the moment.41 
Eventually business and trade were promoted under British rule, which favoured 
the establishment of local and foreign companies.
The question of the local police was one of great importance as the 
different religious groups wanted to be represented. The Police force for the 
Jerusalem region was re-organised and reduced, as in the opinion of the military, 
it was necessary first to improve the quality of the corp.42 During late Ottoman 
times there were two police systems in Palestine and Syria. In Jerusalem there 
was a municipal police force composed of trained policemen and regular army 
troops under the command of Turkish senior officers. The second force was a 
gendarmerie composed of irregulars called to reinforce the local police force in
38 Storrs, The Memoirs, 333.
39 CZA, L3/10/1, O.E.T.A, to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem 5 September 1919.
40 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Glazebrook to The Diamond Chain & Mfg. Co., Jerusalem, 10 May 
1919.
41 NARA, Consular Post, Vol. 87, Glazebrook to Van Siclen & C., Jerusalem, 8  November 1919.
42 Palestine Royal Commission Report, (1937), 114.
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times of troubles as riots.43 At the moment of the British occupation of the city 
responsibility for policing fell on the Military Police, however soon after a city 
police force was re-established and by January 1918 one British and several Arab 
officers led a total of 340 men engaged in police work 44 By July 1920, with the 
establishment of the civil administration, the Palestine Police Force was bom. 
The force was composed of 18 British officers, 55 Palestinian officers and 1,144 
ranks, mainly local Arabs 45 Some Indian Muslims were employed in the police 
force in order to serve in the protection of the Muslim Holy Places. Storrs on the 
occasion of the Nebi Musa riots, claimed that the local police force was only 
partially trained and without tradition.46 What Storrs was referring to was the fact 
that local Palestinian officers continued to enforce the so called “Turkish 
System” of obtaining confession and gathering information based on physical 
violence.47 Zionists requested from the Military Administration more Jewish 
Police officers for Jerusalem and secondly they also requested that the selection 
would be in the hands of the Zionist Commission.48 The military were quite 
ambiguous on the subject as they did not want to be involved in political games 
despite strong pressure from the Zionist Commission.49
As shown the military government was firmly involved with local issues, 
and military officers carefully avoided direct involvement with the Foreign and 
War Offices on the question of the future of Palestine. With the establishment of
43 E. Home, A Job Well Done, (Essex: The Anchor Press, 1982), 16; G.W., Swanson, “The Ottoman 
Police,” Journal o f Contemporary History 7, no.1/2, (January-April 1972): 253.
44 Home, A Job Well Done, 15.
45 Home, A Job Well Done, 35.
46 Storrs, The Memoirs, 348.
47 Horne, A Job Well Done, 15.
48 CZA, L3/52, Zionist Commission to Military Governatorate, Jerusalem 23 February 1920.
49 CZA, L3/52, O.E.T.A. to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem 18 June 1919; Zionist Commission report, 
Jerusalem, 20 August, 1919.
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the military administration, the Foreign Office decided to postpone crucial 
decisions in relation to Palestine and Jerusalem and left to the military the 
business of local politics.50 Borton Pasha, as the first military governor of 
Jerusalem on Christmas Eve, attended mass at Bethlehem and he found himself 
involved in a clash between the French and Italian representatives.51 A few days 
later Borton resigned as Governor of Jerusalem, overwhelmed by its duties, 
possibly due to a breakdown in his health but also unable to deal with the arising 
religious and political issues that had emerged amongst the various communities 
of Jerusalem. On 28 December 1918 Ronald Storrs was appointed Lieutenant- 
Colonel Governor of Jerusalem.
Ronald Storrs, whose personality will be analysed later, had no military 
experience as he had been Oriental Secretary to the Residency in Cairo. He was 
meant to act as a bridge between the military, which disliked or did not 
understand politics, and the political establishment in London.52 Issues like the 
Zionist Commission, then the Arab-Christian Associations and also the internal 
questions among the religious groups brought the military to face the inevitable 
issue of politics.53 The military dealt with local politics as it was charged with the 
task to enforce the status quo while waiting for the developments of events, but 
the arrival of the Zionist Commission was regarded as contrary to the principle of 
the status quo and its work interfered with that of the military
50 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 18; Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 87.
51 Storrs, The Memoirs, 297.
52 PC, The Papers o f Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 10, Box III, Liverpool Post, 10 January 1918: “The 
Appointment o f Mr. Ronald Storrs as Governor o f Jerusalem in succession to Borton Pasha is regarded in 
official circles here as a happy one. Though o f only thirty six years o f age, Mr. Storrs has had 
considerable experience of administrative affairs in Egypt, and he has shown himself to be possessed of  
exceptional ability and o f great tact in the handling o f native people.”
53 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 21.
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administration.54According to the Foreign Office the Zionist Commission was to 
be entrusted to a British officer under General Allenby’s order but directly linked 
to the Foreign Office.55 In the Foreign Office’s plans the Commission should 
have represented the Zionist Organisation and it should have acted as an advisory 
body. The main objectives of the Commission were to form a link between 
British authorities and Jewish population in Palestine; to coordinate relief work 
directed towards the Jewish community; to develop Jewish colonies; to assist 
Jewish organisations; lastly to establish friendly relations with the Arabs and 
other non-Jewish communities.56 Indeed through this project of the Foreign 
Office it is possible to understand why the military thought of the Zionist 
Commission as competitive and parallel governmental institution. The military 
granted, to an extent, the peaceful coexistence of the people in Jerusalem 
however at the high cost of limiting the freedom of the population as in fact the 
main concern of the military administration was public security and distribution 
of basic service, which were dispensed under martial law. In July 1920, as an 
outcome of the Nebi Musa riots, as it will be shown later and of the Peace 
Conference in Versailles, the administration was converted from military to civil. 
It had reached the point where high politics could not be avoided and the military 
could no longer deliver.
54 McTague, “The British Military,” 56; Huneidi, A Broken Trust, 30.
55 TNA: PRO FO 371/3394 Foreign Office to War Office, London, 25 January 1918.
56 TNA: PRO FO 371/3394 Foreign Office to War Office, London, 25 January 1918.
57 TNA: PRO FO 371/3384 Allenby to War Office, 23 October 1918; TNA: PRO FO 141/688, Clayton to 
G.H.Q., Jerusalem 22 December 1917.
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JERUSALEM UNDER BRITISH MILITARY RULE 1917 - 1920
In April 1918 the British Military G overnor of 
Jeru sa lem , Ronald Storrs, issu ed  tw o  
ed ic ts , on e forbidding the dem olition  of ancient 
or historic buildings, the other forbidding the  
u se  of either s tu c c o  or corrugated iron within 
the city w alls, “thu s respecting", a s Storrs 
explained on 15 March 1921, “th e  tradition of 
s to n e  vaulting, the heritage in Jerusalem  of 
an immemorial and a hallow ed past".
Following the British occupation  of Jerusalem , 
the British military authorities repaired and 
widened the railway line to th e  coast, built a 
narrow gauge railway to take military supp lies  
to  th e  front line, and repaired th e  much 
neglected  city g a te s  and w alls.
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The Jewish problem, as seen in Jerusalem, 
is one of living interest, as there the 
visitor w ill see crowded into a few square 
miles samples, as it were, of that scatter­
ed race fmm all the lands whence they 
have been driven, all drawn to their 
ancient Zion He w ill realize, as probably 
he can never do in any other place, that 
stirring of the whole race Zionwards 
which seems to be on the eve of fulfilment, 
a consummation of the dreams of Jewish 
idealists through the long centuries of 
their dispersion
DR E W MASTERMAN
THE DELIVERANCE OF JERUSALEM'191S
£) Martin Gilbert 1977
M ap 3: Jerusalem  under M ilitary rule
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6.1.2 The militaiy, urban leadership and the Zionists
In the spirit of the status quo ante bellum the British did not distance 
themselves from the “politics of the notables” but continued the Ottoman practice
CO
of relying on the main families of Jerusalem. Once again the local notables 
were to play their role as intermediaries between the local population and the 
administration. As stated above, the mayor appointed before the war by the 
Ottomans, Husayn Salim al-Husayni, was confirmed in his place. He did not hold 
any effective power himself unless it was specifically granted by the British, as 
in the case of the distribution of the relief after the occupation.59 When early in 
1918 the mayor died, Storrs appointed the most outstanding member of the 
Husayni family, Musa Kazim, to replace Husayn. 60He was a political activist 
who, once in charge of the mayoral office, managed to play tactful opposition to 
the British at the beginning; however he was eventually dismissed after the Nebi 
Musa riots as will be discussed later on.61 Arab notable families were able to 
maintain their power base, in fact by opposing Zionism they managed to increase 
it. Ilan Pappe argues that the leaders of the notable families were young men 
ready to deal with the new rulers and to support their own political causes with a 
stronger voice as suggested by the creation of the Muslim-Christian 
Associations.62 Since the arrival of the Zionists, Muslim and Christian Arabs 
found a common ground that unified them in both ideological and political terms 
which was then transformed into political action which was developed by the
58 Pappe, A History o f  Modern Palestine, 79; Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 15.
59 See Ch 5 for a more discussion of the distribution o f relief after the war.
60 Storrs, The Memoirs, 308.
61 See Y. Porath, The Emergence o f the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, (London: Frank Cass,
1974).
62 Pappe, A Histoiy o f  Modern Palestine, 79-81; see also Ch 5 for a more detailed discussion on the 
Christian-Muslim Associations.
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notables; Pappe argues that indeed Palestinians possessed a strong elite though 
not a charismatic leader.
The most complex relationship of the military administration was with 
the Zionist Commission. When Chaim Weizmann arrived in the region as head of 
the Zionist Commission in 1918, members of the military administration 
expressed their disappointment and surprise. 64 General Money, Chief 
Administrator, was highly critical of Zionism and of British support to the 
Zionist cause, besides his opinions might have also reflected a strong feeling of 
anti-Semitism: “[Jews] were as a class inferior morally and intellectually to the 
bulk of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the country.” 65 The Chief 
Political Officer Clayton, after the occupation of Jerusalem, expressed his 
concerns in relation to British pro-Zionist support to Mark Sykes as he feared he 
may alienate Arab support in the region.66 Louis Bols, the last Chief Military 
Administrator, after the Nebi Musa riots in April 1920 became disillusioned with 
Zionism; in fact he acknowledged that the Zionists were not ultimately claiming
•  f \ l  - 4 *a National Home but indeed a Jewish State. The only pro-Zionist member of 
the military administration was the Chief Political Officer who held the office 
from March 1919, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. He supported the Zionists 
as he claimed they would be the most loyal friends of the British in the Middle 
East, furthermore he added that the administration should have been purged of 
anti-Zionist elements.69 Although the members of the military establishment were
63 Ibid, 80; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 147-153.
64 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 25; Iiuneidi, A Broken Trust, 30.
65 TNA: PRO FO 371/3386, Money to GHQ, 20 November 1920.
66 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 23
61 TNA: PRO FO 371/85, Bols to Allenby, 12 April 1920.
68 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 39.
69 McTague, “The British Military,” 65-66.
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concerned with the political situation, they never went beyond the actual 
expression of single opinions. The military proved to be more concerned with 
practicalities than politics. They saw the Zionist Commission as a threat to their 
legitimacy as in fact the bureaucratic apparatus of the Zionist Commission was 
almost running parallel of the British administrative one.70 The Commission was 
officially charged by the Foreign Office to carry out, under Allenby’s authority, 
the necessary steps in order to favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home through the formation of a link between the British Authorities and the 
Jewish population of Palestine, the assistance to Jewish organisations and 
population, the collection of information in view of the further development of
71Jewish settlements. It is not a surprise then if the Military British thought of the 
Zionist Commission as an arrogant newcomer; besides some British Army 
officers during the war believed that the Turkish Government was controlled by a 
group of Jewish freemasons which had infiltrated the CUP.72
The second relationship of the military administration was with the 
religious groups of the city, mainly Christians. The British military 
administration, particularly the governatorate of the city, was ordered by the 
Foreign Office to settle matters regarding the Holy Places directly between the 
religious denominations rather than through intermediaries. The Chief 
Administrator was also ordered to allow for the return of those religious leaders 
who had left Jerusalem at the beginning of the war, A careful eye was placed on 
the Greek Orthodox Church as it turned had been the most disrupted after the
70 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 94.
71 TNA: PRO FO 371/3392, Foreign Office to Wingate, London, 13 February 1918; TNA: PRO FO 
371/3394, Foreign Office to War Office, London 25 January 1918.
72 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 94; Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 40; see also J. Ershow, “Conspiracies 
and Commitments: the British in Palestine,” in Yale Israel Journal, no. 5 (Winter 2005): 21.
73 TNA: PRO, FO 141/665, Foreign Office to Clayton, London, 24 January 1918.
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conflict due to financial constraints as explained earlier in Chapter 4. Ronald 
Storrs, who had power over of the Status Quo, often moved from one church to 
another in order to control and prevent breaches of the Status Quo by clergy and 
believers of the different Christian confessions.74 He also tried to involve the 
Churches in public discussions regarding the future of Jerusalem. When Storrs 
founded the Pro-Jerusalem Society in 1918 in order to develop various projects 
on Jerusalem, which will be discussed below, he brought together the 
Franciscans, the Domenicans, the Orthodox, the Armenians and the Anglican
n c
Bishop. Members of the different denominations were quite sceptical with 
regard to the British military administration. Indeed the most sceptical was the 
Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, Rennie Maclnnes, who continued to blame his
nsr
fellow countrymen for allowing the establishment of the Zionists in Palestine. 
Bishop Maclnnes became quite disillusioned and in early January 1918 
acknowledged that the British authorities were much afraid of the political 
difficulties in Jerusalem and that they preferred to delay any serious political
77discussion on the future of the city and Palestine.
6.2 The ”despot” ruler o f  Jerusalem: Ronald Storrs
While Otis Glazebrook and Conde de Ballobar were the leading foreign 
representatives during the war period. Ronald Storrs arose to prominence in 
Jerusalem under military rule. Despite the fact that a proper study on Storrs as 
governor of Jerusalem has never been published, scholars have dealt with this
74 Storrs, The Memoirs, 313-315.
75 Ibid, 327.
76 LP, LC 105, Bishop Maclnnes to the Lambeth Conference, Jerusalem, 7 July 1920.
77 LP, Davidson 395, Maclnnes to Archbishop, Jerusalem, 19 January 1918.
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figure through studying the beginning of the British mandatory government in 
Palestine. Storrs has been portrayed as a despot and autocrat by several scholars 
and some of his contemporaries, indeed Storrs properly played the part as he did 
in 1920 when he claimed , in a paper to rule the Jerusalem district like his 
“predecessor” Pontius Pilate.78 In the following sections I will first give a 
biographical overview of Storrs5s life then I will focus on some of his activities 
as military governor of Jerusalem in order to understand his influence on the 
governorship of the city.
6.2.1 A biography
Ronald Storrs was born in 1881 in Bury St Edmunds, the eldest son of
70Reverend John Storrs, vicar in London and then Dean of Rochester. Storrs was 
interested in languages, culture and arts. He studied at Pembroke College in 
Cambridge. He entered the civil service in 1904 and was appointed to the 
Egyptian Civil Service in the Ministry of Finance until 1909. He was then 
appointed Oriental Secretary to the British Agency in Cairo. It was with this 
appointment, that Storrs had the chance to show his skills in the Arabic language 
and was able to prove his abilities with Middle Eastern affairs. With the outbreak 
of the war, Storrs was appointed Assistant Political Officer to the Anglo-French 
Expeditionary Force in order to deal with Sharif Husayn and Thomas Eliot 
Lawrence, who led the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman regime. In 1917 he was 
briefly appointed to the secretariat of the War Cabinet. Following the capture of
78 PC, The Paper o f Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 10, Box III, Evening News, 21 December 1920.
79 The biographical information regarding Storrs have been gathered through: Storrs, The Memoirs; Segev, 
One Palestine, Complete; Shepherd, Ploughing Sand; A.J. Sherman, Mandate Days, (Slovenia: Thames 
and Hudson, 1997); G.S. Georghalhdes, Cyprus and the Governorship o f  Sir Ronald Storrs, (Nicosia: 
Cyprus Research Centre, 1985).
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Jerusalem and the resignation of the first military governor of the city, Storrs was 
appointed governor of Jerusalem. He served until 1920 as military governor of
O A
the city and then from 1920 to 1926 as civil governor of Jerusalem.
As governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs’ main concern was to rebuild the 
city after the war and to harmonise relations between the different religious and 
ethnic communities.81 As sources are contradictory it is difficult to say whether 
Storrs was a pro or anti Zionist. He did however pay special attention to Christian 
matters, as shown in his memoirs, and especially by his two meetings in Rome 
with the Pope in 1919 and 1921.82 In April 1920 following the Nebi Musa riots, 
Storrs was accused of having been negligent as we will see later in the discussion 
of the riots. In 1926 Ronald Storrs’ career came to an end as he was appointed 
governor and commander in chief to Cyprus. In Cyprus he found a similar 
situation to Jerusalem, as the island was divided between the Turkish and Greek 
communities. Though he proved to be balanced, Storrs could not avoid clashes. 
During the riots of October 1931 the Government House was burned and his 
private art and antiquities collections were also destroyed. Twice in his career 
Storrs had to face the outbreak of violent riots and it appears in both cases, he 
could not have predicted them.
After the Cyprus experience Storrs was appointed as governor of North 
Rhodesia. He was clearly out of his environment as he had little knowledge of 
Africa. During this time here Storrs suffered from tropical diseases; in 1934 he 
retired from civil service and went back to Britain. He then dedicated himself to
80 Georghallides, Cyprus, 1-2.
81 For the question o f buildings and damages of war see Chapter 3.
82 Storrs, The Memoirs, 343,458.
83 Georghallides, Cyprus.
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local government for Islington council in London and was active in social life 
promoting cultural and music societies. Ronald Storrs died in 1955 survived by 
his wife but no children.84
6.2.2 Storrs in power
In order to discuss and assess the influence of Ronald Storrs upon 
Jerusalem as military governor of the city I will first discuss the Pro-Jerusalem 
Society and then I will analyse the contents of some of the decrees Storrs issued. 
Ronald Storrs unequivocally intertwined imperial interests and his personal 
views in his way of government. Aesthetics, a very high civic and religious sense, 
and a feeling that the communities of the city should be involved, led Storrs 
towards the creation of the Pro- Jerusalem Society in 1918; a non governmental 
association with the purpose to assist the military governor in the “preservation
or
and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its districts and inhabitants.” 
The Pro-Jerusalem Society as a non-governmental institution was the transitional 
organisation able to avoid the restrictions imposed on the military administration 
by the customs of the status quo ante helium. The Society was composed of the 
Mayor of Jerusalem, the chiefs of the Christian denominations and other leading 
members of the British, Arab and Jewish communities. According to the statute 
o f the Society the main purposes of the Pro-Jerusalem were the preservation and 
advancement of the interests of Jerusalem; the provision and maintenance of 
parks, gardens and open spaces; the establishment o f libraries, museums, music
84 See D. Birn, ed., Middle East Politics and Diplomacy, (Marlborough: Adam Matthew, 1999).
85 C.R, Ashbee, ed., Jerusalem 1918-1920 Being the Records o f  the Pro-Jerusalem Council During the 
Period o f the British Military Administration, (London: John Murray, 1921), vii.
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n/-
and dramatic theatre centres; protection and preservation of antiquities. Charles
Robert Ashbee, a member of the Arts and Crafts movement was appointed as
Civic Advisor and Secretary to the Pro-Jerusalem Council. As such he was
involved in all aspects of the planning of Jerusalem and he was regarded by the
administration as the resident professional planner.87 However Ashbee was
neither a government nor a municipal employee, in fact he was paid by the Pro-
Jerusalem Society.88 The Pro-Jerusalem Society did not receive funds from the
local government but mainly through private donors. The Pro-Jerusalem Society
also worked towards the encouragement of the establishment of arts and
80handicrafts industries under the sponsorship of Ashbee.
The members of the Pro-Jerusalem Society gathered on a regular basis; 
they met 58 times from its first meeting on 6 September 1918 to 1924.90 Ashbee 
and Storrs’ voices were often the strongest as suggested by the operation of re­
naming the streets.91 The question of street naming was a sensitive one as it
09carried strong ideological value. Storrs minimally followed the familiar British 
colonial pattern in street naming, indeed the majority of the names chosen were 
not linked to the British Empire; in other words he chose to link street naming to 
the history of Jerusalem, perhaps in the attempt to achieve some sort of sectarian 
harmony.93 In fact Storrs chose saints, prophets, scholars and kings, supposedly 
belonging to the three religious camps. He personally named St Francis Street, St
86 Ibid.
87 B. Hyman, “British Planners in Palestine 1918-1936” (PhD thesis, LSE, London, 1994), 352.
88 Ibid, 360.
89 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 49.
90 Hyman, British Planners,” 362.
91 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 61. For the naming of the streets see also Storrs, The Memoirs, 331- 
332.
92 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 61-62.
93 In relation to street naming I am in debt to Yair Wallach who has discussed a paper “The 1920s Street- 
Naming Campaign and the British Reshaping o f Jerusalem,” WOCMES, (Amman, June 2006).
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Paul’s Road, Coeur de Lion Street, Saladin’s Road, Streets of the Prophets and 
also Queen’s Melisende Road, the only one dedicated to a woman.94 As I 
mentioned earlier these names were indeed linked to the history of the city, 
however none of them symbolised the unity of Jerusalem, on the contrary they 
suggested a clear division of the city according to a religious cleavage. In this 
sense Storrs and the Pro-Jerusalem campaign failed to promote some unity or at 
least a common sense of citizenship amongst the Jerusalemites. The Pro- 
Jerusalem Society generally worked efficiently although criticism from the local 
population was frequent, in fact they did not always appreciate the reforming zeal
n r
of Storrs and Ashbee. The personal decrees of Storrs, in form of Public Notice, 
and the suggestions of the Pro-Jerusalem society under military rule, later on 
became the basis of the building and town planning under civil administration as 
we will see below.
Let us now analyse some of the decrees issued by Storrs as military 
governor of the city. In April 1918 Storrs issued a statement to the effect that 
“No person shall demolish, erect, alter or repair the structure of any building in 
the City of Jerusalem or its environs within a radius of 2,500 meters from the 
Damascus Gate until he has obtained a written permit from the Military 
Governor.”96 The necessity to establish basic rules in relation to town planning 
coincided with the conservative attitude of Storrs as he was trying to protect the 
traditional aspect of the city avoiding any stylistic corruption in the architecture. 
Furthermore Storrs tried always to preserve the “celestial” character of Jerusalem.
94 Storrs, The Memoirs, 331-332.
95 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 51.
96 Storrs, The Memoirs, 326, Public Notice 34, April 1918.
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Storrs also prohibited commercial advertisement unless out of sight of the walls 
of the city. Sense of aesthetics prevailed even upon business. 97
“The limitation o f advertisement is an urgent need. The promiscuous 
placarding and profanation o f every conspicuous wall-surface must at all hazards be 
stopped. The Society, therefore, drew up for and in conjunction with the municipal 
authorities the series of regulations which are given in Appendix VII, an appropriation 
was made for them in the municipal budget of 1920, and they have since been 
incorporated in the legislation of the country. ” 98
Storrs did not work only towards the amelioration of Jerusalem’s built 
environment but also he made efforts in order to restore the city’s moral image. 
Non licensed public bars within the walls were closed and distilling was 
prohibited except in private homes. In licensed bars alcohol was not served 
between 2 pm to 6 pm and between 8 pm to 5 am.99 Also prostitution was 
regulated. Brothels were forbidden within the walled city and allowed only in 
Feingold Street (a courtyard on Jaffa Road). Women carrying sexual diseases 
were liable to imprisonment if caught having sex and therefore transmitting the 
disease to members of the military force.100 This decree was indeed issued 
because of health reasons but in the eyes of Storrs prostitution was almost 
unconceivable in a city like Jerusalem. He also prohibited hotel dances and 
cabarets within the walled city.101 This conservative and puritanical behaviour 
was nevertheless mitigated by the lifestyle of the British military officials who 
often attended parties and dancing receptions despite the criticism of the religious 
institutions. The Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem did not hesitate to define Storrs as a
97 Ashbee, Jerusalem 1918-1920, 37.
98 Ibid.
99 PC, The Papers o f Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 6 , Box III, The Globe, New York, 1919; PRO, CO 742/1, 
Official Gazette, Jerusalem, 16 March 1920.
100 The Palestine News (Jerusalem), Gazette no. 5, August 1, 1918.
101 Storrs, The Memoirs, 416.
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“disaster” as he permitted fancy balls which were strictly forbidden in Ottoman 
times.102
The most difficult task faced by Storrs was the political issue of Zionism 
and the politics of the various religious institutions. Storrs never gained full 
support of these bodies of Jerusalem; the Arabs (both Muslims and Christians) 
thought Storrs was pro Zionist as he was part of the British establishment who 
supported Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine; Zionists thought Storrs 
was pro-Arab and non-local Christians never fully trusted him.103
6.2.3 Planning Jerusalem
With the British occupation of Jerusalem modem planning began. It was 
Ronald Storrs who initiated the planning of the city following the basic policy of 
the Status Quo. Storrs never transferred the activity of planning to the Pro- 
Jerusalem Society; indeed the minutes of the meetings of the Society prove that 
the planning of the city was never even discussed.104 As mentioned earlier Storrs 
was a preservationist, that is he used the Status Quo in order to protect the old 
city and its environs, rather than promoting changes and particular developments. 
A good example is the removal of the Clock Tower built by the Ottomans in 
1902 above the Jaffa Gate in 1922 as in the mind of the British planners and of
102 ASV, Sacra Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastiti Straordinari, Pos, 102 Fasc. 69, Latin Patriarch to 
Gasparri, Jerusalem 4 February 1921; See also Pos. 102, Fasc. 70, Latin Patriarch to Gasparri, Appendix 
2, Jerusalem, April 1921.
103 See comments o f Weizmann in relation to the British Administration in Letters and Papers o f Chaim 
Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in 1. Friedman, Riots in Jerusalem, San 
Remo Conference, April 1920, (London: Garland, 1987), 2;
CTS, Diario della Guerra, see comments written in relation to the British Occupation o f Jerusalem.
104 Hyman, “British Planners,” 85 and 362.
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Storrs in particular, the clock tower represented an alien element in the old city, 
ugly and not in keeping with the ancient walls.105
In 1918 William McLean, a civil engineer with experience in the Sudan 
Civil Service and former municipal engineer of Khartoum and Alexandria in 
Egypt, was called to Jerusalem by the Military Administration where he prepared 
the first town planning scheme.106 He arrived in March and by July 1918 he
1 07completed the plan which was approved by Allenby later in the same month. 
The plan was simple and aimed to preserve the old city and to surround the walls 
with a green belt whilst the modem city was to be developed to the west.108 
McLean’s scheme however was short lived, in fact it was opposed first by 
Ashbee, whose duty was to implement the plan, by the city engineer Guini and 
also by the Zionists who suspected the plan could have been contrary to Jewish 
interests. Besides the plan, though signed by Allenby, did not posses binding 
legal status, in fact Public Notices were meant to regulate and not to initiate 
developments as suggested by the rule of the Status Quo.109
The strongest critic of McLean was Patrick Geddes, professor of Botany at 
St Andrew University but a well known urban planner.110 Geddes persuaded the 
Zionist Commission to contest McLean’s plan; eventually the Zionists hired 
Geddes who arrived in Palestine in 1919 well publicised also by the Jewish 
Chronicle,U1 Geddes was asked to work on different projects such as the Hebrew
105 Kark and Oren-Nordheim, Jerusalem and Its Environs, 142.
105 Hyman, “British Planners,” 39-40; E. Efrat and A. Noble, “Planning Jerusalem,” Geographical Review 
78, no. 4, (October 1988): 392.
107 S. Shapiro, “Planning Jerusalem: the First Generation, 1917-1968,” in Urban Geography o f  Jerusalem, 
eds. D. Amiran, A. Shachar and I. Khimi, 141 (Jerusalem: Massada Press, 1973).
108 Flyman, “British Planners,” 53.
109 Ibid, 70,91 and 95.
110 For information in relation to Patrick Geddes see P. Boardman, The Worlds o f  Patrick Geddes, 
(London: Routledge, 1978).
111 The Jewish Chronicle (London), August 29, 1919.
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119University and indeed a general plan for the urban development of Jerusalem. 
Also the Military Administration hired Geddes with the task to report on the 
McLean’s plan. This indeed raises a question; Geddes was paid by the Zionist 
Organisation in order to present an alternative plan and at the same time he was 
paid by the Administration to give comments on the same plan: as I said earlier it 
is apparent that McLean’s scheme was eventually to be short lived. Geddes 
prepared a new town plan by 1919, however as in Palestine there was no central 
town planning until 1921 (Town Planning Ordinance) the Military 
Administration and Storrs in particular worked mainly towards the conservation 
of the city also constrained by the policy of the Status Quo.113
According to Hyman, British planners and administrators were agents of 
culture transfer, I would add that these people did not only want to transfer their 
own culture in Jerusalem, but they wanted to reshape the city according to their 
specific purposes as in the case of Geddes who followed Zionist principles or 
Ashbee and Storrs who looked at the city as something ethereal and to be 
preserved in its original configuration no matter the cost.
112 Hyman, “British Planners,” 113,
113 Ibid, 297.
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6.3 April 1920: Nebi Musa Riots
Illustration  9: N ebi M usa p rocession 114
The military administration had to deal with several episodes of inter- 
communal violence from its establishment as in the occurrence of the first 
anniversary of the issue of the Balfour Declaration when during a Jewish 
procession there was a scuffle with some Arab bystanders.115 However the riot of 
April 1920, known as Nebi Musa, proved to be crucial for the fate of the 
administration; its outcome produced a strong reaction in the Foreign Office and 
among the political establishment in London. The military administration was in 
fact accused by Jewish and non-Jewish Zionists of being anti-Zionist and 
eventually the Prime Minister Lloyd George and Balfour became convinced that
114 NARA. free Copyright. Jerusalem 1920.
115 J. McTague. British Policy in Palestine 1917-1922, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1983): 
54.
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11time had come to establish a civil administration. This section will show how 
the relevance of these particular events has been generally underestimated in the 
academic literature. I will discuss the role of Arab Nationalists, Zionists in order 
to show that eventually the riots proved to be the decisive event which triggered 
the dismissal of the military administration.
6.3.1 The historiographical debate
The Nebi Musa riots have not attracted much academic attention. 
Historians have considered these events of secondary importance mostly 
overshadowed by the clashes between Arabs and Jews like the Wailing Wall riots 
in 1929 or the revolts of 1936-1939. Since the Nebi Musa riots occurred right 
before the establishment of a civil administration in Palestine the interest of the 
scholars waned. In fact scholars have failed to grasp first, the catalysing dynamic 
of the riots in the change of the administration and secondly in the structure of 
the riot signs of a patterned and organised conflict. Generally speaking this event 
has been interpreted as the manifestation of political and also social tensions 
between the Arabs and the Zionists. The literature available covers this event 
briefly, highlighting the emergence of two clear opposing sides, Jews and Arabs, 
and also discusses the role played by the military administration mainly in 
relation to Zionism. Bernard Wasserstein in fact emphasises the deteriorating 
relations between the military administration and the Zionist Commission 
underlying the apparent anti-Zionism of the members of the military 
administration. Wasserstein, therefore, understands the riot more in terms of
116 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 71.
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outcomes, as they produce the catalysing effect to change the nature of the
administration from military to civil.117
Rashid Khalidi and Yehoshua Porath discuss the Nebi Musa riots as part
of the process in the creation of a Palestinian identity but they have not dedicated
118more than a couple of pages to the analysis of the event. Tom Segev has also 
written on the riots, however, he fails to place these riots into a larger historical 
context. He has also fallen into the trap of discussing the contingencies that 
triggered the riots, looking for those responsible for the incidents rather than 
looking for the historical roots which led to this event.119 Segev stresses that 
eventually the replacement of the military administration with a civil one, was 
indeed an achievement of Chaim Weizmann who managed to exploit the riots in
1 90favour of the Zionist cause. Benny Morris also highlights British 
responsibilities but he suggests the possibility of the involvement of an undefined 
Damascus based Arab nationalist group.121 Both Segev and Morns come to the 
conclusion that this clash was a pogrom, a persecution directed against the Jews. 
Radically different is the view of Ilan Pappe who claims that it is not actually 
necessary to look at the riots as a marking point indicating the beginning of the 
Arab-Jewish conflict. He suggests that the Nebi Musa riots were part of a larger 
ideological battle between two emerging nationalist ideologies.122
117 Ibid, 58-72.
118 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity; Porath, The Emergence.
119 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 127-144,
120 Ibid, 141.
121 B. Morris, Righteous Victims, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 96.
122 Pappe, A History o f  Modern Palestine.
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A completely different perspective emerges form the account by the 
Jewish scholar Yehuda Benari in 1975.123 Benari first clearly defines the riots as 
a pogrom against the Jewish population of Jerusalem, secondly he accuses the 
British Military administration as having sole responsibility for the “pogrom”. 
Benari defines the military officers as anti-Semites and also scared of the Jews as 
rumours from Russia depicted the Jews as promoters of the Communist 
revolution. He also claims that the head of the military administration kept secret 
meetings with the Arab leaders to the extent they assisted them to fight the 
Zionists.124 Nevertheless Benari fails to provide convincing evidence for his 
arguments.
6.3.2 Nebi Musa: the context
Nebi Musa was an Islamic religious festival which included processions 
from different towns (the most important and numerous from Hebron) around 
Jerusalem leading to the city and celebrating the prophet Moses during the same 
period as the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover. The central celebration is 
the long pilgrimage walk to the traditional burial site o f Moses along the Jericho 
road from Jerusalem.125 Celebrations lasted a week. According to a local tradition 
this festival was established by Salah al-Din in the 12th century, to 
counterbalance the presence of Christians and Jews flocking to Jerusalem for the 
Easter celebrations.126 Though it is not certain when the festival was first 
celebrated as I will argue later the Nebi Musa festival was never a fully religious
123 Y, Benari, El Pogrom de Jerusalem en el Aho 1920, (Buenos Aires: Congreso Judio Latinoamericano,
1975).
124 Ibid, 3-20.
125 Idinopulos, Weathered by Miracles, 166; Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 127.
126 Porath, The Emergence, 6 ; Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine a Study o f  Jewish, Arab and 
British Policies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 132.
270
event. This celebration served as an opportunity for the Muslim political and 
religious leaders to demonstrate their power vis-a-vis the Christian and Jewish 
communities. The celebrations had the power to create a bond between the 
various parts of country, normally divided and with poor communications, 
gathered because of the festival in a single place.127 The Nebi Musa procession 
was indeed an important event for the Muslim and Christian Arabs in order to 
show their feelings and to gather large attention in the eyes of the numerous 
foreigner, residents of Jerusalem. Leaders of the Arab political parties and 
associations exploited the excitement and enthusiasm of the festival in order to
1 o p
make sure their petitions would be heard. The emerging nationalist sentiments 
in relation to the Nebi Musa riots will be discussed below as part of the analysis 
of the April events.
6.4 Nebi Musa riots: the development
The discussion and assessment of the Nebi Musa riots will be argued 
through some of the defining criteria for a “riot” as discussed in the political and 
anthropological academic literature. Generally a riot is understood as an intense 
and sudden, though not necessarily unplanned, attack between the members of 
two or more communities.129 A riot has been considered a patterned event as
* 130opposed to a spontaneous outbreak of violence. It has been noted that before 
most riotous events it is possible to perceive a particular kind of “atmosphere”
127 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 41-42; Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 64.
128 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 129-130.
129 S.J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds, (London: University o f California Press, 1996), 213-220; D.L. 
Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9-28; P. Van der Veer, 
“Riots and Rituals: The Construction o f Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism,” in Riots and 
Pogroms, ed. P.R. Brass, 154-159 (New York: New York University Press, 1996); D. Veer Mehta, 
Sociolog}> o f  Communal Violence, (New Delhi: Amnol Publications, 1998), 1-12.
130 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 6-1 and p. 227-229.
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1 o  1
which corresponds to a particular socio-political context. In the case of the 
Nebi Musa riots before the explosion of violence two political parties and one 
paramilitary organisation emerged opposing each other. As we saw in Chapter 4 
which deals with the Christian institution in Jerusalem, Arab Muslim-Christian 
associations emerged from 1918 in support, first with the incorporation of
Palestine into Syria and secondly, these associations flooded the British
1 ^2authorities with anti-Zionist petitions aimed to stop Jewish immigration. In 
March 1920 the Syrian Congress declared Faysal king of Syria and Palestine; 
Arabs who had hoped to be incorporated into his kingdom fuelled large 
nationalist demonstrations in Jerusalem which also took an anti-Zionism 
nature.133 At the very same time on the Jewish side, a leading Zionist, Vladimir 
Jabotinsky started to recruit people in order to form a paramilitary Jewish self 
defence organisation, then known as Haganah, composed of some 200 troops. 
Sources available point out that it is likely that by the end of March there were 
600 men performing military drills on daily basis.134
At the beginning of 1920 the political context in Palestine was becoming 
complex and in Jerusalem the Zionist Commission felt that they were the victims 
of the British military administration.135 Weizmann wrote in late March 1920:
“Many intelligent Arabs hate us because they genuinely believe we are tools 
of the English, who have come in now to grab the whole o f the Near East. I shall go 
further and say that if  not for the English, who are at present taking great care that we
131 Ibid, 89-94. Horowitz calls “The Lull” a particular atmosphere before the riot; Brass, Riots and 
Pogroms, 8-9.
132 Pappe, A Histoiy o f  Modern Palestine, 82.
133 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 60.
134 Ibid, 63; Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 195.
135 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 85-101; Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 34-57.
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should not get into direct touch with the Arabs, we could comparatively easily make 
friends with the Arabs. ” 136
However the Zionists were quite scared of Faysal and the possible 
consequences of his attempt to gain control of Syria. Zionists felt that in front of 
Arab pressure the Balfour Declaration could be eluded and eventually the 
establishment of a “National Home” delayed if not forgotten; on the other hand 
Arab elites were scared of the strong Jewish immigration coming into the country 
that could lead to the eventual dispossession of Arab properties and lands.137 
Arab elites were also afraid of the Zionist Commission as it was seen as a 
government within the government as mentioned earlier in relation to the military 
British administration and a sign of the will to establish a Jewish State. Once the 
effects of the Balfour Declaration began to be clear and intelligible in 1920 to the 
Arab elites and population the attitude towards the Jews radically changed 
assuming a more confrontational tone.138 According to Rashid Khalidi a local
Arab Palestinian identity was already developing during the late Ottoman rule as
1 ^ 0shown by the publication of the paper al-Filastin. This paper, whose name
clearly shows the emergence of a local sentiment, became the strongest opponent 
of Zionism but also the voice of the Arab Orthodox who were attempting to free 
themselves from the domination of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy.140 It is 
apparent therefore that a local patriotism was already on the scene and that
136 Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in Riots in 
Jerusalem, San Remo Conference, ed. I. Friedman, 2 (London: Garland, 1987).
137 Shepherd, Ploughing Sand, 38-40; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the 
Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920; Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 47; 
Khalidi, Palestinian Identity; TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Director o f the Arab Club (Mohammed Derweesh) 
to Allenby, Jerusalem April 1920.
138 TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Director of the Arab Club (Mohammed Derweesh) to Allenby, Jerusalem 
April 1920: “We declare that we cannot accept the Jews in our Country. [...] We declare that we do not 
accept the Jews neither as guests nor as neighbours in Palestine.”
139 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 126.
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Zionism acted as catalyser for the development of this local sentiment into a 
larger ideological milieu.
Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Commission in Palestine, 
in late March 1920 wrote to the Zionist Commission in London:
“Relations between the Jews and the Administration have gone from bad to 
worse. [...] In view o f possible outbreaks o f hostility against us, the Military 
Authorities have found it necessary to take measures, but the order which has been 
issued to the troops is in my opinion almost a direct provocation not to do anything in 
case outbreaks do take place. ” 141
Weizmann, according to his own definition, was actually predicting a pogrom. 
Zionists were quite concerned at the benevolent treatment that the military 
administration reserved for Arab nationalists as in the case of the limited British 
military intervention after the Arab nationalist demonstration in March 1920.142 
After these' demonstrations and with the Nebi Musa festival approaching a 
delegation of the Jewish Self-Defence Force asked Storrs for the right to carry 
weapons during the festival in order to protect the Jewish population of 
Jerusalem; Storrs rejected the request on the basis that: “every precaution will be 
[...] taken by the Authorities to ensure public security.”143
Colonel Meinertzhagen, the Chief political officer of the Military 
Administration and a open Zionist supporter, wrote to Lord Curzon (the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) expressing his concern: “Though I do not anticipate any
immediate trouble in Palestine, there is always the risk of isolated cases of Jews
being killed, of reprisal by the Jews, or o f extensive Arab raids along the 
Palestine border.”144 The “atmosphere” depicted was indeed not idyllic. Vladimir
141 Letters and Papers o f Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann to Zionist Executive, 25 March 1920, in Riots in 
Jerusalem, San Remo Conference, ed. I. Friedman, 2 (London: Garland, 1987).
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143 CZA, Z4/16078/66, Storrs to Jewish Self-Defence League, 31 March 1920.
144 TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Meinertzhagen to Curzon, Cairo, 31March 1920.
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Jabotinsky on the other hand wrote to Weizmann on 12 March predicting that a 
pogrom would be liable to break out any day.145 Considering the tone of a letter 
from the Arab Club, a Muslim-Christian society, to Allenby it is possible to see 
how early signs of a riot were quite visible: “We declare that we cannot accept 
the Jews in our country. Should they be permitted to do what they intend doing, 
we shall fight against them till death.” 146 Nevertheless there were those who 
thought differently particularly Ronald Storrs who, having prohibited the 
carrying of weapons by the Jewish Self-Defence Force wrote to Allenby 
suggesting that so far as he could gather, information from preliminary signs and 
reports, showed that tensions were no greater than the previous year and that he 
thought nothing serious would happened.147 The question is therefore, was this 
lack of judgment or premeditated negligence?
6.4.1 The Riots and their causalities
The causalities differ from the causes of a riot as the causality of the event 
may be triggered by single episodes which cannot explain alone the cause for the 
explosion of violence.148 The causality is generally not self explanatory, meaning 
the causalities cannot alone explain the reasons for the outbreak of violence as in 
the case o f the Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem. On Friday 2 April the first 
ceremony of the Nebi Musa festival passed without incident and it seems the 
small police force dealing with the procession was successful.149 On Sunday 4
145 Quoted in Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 131.
146 TNA: PRO FO 371/5034, Mohammed Derweesh (Director of the Arab Club) to Allenby, Jerusalem, 
April 1920.
147 PC, The Paper of Sir Ronald Storrs, Reel 7, Box III, Storrs to Samuel, Jerusalem 18 August 1920.
148 See a list o f proximate causes of communal rioting in D. Veer Mehta, Sociology) o f Communal 
Violence, 2-4.
149 N. Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917-1925, (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 58.
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April, the day of the main pilgrimage from the shrine of the prophet Moses to 
Jerusalem, the procession stopped on the Jaffa road just opposite the Jaffa gate 
and notables and religious leaders started to deliver strong and vivacious political 
speeches, contrary to the usual protocol.150 Among the people that proclaimed 
speeches, two are worthy of report. Aref al-Aref the editor of the popular 
nationalist newspaper published since 1919, al-Suriyya al-Janubiyya (The 
Southern Syria), declared: “If we don’t use force against the Jews, we will never 
be rid of them” and then the crowd chanted “Nashrab dam al Yahud” (We will
1 c 1
drink the blood of the Jews). Also the mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husayni spoke 
from a balcony whilst the crowd after his speech roared: “Palestine is our land, 
the Jews are our dogs!” Pictures of Faysal were also displayed and he was 
greeted as King of Syria and Palestine. 152 As shown in the picture above flags 
and banner supporting Faysal were also displayed
At this point the riot began just inside Jaffa gate. Although it is not clear 
what was the exact incident that triggered the riot it is arguable according to the 
sources available that there was more than one. In the vicinity of the Arab rally 
some Zionists were listening to the speeches. Some evidence suggests that these 
Jewish spectators were quite provocative. Allegedly a Jew had pushed an Arab 
carrying a nationalist flag similar to the one used by Faysal in Syria, and he tried 
to spit on the banner and on the Arab crowd.154 Another accident reported as the
150 TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, 
Jerusalem April 1920.
151 Morris, Righteous Victims, 95.
152 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 128; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report o f the Court of Enquiry into 
the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, Jerusalem, April 1920.
153 TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report o f the Court o f Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, 
Jerusalem, April 1920.
154 Abcarius, Palestine Through the Fog o f Propaganda, 67; TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report o f the 
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trigger of the riot suggests that a Muslim pilgrim was attacked by a Jewish 
soldier.155
Shops were looted and spectators were beaten with stones.156 Some Jews 
involved carried weapons, as in the case of two old Jews that fired from a house 
which overlooked the procession route. Both were then shot by the British-Indian 
police deployed by Storrs.157 The incidents started at 10 am and it was practically 
over by midday. During the night everything appeared to be quiet. Early on 
Monday morning the pilgrims from Hebron, who had been confined for the night 
in the Police barracks, were escorted out of the city through St. Stephen’s gate. 
Disorders broke out again early in the morning and lasted until 3 pm when 
martial law was declared.158 The following day, Tuesday, the looting and 
violence continued but at a lower scale. A number of Jews entered the city 
through the Arab quarter where they had been accommodated in a synagogue. 
Two cases of rape against Jewish women were reported. By the evening the 
situation was under control.159 The reported casualties amounted to 251, of which 
9 died and 22 were critically wounded. 5 Jews and 4 Muslims had been killed; 
the great difference is in the number of wounded: 211 Jews reported wounded as 
opposed to 21 Muslims and 3 Christians. 7 British soldiers were also wounded, 
however it appears that the police were never the target of the attackers whether 
Arabs or Jews.160
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6.4.2 Analysis o f  the Riots
In this section I will discuss the riots from the perspective of victims, 
“specialists’5, third party and pogrom in order to define the nature of the Nebi 
Musa riots.
A criterion defining a riot is in relation to targets or victims of the riot 
itself.161 The term target has been used by those who see riotous crowds as 
organised and motivated, acting purposefully rather than randomly. The term 
victims, on the other hand, has been used by those who see crowds as chaotic, 
disorganised, leaderless and aimlessly. However, riots involve both targets and 
victims. When in a fight the people involved define the casualties of the struggle 
itself as targets, it generally means that one or more groups acted as structured 
entities. These groups can also possess a strong identification in particular values, 
in fact their attack is not random but directed towards a specific objective. If  the 
casualties of incidents, on the other hand, are defined as victims, it is arguable 
that the actors did not belong to any organised structure and they are moved more 
by passion rather than a clear purpose. Victims define turmoil, whilst casualties 
to an extent are defined as targets, the latter define a riot.163
The term “victims” also bears a secondary meaning, quite problematic, 
when used by one side to describe their own casualties, for then the “victims” 
may have been “assailants”. 164 This second meaning is crucial in the 
interpretation and analyses of the events as it may indicate which side has been 
taken by the people involved or the scholars studying the event. Besides
' 161 Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 21-26; Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 124-128.
162 Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 21.
163 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riots, 1.
164 Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 25.
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“victims” and “targets” in a riotous event we may have “innocent” casualties: 
when a passer by, mere onlookers or simply people stacked in the crowd, are 
injured or even killed. Nonetheless “innocent” may also be problematic as one 
side may define its own casualties as “innocent”;1651 would suggest that the term 
“neutral” casualties be used as these particular players did not take any side in 
the riot.
The structural development of the riots and the dynamics discussed 
suggest that it is indeed more accurate to use the definition of “target” rather than 
“victims”. The riots saw two competing nationalist aspirations, Arab and Zionist, 
with a strong national and religious identity following rational and specific 
political purposes: to promote Arab nationalism and the opposition to Zionism 
and on the other hand the creation of a Jewish national home that in Zionist 
ideology meant the creation of a Jewish state. Both crowds were not leaderless 
and looked organised. Arabs were led by notable and nationalist leaders whilst 
Zionists were led by Jabotinsky as leader of the Haganah who took part directly 
in the fight; he was then arrested and charged for illegal possession of weapons 
and sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment, the sentence was eventually 
revoked in 1920.166 Though in their own statements Arabs and Zionists described 
the casualties as “victims”, they had been targets of a planned conflict by both 
sides. The Zionist Commission defined the Jewish casualties of the riots as 
victims of a pogrom.167 In contrast, the Muslim-Christian Society writing to 
Storrs in the aftermath of the riots accused the Jews of disturbing the peace of
165 Ibid, 23.
166 Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 137-138; 143-144.
167 CZA, Z4/16084, Zionist Commission Memorandum, Jerusalem 11 April 1920. A later statement of the 
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Jerusalem which led to the “massacre of a number of innocent Muslims and 
Christians.”168 Systematically Arabs looted Jewish shops, whilst Jews fired, with 
illegally possessed guns, upon Arabs. The difference in the number of casualties 
may be explained by the number of Arabs in the city. On an average day the Jews 
were the majority in Jerusalem but the number of Muslims in the city soared in 
connection with the celebrations.169
Eventually the two crowds were composed of committed people interested 
in fighting for their own cause; however among the casualties we may count 
some “innocents” that is persons not involved in the incidents, as explained 
earlier, and with no interests in the actual fight. These “innocents” casualties 
were a few Orthodox Jews not politically interested in the fighting as they did not 
indeed support Zionism and they looked suspiciously at the newly Muslim- 
Christian alliance. In the development of the riots it is not clear the circumstances 
these people had been involved and as in the case of a Muslim girl who
1 nf\
apparently fell victim to random shooting.
In the analysis of the riots we may look at two particular external criteria 
in relation to the development of the riotous events between two communities, A 
riot may be defined in accordance to the presence of “specialists” that is a 
particular category composed of people who are ready to be called out on riotous 
occasions, who profit from it, and whose activities profit others who may or may 
not be actually paying for the violence carried out like mercenaries.171 Some 
“specialists” are sometimes employed in order to escalate the nature of a fight
168 TNA: PRO FO 371/5114, Muslim-Christian Society to Storrs, Jerusalem April 1920.
169 For population figures see Ch 2.
170 TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court of Enquiiy into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, 
Jerusalem, April 1920.
171 Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 12-13.
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from initial incident to more serious riots. Among the “specialists” we may also 
have journalists and pamphleteers who deliberately spread rumours and 
propaganda against a particular group.172 The second external criterion to be 
discussed in defining the Nebi Musa riots is the “third party”. Between two 
fighting parties we may have a third side that should be neutral and may possibly 
grant order and safety. Nevertheless, the third party may decide to support one of 
the sides involved in order to protect its own interests; the support to one of the 
side is generally secret and it may, although not exclusively, consist of financial 
or technological support. A third party may also be interested in supporting all 
the fighting sides as following the classical principle of divide et impera. 
Academic literature tends to consider the “third party” as the intervention of the 
State or public institutions.173
In relation to the presence of specialists according to the reports available 
it is arguable that amongst the Arabs gathered outside Jaffa gate there were agent 
provocateurs, likely to have belonged to some associations with the purpose of 
ensuring that the inflammatory speeches would be followed by direct action.174 
However considering the already present high tension between the parties and 
simply the lack of evidence concerning agent provocateurs, I would argue these 
agents did not play a decisive role in the riots. In relation to the Jewish side no 
evidence has been found to support the idea of the presence of specialists 
amongst the Zionists.
172 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 74-75.
173 Ibid, 231-252; Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 26-32.
174 TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report of the Court o f Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, 
Jerusalem, April 1920.
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Moving to the question of the third party it is necessary to underline that 
this is the most complex issue in the analyses of the Nebi Musa riots. There are a 
number of questions that should be addressed. What role did the British military 
administration play? Did they support one of the sides involved or did they try to 
simply restore order as quickly as possible? Were there any divisions among the 
British military officers?
From the reports available in late April and from the Commission of 
Inquiry established by the High Commissioner of Egypt and Commander in 
Chief Allenby in April 1920, we understand that Storrs seems to have ignored
i n c
early warnings of impending troubles. The local Police Force had been 
accused by Zionists of being inadequate and with a clear Arab majority. Storrs 
deployed only a fraction of the force available in the old city at the beginning of 
the Nebi Musa festival as he did not consider more troops were necessary to keep 
order.177 On Friday, the day before the outbreak, the ceremony passed without 
incident as mentioned earlier; this led Storrs to think, or at least to claim, that the 
small local police force, composed mainly of Arabs, could cope with the main 
procession. After the first day of riots Storrs decided to withdraw the main bulk 
of the troops from the Old City in order to enable business to proceed as usual. 
Storrs believed that showing that normality was restored could prevent more 
violence breaking out. Eventually the Court of Inquiry stated that the “removal of
17Rthe inner pickets proved to be a very serious error in judgement.” The report of
175 Ibid: “[...] Colonel Stores inclines to consider the actual danger at the Nebi Musa Festival itself was 
greater in the preceding year. The majority of witnesses are not of his opinion.”
176 TNA: PRO FO 371/5117, Landman (Secretary of the Zionist Organisation) to the Under Secretary of 
State for the Foreign Affairs, London, 16 April 1920.
177 TNA: PRO WO 32/9614, Report o f the Court o f Enquiry into the Riots in Jerusalem During Last April, 
Jerusalem, April 1920.
178 Ibid.
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the Court of Enquiry on one hand did not claim that the Military Administrators 
favoured one side, and on the other hand showed that the military administration 
was indeed divided, with one side, the majority, being pro Arab and the other 
side, the minority, being pro Zionist. The prime minister’s secretary, Philip Kerr, 
wrote to the Foreign Office asking for more details in relation to the alleged anti- 
Zionist attitude of members of the military administration.179 Indeed the matter 
was no longer self contained in Palestine and it was becoming an issue which 
required the attention of the Prime Minister.
The political officer Col. Meinertzhagen openly claimed that the 
Administration was warned of pending troubles in Jerusalem and that the military 
took inadequate steps to prevent it and failed to keep order in the city when 
trouble arose. Meinertzhagen was shocked when he found out that officers of the 
British Administration were actively implicated and plotting against their own 
government. He warned both Allenby and Bols (the chief administrator) but 
according to him they preferred silence to exposure. 180 As evidence 
Meinertzhagen stated that on the day of rioting a notice was displayed all over 
Jerusalem: “The Government is with us, Allenby is with us kill the Jews; there is 
no punishment for killing Jews.”181 Looking at the developments of the events it 
is quite difficult not' to think that Meinertzhagen was right; however the lack of 
more substantial evidence leads us to think that the Military Administration was 
likely to have been anti-Zionist, but far from supporting an open conflict.182
179 TNA: PRO FO 371/5119, P. Kerr to Foreign Office, London, 19 May 1920.
180 R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diaiy, (London: Cresset Press, 1959), 79-84.
181 Ibid.
182 See for instance TNA: PRO FO 371/5119, Philip Kerr to Campbell (FO), 29 May 1920: “[...]The 
existing administration is taking no effective steps to prevent such an outbreak, but that if they did take a 
few firm steps and made it perfectly clear to the Arab leaders that they would suffer severely... .if.”
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The last issue I shall discuss is the Jewish definition of the riots as a 
pogrom. Pogrom is a Russian word that defines an organised massacre; in the
tli *English speaking world since the beginning of the 20 century the definition of 
pogrom has been chiefly applied to those who organised slaughter directed 
against the Jew s.183 Furthermore the term pogrom also connotes collusion 
between the official power and one of the sides involved in the struggle.184 I 
would argue that a pogrom is mainly a subcategory of the riot, since this 
definition has eventually ended up defining only attacks on Jews.185
Zionists did not hesitate to define the Nebi Musa riots as a pogrom.
1 RAMeinertzhagen also considered these events as a miniature pogrom. According 
to a narrow definition of pogrom as an attack against persons and properties of 
particular group, the April riots were indeed a pogrom; Arabs as a distinctive 
ethnic group fought against the Zionist which represented another distinct ethnic 
and religious group. However if one considers the pogrom as a riot with the 
participation of the state and/or its agents, the question becomes more complex. 
As argued earlier there is evidence suggesting that the military administration 
was at odds with the Zionists; the military felt uncomfortable with the presence 
of the Zionist Commission and also some of the officials were openly anti Semite. 
Nevertheless to state that the British were actively involved in the Nebi Musa 
riots is to jump to an uncritical conclusion. The Jewish Chronicle, the popular
183 Brass, Riots and Pogroms, 33.
184 Ibid.
185 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 20.
186 Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diaiy, 79-84.
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Jewish paper published in London, was hesitant to believe in a British manoeuvre 
against the Zionists.187
6.5 Some conclusions on Military Adminisfration and Nebi Musa riots
In this chapter I have discussed four main themes. In terms of the 
continuities and ruptures with the Ottoman administration, British rule proved to 
rely to a great extent on the existent political and social structures and institutions. 
Although Ottoman administrative councils were dissolved the municipality was 
maintained as a bridge between the British and the local population. The 
administrative changes implemented were limited by the convention ruling the 
status of military occupied territories known as the status quo ante bellum. The 
political and institutional picture of the Military Administration is a complex one. 
On one hand, bounded by the policy of the status quo the military was not fully 
operational. This favoured the Foreign Office in London which gained some time 
in order to plan the future of Palestine and Jerusalem. The attempt of the Foreign 
Office to control the military machine and administration failed to the extent that 
the majority of the military officers employed in Jerusalem proved to possess 
prejudices against the Jews, which was contrary to the main policy making 
favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine as illustrated 
by the Balfour Declaration. The Chief Political Office Colonel Meinertzhagen, 
the only top official being openly pro-Zionist, had enough evidence when after 
the Nebi Musa riots he wrote to Allenby accusing the officers of the 
Administration, almost without exception of being anti-Zionist.188 This anti-
187 The Jewish Chronicle (London), April 16, 1920.
188 TNA: PRO FO 372/85, Meinertzhagen to Allenby, Jerusalem 14 April 1920.
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Zionism had several roots but was certainly fuelled by the presence of the Zionist 
Commission which was seen as an alien institution in competition with the 
Military Administration and contrary to the customs laid down in the military 
manual of war. In fact the establishment of the Zionist Commission was indeed a 
breach of the status quo.
Secondly, the relationship between the military administration and the 
local elites composed of the notables suggest that the military establishment 
regarded the landowning class as the natural intermediary and pursued a careful 
politics of notables as suggested by Wasserstein.189
The second part of the chapter dealt with the case study of the Nebi Musa 
riots that took place early in April 1920. The dynamics of this riot show how the 
military administration dealt with the riots which was indeed a representation of 
the emerging Arab-Jewish conflict. The military apparatus allowed the 
demonstrations to take place and they adopted a sort of “wait and see” policy. 
Only when incidents became evident and unstoppable did the military intervene 
in order to bring to a halt the riots. The apparent British failure to prevent and to 
deal with the riots has shown the political limits of the military administration 
which proved to be openly anti-Zionist and supportive of the Arab cause. The 
military was clearly distant from the Foreign Office which was indeed supportive 
of the Zionist cause. The riots took place a few weeks before the San Remo 
Conference which sanctioned the allocation of the mandates for the 
administration of the former Ottoman Arab lands. The riots became a strong 
argument for the Foreign Office in order to speed up the process of transfer from 
a military to a civil administration in Palestine. This shift is not only a cosmetic
189 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine, 15.
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change, in fact it represents the primacy of politics over military decisions; 
besides it represented the reallocation of political values, the Military rule 
represented anti-Zionism and the civil administration was to represent pro- 
Zionism. Despite the fact that the British had not yet signed the peace treaty with 
Turkey, signed only at Lausanne in 1923, they decided to dissolve the O.E.T.A. 
and to establish a civil administration though it was contrary to the customs of 
the status quo ante helium. It is therefore arguable that the Nebi Musa riots 
catalysed and accelerated the process of change from military to civilian 
administration which reflected the re-establishment of the main political aims of 
the British in Palestine and a victory for the Zionists. We may also view this as a 
double victory for the Zionists and in particular for the Zionist Commission. In 
fact as first High Commissioner for Palestine the British Government appointed 
Herbert Samuel, a capable officer but also a secular Jew strongly in favour of 
Zionism.
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Conclusion
What is Jerusalem? The umbilicus mundi for Christians, the “mountain of 
the Lord” for Jews and the original qibla for Muslims. Whilst it is difficult to 
define the political, religious and historical meaning of the city, Jerusalem has 
proved to be a contested city in history, an urban space which according to the 
three religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, is the gate-way to the divine 
world. This very nature has made the city the subject of various conflicts for its 
political and religious control. It is because of the religious value of Jerusalem 
that when the British took over in 1917, religion and politics went hand in hand 
as it has been argued in Chapter Three. In this respect Abigail Jacobson rightly 
argues, that the British attempted to underplay the religious symbolism of the 
occupation as in the case of the restrictions on publication of articles concerning 
the crusades.1 However this event was exploited in terms of internal propaganda 
in order to boost the morale of a nation heavily involved in the war effort. This 
study has shown that religious symbolism did play a crucial role in London.
This thesis has developed three main areas of investigation in order to fill 
major gaps in the existing literature on the history of Jerusalem at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Firstly by making use of the historiographical approach 
known as microhistory, it has investigated and highlighted particular political and 
religious aspects of the history of Jerusalem. I have focused on the transitional 
period from Ottoman to British rule between 1914 and 1920 which has been 
understudied and whose importance for our overall understanding of the late 
Ottoman and mandatory histories of the city has been underestimated. This 
transitional period has often been dismissed by non-academics merely as the end
1 Jacobson, “From Empire to Empire,” 293.
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of the “evil Turkish rule” whilst some scholars like Martin Gilbert have stressed 
the re-establishment of a Christian rulership over the city ending eight centuries 
of Muslim rule. Focusing on the microhistorical approach, it has been shown that 
the transitional period was more than a simple change in administrative patterns, 
it also represents complex continuities. In addition it was a redefinition of 
ideologies (Arab Nationalism vs. Zionism) and identities (Arab and 
Jewish/Zionist). Political values deriving from those changes have been also 
redefined, in fact Zionists often portrayed themselves as the natural carriers of 
modernity and western values in Palestine, in opposition to the traditionalist 
block represented in Jerusalem by local Arabs and Jews settled in Jerusalem. On 
the other hand, the once divided Arabs turned discussions regarding nationalism 
and Zionism into political action as represented by the creation of the Christian- 
Muslim associations which became the first representation of political struggle 
against Zionism.
A second theme discussed in the thesis is the administrative, political and 
religious changes which occurred in Jerusalem following the British occupation 
of the city in 1917. The administrative transformations brought about by the 
British, and the problematic question of the status quo ante bellum - which 
according to part of the military administration and the non-Jewish population of 
the city was violated with the Balfour Declaration and the promise of a national 
home to the Zionists - reshaped the political and demographic structure of the 
city. Though demographically the Jews were the majority in the city during the 
late Ottoman administration, they did not possess any political power which was 
exercised exclusively by Muslim and Christian Arabs as suggested by the
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composition of the local administrative councils. The arrival of the British and 
establishment of the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem meant that the Jews were 
now ready to enter the local political arena and to exploit politically their 
demographic superiority and the promises made by the British government in the 
form of the Balfour Declaration.
In administrative terms the military nature of the British rule did not 
constitute a radical rupture with the previous state of affairs. In fact during the 
war the city was led by a military Turkish governor who ruled on a personal basis, 
in accordance with war time commitments and with the local notables. Similarly 
the British administration of the city was led by the appointed Ronald Storrs, 
who as military governor o f Jerusalem used a more consistently personal 
approach. This manifested itself thorough the enforcement o f decrees which 
reflected his personal tastes as in the case of the arts and architecture, in order to 
rule the city. Storrs had in mind a Jerusalem which should have been British and 
looking at the Biblical past with the result of alienating both Arabs and Zionists, 
but also those British who disagreed with the main British policy making.
As mentioned earlier the British occupation changed the political balance 
amongst the population of Jerusalem in favour of the Zionists. Arabs, Christians 
and Muslims became united against the new common enemy represented by 
Zionism as shown for instance by the establishment of the Christian-Muslim 
associations. The greatest change in the political balance of the city after the 
British occupation was represented by the establishment o f the Zionist 
Commission which became a parallel and the competitor institution to the British 
military administration. Eventually, the competition between the two
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administrative institutions came into open conflict through direct criticism of one 
another as suggested by the frequent exchange of letters and administrative 
obstructionism enforced by the British military. After the Nebi Musa riots in 
April 1920, this conflict was ended by the Foreign Office in favour of the wishes 
of the Zionist Commission with the establishment of a civil administration in 
July of the same year which, ended more than two years of British military rule.
Thirdly, urban life and the relationship between the city and its foreigner 
population - variously defined as consuls, private citizens, religious authorities, 
pilgrims and institutions -  has also been investigated. The presence of foreigners 
in the city under Ottoman administration - as often in urban areas of the Arab 
Middle East - was crucial for the modernisation of the city in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Jerusalem acquired new hospitals and schools but also 
lighting and a new railway connection to Jaffa built with foreign capital. It was 
also a crucial factor for the income of the Ottoman administration as well as of 
the religious institutions that benefited from the visitors, mainly pilgrims from all 
over the world, to the Holy City. Foreign presence during the period of the 
transition from Ottoman to British rule was mainly represented by a few 
diplomats, religious clergy and members of the American Colony who carried 
out mainly relief work supporting the inhabitants of Jerusalem, who were 
suffering from the disruptions caused by the war. The British occupation, to a 
degree, reshaped the role of the foreigners in the city. Pilgrims began to flock and 
tourists increased as a consequence of a larger selection of tourist facilities and 
services. Consuls and businessmen returned to the Holy City with new interests 
and new commercial activities. Religious institutions galvanised by a potential
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freedom never experienced under Ottoman rule restarted their promotion of 
political, religious and economic interests competing against each other and 
bidding the British administrators. Zionists, after the break caused by the war, 
resumed their multiple activities in order to change their status from foreigners to 
locals. Zionists of different nationalities aspired to acquire legal local residence 
in Jerusalem and Palestine by lobbying the British, acquiring land from Arabs 
and promoting their world-wide project to re-establish the Jews in Palestine. 
Jerusalem was not the focus of the Zionists as the city was the symbol of the old 
Jewish population. For the British, Jerusalem was the natural capital of the region, 
the Zionists as a result were forced to establish the Zionist Commission in the 
same city. The result of which was that Jerusalem became the primary scene of 
the Arab-Zionist struggle as suggested by the Nebi Musa riots and the following 
incidents, of 1929.
In the discussion of the foreign presence in Jerusalem I have particularly 
focused on two key figures: the Spanish consul Conde de Ballobar who never left 
the city during the war period, and the American consul Otis Glazebrook, who 
only left Jerusalem in 1917 when the United States joined the war. If  on one hand 
the study of the Spanish consul has shed light on the diplomatic relations still in 
existence in the city during the war and the complex net of relations between the 
different Christian denominations; on the other hand the study of Glazebrook’s 
activities has been crucial in order to understand the complex network of 
charitable organisations supporting the inhabitants of Jerusalem, especially those 
Zionist organisations around the world which supported the Jews of Jerusalem 
and Palestine showing also the beginning of the pro-American position vis-a-vis
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Zionism. Glazebrook proved to be the key character in this operation as the 
financial support coming from America was channelled through him; he was 
eventually in charge of the distribution of aid as shown by the numerous receipts 
preserved in the American archives. It has also been possible to highlight the 
relevant role of American Jewry who became one of the most prominent sources 
of financial support for the Jews and in particular for the Zionists.
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APPENDIX A
American Consuls in Jerusalem1
JW  Gorham 1856- 1860
Willian R Page 1860- 1861
Franklin Olcott 1861 -  1862
Isaac van Etten 1863
Albert Rhodes 1863 -  1865
Victor Beauboucher 1865 -  1870
Richard Beardsley 1870 — 1873
Frank S de Hass 1873 -  1877
JG  Wilson 1877- 1882
Selah Merrill 1882-1885
Nageeb J Arbeely 1885
Henry Gillman 1886-1891
Selah Merrill 1891 -  1893
Edwin S Wallace 1893 -  1898
Selah Merrill 1898- 1907
Thomas R Wallace 1907-1910
William Coffin 1910-1913
Dr. Otis A Glazebrook 1914-1917
1 Lipman, Americans and the Holy Land, 309.
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APPENDIX B
2
British Consuls in Jerusalem
William Tanner Young 1841-1845
James Finn 1845- 1862
Noel Temple Moore 1862-1890
John Dickson 1890- 1906
Edward Charles Blech 1906-1909
Harold Eustace Satow 1909-1912
P J C MacGregor 1912-1914
William Hough 1914
APPENDIX C
German Consuls in Jerusalem
Ernst Gustav Schultz 1842- 1851
Dr. Georg Rosen 1852-1867
Prof. Heinrich Julius Petermann 1868- 1869
Baron Karl von Alten 1869- 1873
Baron Thankmar von Munchausen 1874- 1881
Dr. Julius Reitz 1881 -  1885
Dr. Paul von Tischendorf 1886- 1899
Dr. Friedrich Rosen 1899-1900
Edmund Schmidt 1901-1916
Dr. Johann Wilhelm H Brode 1916-1917
2 Eliav, Britain and the Holy Land.
3 ISA, RG 67, List of German Consuls who served Jerusalem till 1917
APPENDIX D
Late Turkish Governor o f  Jerusalem4
Ali Ekrem Bey 1906- 1908
Subhi Bey 1908- 1909
Nazim Bey 1909- 1910
Azmi Bey 1910-1911
Qevdet Bey 1911-1912
Muhaddi Bey 1912
Tahir Hayreddin Bey 1912-1913
Macid £evdet Bey 1913-1914
Midhat Pa§a 1915
Ahmet Munir Pa§a 1916-1917
Izzet Pa§a 1917
APPENDIX E
British Military Administrators5
Edmund Allenby 1917-1918
Arthur Money 1919-1919
H. Watson (acting) 1919
Louis J. Bols 1919-1920
4 Eliav, Britain and the Holy Land, 411; Kushnev, “The Ottoman Governors o f Palestine 1864-1914, 
277.
5 Wasserstein, The British in Palestine.
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